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Abstract 
. 
 Prevailing theories have failed to take into account the development of policy and 
institutions in microstates that are engineered to attract investments in areas of comparative 
advantage as these small islands confront the challenges of globalization and instead have 
emphasized migration, remittances and foreign aid (MIRAB) as an explanation for the survival 
of microstates in the global economy.   
 This dissertation challenges the MIRAB model as an adequate explanation of investment 
strategy in microstates and argues that comparative advantage is a better theory to explain policy 
behavior of microstates. These small economies can take advantage of their exotic locations and 
natural endowments of sun and sand to develop a robust tourism sector through prudent 
investments and incentives in collaboration with stakeholders in the industry. This case study on 
the Fiji Islands will demonstrate that microstates are capable of developing policy instruments 
that encourage investments, even during periods of deep political crisis, thus underscoring a 
maturation of institutions in small post-colonial societies. 
 The development of the tourism industry in Fiji was neither an ad hoc exercise nor an 
instance of creation ex nihilo, as both government and the private sector recognized over time 
the economic potential of tourism as a conduit for national development. The state collaborated 
in this endeavor by building institutions and supporting investments in hopes of capitalizing on 
the positive spillovers that could occur from a robust tourist industry. This dissertation argues 
that investments undertaken by the Fiji Islands in the tourism sector was a rational strategy to 
fully exploit its comparative advantage through the development of sophisticated institutional 
and organizational structures that emerged to meet the challenges of a complex global industry.  
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Chapter One 
 
Introduction 
 
 MAP: OCEANIA 
 
 
Introduction 
 This dissertation explains investment policy in microstates of Oceania through exploring 
the experience of the Fiji Islands from 1975 to 2010. The study of investment policy in 
microstates fills a gap in the expansive literature on investment policies over the last three 
decades (Diamond and Diamond 2006; OECD 2003; Anthoine 1979) and gives us a lens to 
examine the survival strategies of small island states in the international system. A careful 
enquiry on the Fiji Islands as a typical microstate will demonstrate both the challenges and 
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capabilities of microstates in developing policy instruments to encourage investments even 
through periods of deep political crisis, thus underscoring a maturation of institutions in small 
post-colonial societies.  
(a) From Sugar to Tourism 
 The Fijian economy for the better part of a century was dominated by sugar production 
which began with the early European settlers in the 1860s and developed into an export 
commodity by the colonial government in 1883, lasting through Independence into the 1980s.
1
 
Since then, the production and export of sugar in Fiji has steadily declined due to a pair of 
internal and external reasons which will be explored later in greater detail, such as the intractable 
problems of land tenure and the World Trade Organization (WTO) ruling against sugar 
subsidies. The cessation of leases under ALTA (Agriculture Landlord and Tenant Act) and the 
end of the preferential trade agreement with the European Union in 2005 has forced the State to 
come up with alternative policies to plausibly replace an industry which may not survive without 
life support. The emergence of the tourism sector in Fiji and the eventual eclipse of sugar 
production as the country’s dominant industry refocused the government’s attention away from 
agriculture and towards tourism. This transition from sugar production to a tourism based 
economy in Fiji has not been examined from an institutional and policy perspective and 
challenges the dominant narrative of microstates as institutionally “failed societies.” The Fiji 
Islands like other microstates in Oceania rationally perceived tourism as a natural fit congruent 
with its endowments and developed strategies to exploit its comparative advantage. It has thus 
tied its investment policies with the tourism sector.    
                                                          
1
 See http://www.fsc.com.fj/history_of_sugar_in_fiji.htm for a brief historical timeline. (Accessed September 5 
2011). 
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 This project therefore focuses on the tourism industry in Fiji and seeks an explanation for 
its success and adaptability and examines the role that the state has played in ensuring the current 
dominance of the sector in Fiji. I further look at the evolution of institutions and policies that 
emerged in Fiji as a response to the needs and challenges peculiar to tourism in a small island 
economy and postulate that tourism was a legitimate tool for economic development. The 
tourism industry as a unique and complex undertaking required adept institutions, stakeholder 
relationships, international collaboration and the construction of agencies, incentives, policies, 
domestic support, resources and human capital to become a successful sector. The one notable 
failure examined in greater detail in chapter four was the shift in direct investment by the state 
using public funds to underwrite large tourism development projects in Momi Bay and Natadola, 
resulting in substantial losses. The demands imposed on the industry to expand carrying capacity 
encouraged the state to become a direct partner in tourism development but the failure of these 
projects emphasized rather expensively the importance of the state in building institutions rather 
than resorts. The Fijian example is an ideal case study on how small island states situate 
themselves in the global economy and negotiate through the international system.  
(b) Tourism and Crises 
 The military coup d’état of 1987 in Fiji was a pivotal event in the South Pacific. It was 
the first coup of its kind in Oceania, and it occurred in the most politically and economically 
developed country in Oceania. While a substantial body of work has emerged in the two decades 
since the coup, on the political, cultural, social and ethnic implications of that crisis, and 
diagnosing the causes and consequences of the coup (Howard 1991; Sutherland 1992: Lawson; 
1996;), very little work has emerged on examining its effect on policy, institutions, sectors and 
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agencies,
2
 especially studies that examine the role of domestic political crisis on investment 
policy in general and the tourism sector in particular, Beirman (2003) and King and Berno 
(2002) have come closest in probing this question. Most scholarship has either focused on 
macro-political issues such as constitutions, democracy, elections or normative concerns over 
race, ethnicity, culture (Crocombe, Neemia, Ravuvu Vom Busch 1992) or resource allocations 
such as land and most recently customary fishing rights (Maunders 2007; Cooke and Moce 
1995). These are important and significant issues that continue to occupy scholars and interested 
parties in moving Fiji and other troubled islands beyond the current political stalemate, and a 
study on investment policy hopes to contribute to that end. 
The volatile political situation in Oceania in recent years has understandably received a 
disproportionate amount of scrutiny and scholarly analysis, especially Fiji and the Solomon 
Islands, but serious inquiry about state initiatives and policies have been lacking. Most research 
has focused on political determinants, i.e. the effects of corruption, economic freedom and 
democracy and its relationship with investments, growth and development. I do not eschew the 
importance of these variables, and as studies have indicated, the role these determinants play in 
securing investments, especially FDI. However, an exaggerated emphasis on political 
determinants has overlooked the actual policy instruments developed by the state to enhance 
investments and economic activity in areas of comparative advantage.  
However the unhappy realities of geography, demographics and economics 
characterizing microstates have had deep institutional and political consequences and therefore 
severely restricted their capacity to develop investment strategy as compared to countries with 
                                                          
2
 The work by Yash Ghai (1990) is a notable exception to the general emphasis on political developments, i.e. 
democracy and nation building. 
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robust factor endowments, abundant human capital and sophisticated infrastructure.
3
 
Consequently, the prevailing theory has emphasized migration, remittances and foreign aid 
(MIRAB) as an explanation for the survival of microstates in the global economy.  
This project challenges the MIRAB model as an adequate explanation and instead argues 
that comparative advantage is a better theory to explain policy behavior of microstates. The 
small economies of Oceania have taken advantage of their exotic locations and natural 
endowments of sun and sand to develop a robust tourism sector through prudent investments and 
incentives between the different stakeholders. This dissertation is an examination of how the 
microstates of Oceania, given the many limitations of size and resources, have managed to not 
only survive but occasionally flourish in the international system, contrary to the expectations of 
the MIRAB model. 
Table 1.1: Microstates 
MICROSTATES - OCEANIA 
 POPULATION (2007) GDP (2007-US$) GDP per capita (2007-US$) 
MICRONESIA (FSO) 108,000 235.9M 2,183 
FIJI 869,000 3.3B 3,824 
KIRIBATI 98,000 67M 686 
NAURU 10,745 45Ma 4,522 
NIUE 1,625b 10Mc 6,088c 
MARSHALL ISLANDS 61,815 149.2M 2,851 
SAMOA 189,000 397M 2,101 
SOLOMON ISLANDS 508,000 377M 741 
TONGA 103,000 246M 2,397 
VANUATU 229,000 494M 2,160 
AUSTRALIA 21,200,000 911.0B 43,010 
NEW ZEALAND 4,200,000 128.7B 30,390 
Sources: Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade http://www.dfat.gov.au (accessed November 21, 
2009). 
a 
2005 figures,
 b 
2006 figures,
 c 
2003 figures 
 
                                                          
3
 The story of Singapore as the model of how a small State has become a major player in the global economy is 
often invoked, but as authors Leichter (1983), Grice and Drakakis-Smith (1985), Rowley and Warner (2007) reveal, 
none of the Pacific Islands share Singapore’s policy and human resource management, nor does the State in these 
Islands control the factors of production to the extent that Singapore does. 
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Motivations 
 
 This research project challenges the prevailing theory (MIRAB) which assumes that 
microstates are incapable of structuring investment strategies because they are too weak and 
unstable and subsequently lack the institutional sophistication required of states in creating 
policies amenable for development. Are microstates hapless victims reduced to a mendicant 
status, passively afloat in the wide-open sea as the MIRAB model suggests? Granted that these 
small economies may not have the policy sophistications of larger societies, but does it 
necessarily follow that agencies and sectors are incapable for formulating a coherent investment 
policy? Finally the political scorecard has not been favorable to these small islands, but there are 
no failed states in Oceania or presence of brutal conflicts that are common elsewhere. Even the 
coup d’états in Fiji from 1987-2006 have been benign in nature, executed without a single shot 
fired, minus casualties or bloodletting. Jon Fraenkel (2004) conclusively exposed the limitations 
of comparing the Pacific Islands with the tribulations of Africa, methodologically and 
substantively by positing that natural resources, proxy conflicts during the cold war, deep ethnic 
and linguistic cleavages were the defining characteristics of post-colonial Africa and a significant 
ingredient to its enduring instabilities, none of which could minimally characterize the 
microstates of Oceania. 
 The MIRAB model however inadvertently demonstrates many capabilities of microstates 
that are easily overlooked, i.e. (1) microstates are able to train people with desirable skills that 
are exportable (2) microstates can develop sophisticated bureaucracy to capture aid and 
remittances (3) microstates have enough State and institutional power to bounce back from crisis 
and not descend into anarchy following political upheaval, all of which I argue are quite helpful 
in constructing policy that encourages investment.  
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 The case study on Fiji will show that microstates are capable of developing policy 
instrument to encourage investments, and those agencies and sectors are able to collaborate and 
successfully execute policy. I will also show the impact of crisis on policy, although I make no 
assessment on the virtues and values of democracy nor do I dispute the economic analysis of the 
costs of political crisis. This project simply examines the influence of crisis on policy, how did it 
change? What affect it had on agencies and sectors? A thorough explanation of investment 
policy in microstates will require a close sectoral examination and one sector that is common for 
all the microstates in the region is tourism. Not only has tourism emerged as the most important 
industry among microstates in Oceania (McElroy 2003), but also more importantly serves as a 
hard-case example of the one industry most vulnerable to political crisis and upheaval. 
 The results of this project will have important implications for microstates in Oceania, 
how is investment policy developed in these small economies? What kind of policy instruments 
government’s favor? What sort of influence is exerted by powerful sectors of the economy? How 
capable are agencies in executing policy? What is the effect of political crisis on policy? Were 
governments in microstates prudent in favoring a particular sector? What are the long-term 
consequences of these investment policies? 
Political crisis significantly affects both the ability of the state to develop policy 
instruments and sectors vulnerable to political shocks. However the central puzzle will be to 
determine to what degree if any did investment policy change from before the political crisis and 
after, as well as scrutinize the effect of the crisis on the tourism sector to empirically determine 
the effect of the crisis. The operating hypothesis is that while there were some adjustments to 
policy instruments and sectoral disruptions in the immediate aftermath of the crisis, over the 
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longer term (ten years beyond the initial crisis the government’s decision to continue with its 
investment policy especially in tourism has proven to be prudent and efficacious).  
Paresh Narayan (2005) in a significant article echoes this last hypothesis about the 
transitory effects of political crisis on tourism and argues that government policy calling for 
greater investment in the sector is justifiable. However his economic model elides over why the 
largest sector of the economy has been insulated over the long run from the deleterious effects of 
a severe political crisis, which this project hopes to answer. Rory Scott (1988) and Michael Hall 
(1994) have tentatively responded that as long as political instability is not followed by political 
violence, then the tourism sector is capable of bouncing back from crisis. The emphasis on Scott 
and Hall’s study has been on the industry per se, while this project is fundamentally interested in 
the permutations of policy, notwithstanding the valuable contributions to the debate. 
The MIRAB Model 
In 1984 authors Geoffrey Bertram and Ray Waters developed a model that sought to 
explain investments among the microstates in Oceania that emphasized migration, remittances 
and foreign aid to prop up the bureaucratic apparatus of Island economies (henceforth referred as 
MIRAB). Building on the existing template of microstates ostensible lack of endowments, 
Bertram and Waters posed the seemingly obvious question, what explains the survival of these 
microstates (Bertram 1999:1-2)? The state they concluded was irrelevant in the economic 
success of these microstates, because “the living standards of indigenous island populations were 
raised and maintained by financial transfers from the metropolitan powers” (Bertram 1999:3). 
With the exception of the Kingdom of Tonga, all of the microstates of Oceania were former 
colonies of Great Britain, United States, New Zealand, Australia and France (which still retained 
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parts of French Polynesia).
4
 Since independence, the movement of peoples from the islands to 
the metropoles has steadily increased the current of labor and remittances (Brake 1993; Ward 
1989; Narayan and Smyth 2003; Ware 2005; Robertson 2006). The export of peoples has 
resulted in an economy dependent on the flow of remittances and attenuated the necessity of 
developing policies conducive to investments. Bernard Poirine (1998:32) in response to the 
initial question posed by Baldacchino (1983) on comparative advantage and microstates, argued 
in defense of MIRAB that island economies simply chose to export labor that in turn generated 
remittances
5
 back to the islands. 
 The second and third component of the MIRAB model emphasizes foreign aid and 
“nontradable production generally dominated by government, hence the term Bureaucracy” 
(Bertram 1999:1). Because of the long colonial histories of these islands, the largesse of foreign 
aid to sustain their economies is an extension of the colonial legacy and responsibility, echoing 
Deryck Scarr (1990) that “…transfers of aid to Pacific Island countries is a contractual exchange 
between former metropolitan powers and the islanders: in return for ending their direct political 
responsibility for the islands welfare and securing their strategic interests…by underwriting the 
costs of statehood”. Microstates should therefore embrace their rentier status argue Baldacchino 
(1993:43) and Kaplinsky (1983: 203-204) and seek to exploit the existing relationships as well as 
cultivate new sources of aid or as John Connell (1991) quoted in Baldacchino (1993) frankly 
asserts, “The only semblance of ‘self-reliance’ is the reliance by microstate citizens upon their 
                                                          
4
 Microstates that are not sovereign entities are excluded from this project (for example, Cook Islands, American 
Samoa, New Caledonia) are among some of the main islands that are not part of this analysis (see also the section on 
microstates in this proposal). 
5
 The World Bank website has a comprehensive analysis on the global flow of remittances at 
http://remittanceprices.worldbank.org. It is outside the scope of the project to argue on the merits and demerits of 
remittances but to demonstrate the inadequacy of the MIRAB model in explaining investment policy in microstates. 
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abilities to negotiate the sums of money they need, in return for whatever marketable rights they 
are willing to surrender.” 
Microstates as Weak 
 Not only are microstates deemed irrelevant in developing investment policy under the 
rubric of MIRAB, but also neither state institutions nor specific sectors of the economy are 
capable of formulating policy. The natural limitations of size and resources also limit the 
capabilities of microstates to engage in the sophisticated task of policy development (Warrington 
1994:109). Economic vulnerability together with geographic isolation and a dependence on a 
single primary commodity have not created opportunities to develop the technical abilities 
required for policy development. For example the study by Doecke Faber and Tosca Vijfeijken 
(1994) from the European Centre for Policy Management
6
 on tourism and agriculture policy in 
the Eastern Caribbean
7
 concluded, that lack of skills, weak agencies and powerful industry 
influences colluded to hamper policy and the ability to rationalize inter-sectoral objectives (Faber 
and Vijfeijken 1994:106-107). These microstates, thrust abruptly into the modern world with 
nascent institutions (Warrington 1994:117-120) are ill equipped to handle the task of complex 
policy formulations and subsequently, consistent with the MIRAB model, ought to focus on 
retaining and deepening ties with their former metropoles, who in return will manage the 
investment policy of their former colonies (Hoetjes 1992:142-143).  
 The case of Vanuatu seems to confirm the notion of microstate weakness, in a study 
conducted by Michael O’Donnell and Mark Turner (2005:617) on the administration of public 
sector agencies. A clear lack of any coordinated policy stream, skilled staff and integration 
                                                          
6
 The website is at http://domino.ecdpm.org/Web_ECDPM/Web/Content/navigation.nsf/index.htm (accessed 
January 3, 2010). 
7
 Antigua and Barbados, The British Virgin Islands, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, Montserrat, St. Lucia, 
St. Vincent and The Grenadines. 
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between policy development, implementation and sectoral feedback, exposed the incapacity of 
Vanuatu to develop coherent policy. Compounding the problem was the chronic political 
instability that resulted in nine different governments in nine years through 2004 (O’Donnell and 
Turner 2005:621). 
Microstates as Unstable  
Given the political realities on the ground in recent years, there is perhaps a justified 
wariness about the prospect of a vibrant and stable Oceania. The riots in Tonga in 2006, the 
conflict and subsequent military intervention in the Solomon Islands and the fourth coup d’état 
in Fiji have raised questions about democratization, political stability and state capabilities in 
Oceania (Reilly 2004; Wainwright 2003; Hayward Jones 2008). One analyst after observing the 
political crisis that engulfed Fiji and Solomon Islands in 2000 bluntly concluded that the South 
Pacific was undergoing the process of “Africanisation” (Reilly 2000). Democratic failure and 
political instability that seemed endemic to African regimes had finally arrived in Oceania, such 
as (1) the growing tensions in the relationship between civil regimes and military forces, (2) the 
intermixture between ethnic identity and the competition for control of natural resources as 
factors driving conflicts (3) the weakness of basic institutions of governance such as prime 
ministers, parliaments and, especially, political parties (4) and the increasing centrality of the 
state as a means of gaining wealth and of accessing and exploiting resources (Reilly 2000:262-
263). Ron Duncan and Satish Chand (2002) moved from Reilly’s political assessment of why 
Oceania was in crisis to the prosaic struggles over resources and opportunities in a region 
referred to as an “arc of instability.” Enormous reserves of natural resources, poorly delineated 
rules marking property rights, persistent unemployment and weak central governments created a 
perfect storm for chronic instability in Oceania. The roots of this instability could go even deeper 
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into the very structure of pacific society, i.e. its ethnic makeup, cultural allocations of resources 
and the traditional chiefly structure, all of which, as Benjamin Reilly (2004) and Asesela Ravuvu 
(1992) suggested, conspire against the adoption of democracy or political stability. Imposed 
upon this balkanized structure was western democracy that as Stephanie Lawson (1996) argued 
was bound to fail sooner or later. 
  The coups in Fiji (1987, 2000, and 2006) only underscored the political instability of 
Oceania and characterized the region as unstable, governments as weak and states on their way 
to failure. Stewart Firth (2001:277) noted that the consequences of the 2000 coup in Fiji, 
Political instability affected the three largest countries in the Pacific Islands and therefore affected the 
region as a whole. Smaller island countries depend particularly on Fiji as a transport hub and centre of 
regional organizations, many of them jointly funded by Forum member states, which have a direct financial 
investment in Fiji. Smaller states also have an interest in regional political stability, because events in one 
major country can give the whole region a bad name among tourists and potential investors. The reputation 
of the South Pacific as a whole was at stake. 
 
Prior to the events of 2000 in Fiji was the 1987 military coup, the first of its kind in Oceania and 
set the template of instability and crisis in the South Pacific. Gerard Finin and Terrence Wesley-
Smith (2000) suggest that the 1987 coup in Fiji revealed profound institutional weakness in the 
power of the State to manage its interests and execute policy, especially policies that may offend 
elite groups and individuals. Economists Paresh Narayan and Biman Prasad (2007) provided 
evidence of the long-term consequences to Fiji’s economy as a result of the coups showing 
declines in trade, GDP and real growth. 
Theoretical Foundations 
   
Governments develop a variety of policy instruments to encourage investments, develop 
specific sectors, and protect domestic industries within a deeply competitive economic 
environment, globally and domestically, (Diamond and Diamond 2006; Porter 2008). Driven by 
the necessity to attract foreign direct investments, countries have subsequently rearranged 
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policies that accommodate FDI. Table 1.2 illustrates the regulatory changes that nation-states 
have pursued in order to secure FDI for their host economies. 
Table 1.2: National Regulatory Changes Towards FDI, 1995-2006 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
No. of Countries introducing changes 
No. of regulatory changes 
       More favorable to FDI 
       Less Favorable to FDI 
63 
112 
106 
6 
66 
114 
98 
16 
76 
150 
134 
16 
60 
145 
136 
9 
65 
139 
130 
9 
70 
150 
147 
3 
71 
207 
193 
14 
72 
246 
234 
12 
82 
242 
218 
24 
103 
270 
234 
36 
93 
205 
164 
41 
93 
184 
147 
37 
Source: UNCTAD database on national laws and regulations. See the World Investment Report, 2007 p. 14 
 
 
This project primarily focuses on the development of investment policy within a 
microstate, notwithstanding the significant emphasis on political determinants as important 
factors in attracting FDI, (Jensen 2006; Blanton 2007; Lall and Narula 2004). While the saliency 
of FDI as a conduit for economic growth and development is hardly a debatable proposition for 
most economies (Banerjee, Oetzel and Ranganathan 2006; Dailami and Leipziger 1998), 
political determinants that either attract or inhibit FDI are very much part of the debate. Some 
scholars (Egger and Winner 2006; Habib and Zurawicki 2002; Wrage 2007) have argued that 
foreign investors are repelled by corruption and lack of transparent institutions, and therefore less 
likely to invest in a particular country while others stipulate the necessity of democratic norms in 
attracting foreign direct investments (Jakobsen and de Soysa 2006; Li 2006; Jensen 2003; Oneal 
1994; Busse 2004; Harms and Ursprung 2002). This project is limited to examining the impact of 
political crisis on investment policy and the ensuing sectoral responses and focus on the kinds of 
policy instruments governments employ in these small economies to develop and enhance 
investments such as subsidies, investment aid, locational incentives (all of which are used 
interchangeably, see Thomas 2000, 2007) and the institutional and sectoral forces instrumental in 
the development and implementation of investment policy. What can we know about the 
interaction between government agencies and powerful sectors that explain investment policy in 
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microstates? What was the impact on both policy and sector in the event of a severe political 
crisis? 
John Dunning’s (1971, 1973) eclectic theory of FDI based on ownership location 
internationalization (OLI) and James Brander and Barbara Spencer (1985) on strategic trade 
theory helps situate the use of policy instruments by governments to encourage investments. In 
studying the behavior of multinationals, Dunning postulated three important attributes that 
incentivize FDI, (1) the firm must possess ownership specific advantages enabling it to exploit 
economies of scale, (2) the ability to internalize foreign production processes and (3) the host 
country must possess location specific advantages, i.e. factor endowments, market structure 
government legislation and policies.  
Secondly, the genesis of policy is not a creation ex nihilo event but occurs within the 
matrix of rules, agencies and actors. Peter Hall (1995:90-113) began his institutional analysis of 
British economic policy in the 1970’s within a broader “matrix of competing interests and ideas” 
(91) which included both the Labor and Conservative governments of the day, the “white paper” 
on Competition, Credit and Control (CCC), the Bank of England, the powerful financial sector in 
the City of London, the permanent secretary of the treasury, the research departments of the 
brokerage house, independent institutes, the Center for Policy Studies established by the 
Conservative Party, the British press, the Trade Unions and the British party system. Hall went 
on to conclude that only by examining the complex interaction between these actors and agencies 
could one adequately explain British economic policy in those years. 
Similarly, Nitsan Chorev (2007) in his study of US trade policy illuminates the specific 
role that multiple actors played to shift the center of gravity from protectionism and towards a 
liberal trade regime over six decades (1934-1994). The US Congress, Chorev argues was 
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generally more amenable to protect declining industries at the expense of free traders but by 
1994 when the United States joined the World Trade Organization (WTO), the logic of free trade 
was a fait accompli. This transformation occurred as a result of institutional shifts made possible 
by the complex interaction between stakeholders at each epoch. During the era of free trade, the 
role of the service sector (banking and finance, transportation, construction, telecommunications, 
management consulting, advertising, education and entertainment) is especially highlighted in 
the ensuing policy shift, as well as the influence of the Executive Branch, including the United 
States Trade Representative, the Departments of Treasury and Commerce on the new trade 
policy (Chorev 2007:149-194).
8
 
In his excellent study of British and German Labor Ministries between World War 1 and 
the Great Depression, Tien-Lung Liu (1998) addresses the problem of policy shifts using a 
contingency theory model that shows state agencies as active interlocutors over policy according 
to historical conditions “simultaneously or alternatively favoring important groups such as 
capitalists, organized labor, and state managers” (Tien-Lung Liu 1998:43, 51-55). Contingencies 
according to Liu “…are defined as crucial historical events that have momentous impacts on 
state policies because they facilitate or hinder dominant classes, organized labor, and state 
agencies to achieve their goals by shifting the balance of power within and between them” (Tien-
Lung Liu 1998:54).  
Policy, as these scholars have argued occurs, within a political and institutional 
environment (Krasner 1984), and explaining the permutations of investment policy in 
microstates will entail a close examination of state agencies, investment boards and influential 
sectors, most notably the tourism industry, using insights from historical institutionalism in order 
                                                          
8
 I am not making any assessment on the merits of Chorev’s analysis; I am simply interested in observing the 
relationship between governments, state agencies and powerful sectors over the formation and direction of policy. 
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to develop a clearer understanding about the roles played by the aforementioned actors in the 
formation of investment policy. Historical institutionalists, writes Theda Skocpol, (1995:106) 
“…are more likely to trace sequences of outcomes over time, showing how earlier outcomes 
change the parameters for subsequent developments.” Furthermore, she writes, historical 
institutionalists are “also interested in conjunctures of separately located processes or conflict”. 
Skocpol raised this issue in regards to the paucity of historical and sociological delineation in 
rational choice theory. If we interpret the universe and our place in it through the matrix of 
institutions, then historical institutionalism seems to provide a fuller picture of social reality.  
Importance of Crisis 
Finally an important puzzle in this inquiry is the role of crisis and its impact on 
investment policy. This is a significant investigation of the effect of political crisis on actual 
policy and provides an opportunity to examine in fine detail the effect it had on all aspects of 
investment policy in microstates in Oceania. The substantial literature on the political crisis of 
1987 in Fiji has either focused on the complex political causes and it’s enduring consequences 
nationally and regionally or has emphasized the role of political determinants Gounder (1998, 
2002; Prasad and Asalu-Adjaye 1998, Nelson and Singh 1998) on economic growth and 
development. While debate on the future of democracy among the Oceanic Islands is important, 
it cannot obviate the responsibility of stakeholders to develop investment strategies within the 
parameters of their resource capabilities.  
The third component of this project examines investment policy through the lens of the 
punctuated equilibrium model by asking the following questions, how was policy affected by the 
crisis? What effect did the crisis have on the tourism sector? Did it force the state and its 
agencies to rethink/renege on its commitment to the tourism sector? What role did the industry 
  17 
play in maintaining the significant levels of support it had received prior to the crisis? If 
investment policy remained unchanged and tourism industry escaped unscathed, did it vindicate 
the preponderant bias of the state regarding its incentive priorities? Are investment policies in 
microstates by dint of their size, location and insignificance insulated from political disruptions? 
An affirmative response would compel a reexamination of standard arguments especially for 
micro-economies to separate policy instruments that enhance investments and political 
developments that enhance rights and liberties.  
Stephen Krasner (1984) argued, “…Change is episodic and dramatic, rather than 
continuous and incremental. Crisis is of central importance” so too John Ikenberry (1989) 
argued, “…change is likely to be episodic and occur at moments of crisis (war and depression) 
when existent institutions break down or a discredited and when struggles over basic rules of the 
game change.” Similarly, John Hogan combining insights from historical institutionalism argues 
that choices made at the genesis of institutional formation will have an enduring effect over its 
lifetime. Hence, institutional change occurs not as a gradual process over time, but abruptly in 
sudden punctuated moments when “trigger events”9 emerge. Policy change is subsequently 
predicated on severe crisis or endogenous shocks (Greif and Laitin 2004) using a model first 
derived from evolutionary biology (Gersick 1991).  
In policy analysis, punctuated equilibrium theory has been comprehensively developed 
by Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones (1993, 1998), first in explaining agenda setting and 
interest group behavior in American Politics (1993) and more recently with James True, the 
dramatics shifts in federal budgeting (1998). For example, they observed that government 
spending fluctuated between postwar adjustment till 1956, rapid growth through 1974 and 
                                                          
9
 See Hogan (2006, 660). 
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restrained spending post 1976 (Baumgartner, Jones and True 1998) as a response to fundamental 
domestic shifts in priorities and control over appropriations. One could similarly postulate the 
expansion of the federal deficit and budget under the last Republican administration as a 
response to a shift in budget priorities brought on by the crisis of September 11, 2001.
10
 
Punctuated equilibrium theory is a useful model to explain any possible shift in policy 
and institutions in Fiji as a result of the dramatic crisis of 1987. Unlocking the puzzle of possible 
changes in investment strategies before and after the coup will significantly contribute to 
understanding the role of the state, sectors, agencies and help explain investment policy in 
microstates, especially those undergoing similar political difficulties. 
The Argument 
 Islands with close and in some cases, dependent ties with metropolitan powers (such has 
Samoa, Cook Islands and Tonga with New Zealand), Nauru with Australia and Federated States 
of Micronesia (FSO), Palau and Marshall Islands with the United States have encouraged labor 
mobility and the subsequent receipts of remittances as policy, while all microstates in Oceania 
receive some form of foreign aid packages which is a byproduct of lender priorities, historical 
associations, foreign policy objectives and the national interests of donor countries. The MIRAB 
model relegates microstates to a permanent dependency status and nullifies their achievements in 
developing investment policy congruent with their comparative advantage.  
 The central idea that animates the MIRAB hypothesis is that microstates are  
institutionally anemic societies wedged between perennial weaknesses or teetering on failure. 
The complicated challenge of exploiting comparative advantage and formulating regulations and 
                                                          
10
 I am not in a position to analyze the specificities of Baumgartner, Jones and True’s examples, which is outside the 
scope of this paper. These examples are highlighted to demonstrate the applicability of punctuated equilibrium to 
explain policy changes.  
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policies is beyond the ken of these small island communities and thus the only alternatives 
available to them is beg and borrow. A careful examination of the Fiji Islands as a representative 
microstate yields a different set of conclusions than the one proposed by the MIRAB model and 
argues that comparative advantage is a better model to explain investment in small island 
communities by analyzing the development of the tourism industry in Fiji.  
Table 1.3: Hypothesis 
 Competing Theories 
 MIRAB Comparative Advantage 
Policy  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Institutional Assumptions 
 
 
 
 
 
Empirical Expectations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Theory under Crisis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data 
External migrant worker schemes to 
encourage labor mobility 
Relaxed capital controls to capture 
remittances 
Closer metropolitan and regional 
partnership to enhance Aid inflows 
 
Endemic political instability 
Anemic policy networks 
Sectoral cooptation 
 
 
 
Robust labor movements in period under 
investigation 
Increase in remittances as a greater 
percentage of GDP 
Reliant on greater levels of foreign Aid to 
maintain State functionality 
 
 
Confirms institutional assumptions 
Increases migration, remittances and Aid 
Enhanced reliance with regional and 
metropolitan powers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Department of Immigration  
The Fiji Bureau of Statistics   
Investment allowances and subsidies 
for hotel and resort development 
Tax holidays and duty exemptions 
Reduction on VAT (value added tax) 
and utility licenses 
 
 
Microstates while limited and 
dependent, retain institutional 
capabilities to develop investment 
strategies in line with their 
comparative advantages 
 
Expansion of the sector under 
investigation (Tourism) 
Institutional deepening between 
stakeholders in the industry 
Increasing role of the State in 
managing the sector through 
investments and incentives 
 
1. Collapse of Tourism industry  
Loss of State investments in the 
sector 
Realignment of stakeholders to 
disengage from the industry and 
pursue investments in less vulnerable 
sectors 
 
2. Hypothesis supported-promotion 
of Tourism is congruent with 
comparative advantage 
Microstates can develop investment 
policy and have the institutional 
capacity to manage policy through 
severe crises 
 
Fiji Trade Investment Board 
The Fiji Development Bank 
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Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
The Reserve Bank of Fiji 
The Fiji Visitors Bureau 
The Reserve Bank of Fiji 
The Fiji Bureau of Statistics 
  
 
Methodological Issues 
  
(a) Defining Microstates 
 
The United Nations through its Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) commissioned 
in 1967 the first international panel to discuss the structure and nature of microstates and 
released its report three years later (UNITAR 1971). Drawing upon Charles Taylor’s typology of 
microstates, the UN report conceptualized microstates along demographic, spatial and economic 
lines, while admitting to the arbitrariness of their definitions (UNITAR 1971:30). The UNITAR 
report used a population between 100,000 and 1 million to denote a microstate and established a 
pattern of broad inexactitude, while Taylor stipulated a population of up to 3 million as 
indicative of a microstate (Dommen and Hein 1985, 10) an astonishingly high number at a time 
when world population stood at only 3.7 billion.
11
  
Elmer Plishke’s (1977) influential work on microstates restricted them to a population 
under 300,000 in order for a state to qualify as a microstate which included a category of sub 
microstates with a population below 100,000. Michael Gunter in the same year as Plishke’s study 
appeared (1977) employed a 1 million population cutoff to define a microstate in his analysis of 
the United Nations microstate problem. By the 1990s scholars were pushing demographic limits 
for microstates up to 1.5 million (Hindmarsh 1996:38; Bray1991:505). The current limits on 
population that would be constitutive of a microstate stand at the 1 million mark (Goldstein, 
Rivers and Tomz 2007:52). While this is a reasonable demographic ceiling accepted for this 
                                                          
11
 Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World 
Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision, http://esa.un.org/unpp (accessed November 21, 2009). 
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project together with GDP and territorial size, I contend that within the rubric of political 
economy, these categories will have to be slightly revised. 
The second level of microstate categorization attempted by the UNITAR report was 
along territorial size (UNITAR 1971, 59-78) based on the 1966 UN statistical yearbook. Apart 
from including both self-governing and dependent territories into its analysis and the dated 
nature of the report, the most serious problem was finding an acceptable cutoff for territorial 
size. For example Fiji in 1966 (a British Colony) had a population of 478,000 and a land area of 
18,169 sq. km whereas Namibia (under South African administration) had a population of 
584,000 and a land area of 824,292 sq. km. While both Fiji and Namibia could qualify as a 
microstate under the population marker (below the 1 million population threshold) could one 
reasonably adduce Namibia as a microstate with a territory 45 times that of Fiji? Unsurprisingly 
later studies including Plishke (1977) and Dommen and Hein (1985) abandoned territorial size as 
a categorical marker that defined a microstate just as UNITAR did in its later deliberations on 
small states and territories. 
Separately from the UNITAR report, Raimo Vayrynen (1971) used aggregate variables 
(area, population, GNP, military budget, value of industrial production) to define and measure 
small power status. While he did not isolate the phenomena of microstates as a distinct category, 
Vayrynen did include GNP as a measurement of small power but he established no cutoff point 
in his analysis. Dommen and Hein (1985, 123) using the UNCTAD figures from 1980 suggested 
a GDP/GNP of US500 million as a measurement of a microstate. Unfortunately as the authors 
observe, because of the anemic economies of the African sub-continent, Equatorial Guinea with 
a GDP of 69 million is territorially larger than 10 independent island economies combined. 
Conversely, Iceland with a population 315,459, and an area size of 103,000 sq. km and a GDP 
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per capita of 52,493 USD
12
 hardly qualified as a microstate when compared with the Solomon 
Islands with a population of 508,000 and a GDP per capita of 741 USD.
13
  
The United Nations decades after the UNITAR report have only exacerbated the 
confusion over microstates with its current classification of least developed countries (LDCs), 
landlocked developing countries (LLDCs) and Small Island developing states (SIDS). The later 
small island developing states (SIDS) includes Haiti with a population of 9 million and a GDP 
per capita of 1,300 USD as well as Singapore with a population of 4.6 million and a GDP per 
capita of 49,700 USD.
14
 Thus, even while retaining the population threshold of one million 
peoples as indicative of a microstate, the wide diversity and disparities between states (See Table 
1.4) make any analysis of investment policies common to deeply problematic. This research 
project will therefore limit itself to explaining investment policies of microstates in Oceania 
(Rolfe 2006) using the experience of the Fiji Islands as a case study. 
Table 1.4: Microstates with Population <1 Million (2009) 
AFRICA Pop. ASIA Pop. CARIBBEAN Pop. 
Djibouti 
Comoros 
Cape Verde 
Equatorial Guinea 
Sao Tome and 
Principia 
Seychelles 
864,000 
676,000 
506,000 
676,000 
163,000 
 
87,000 
Brunei 
Maldives 
390,000 
309,000 
Guyana 
Bahamas 
Barbados 
Saint Lucia 
Saint Vincent and 
Grenadine 
Grenada 
Antigua and Barbuda 
Dominica 
St. Kitts and Nevis 
738,000 
342,000 
256,000 
172,000 
109,000 
 
106,000 
88,000 
67,000 
52,000 
EUROPE Pop. OCEANIA Pop. SOUTH AMERICA Pop. 
Cyprus 
Montenegro 
Luxembourg 
Malta 
871,000 
620,000 
486,000 
409,000 
Fiji 
Solomon Islands 
Vanuatu 
Samoa 
849,900 
523,000 
240,000 
179,540 
Suriname 
Belize 
520,000 
307,000 
                                                          
12
 2008 data retrieved from official government databank at http://www.statice.is. (accessed January 5, 2010) 
13
 2007 data retrieved from Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade http://www.dfat.gov.au. (accessed 
January 5, 2010) 
14
 2007 data retrieved from United Nations Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, 
Landlocked Developing Countries and the Small Island Developing States (UN-OHRLLS) at 
http://www.unohrlls.org/en/home . (accessed January 5, 2010) 
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Iceland 
Andorra 
Lichtenstein 
Monaco 
San Marino 
 
315,459 
86,000 
36,000 
33,000 
31,000 
 
Federated States 
of Micronesia 
Tonga 
Kiribati 
Marshall Islands 
Palau 
Tuvalu 
Nauru 
111,000 
 
104,000 
98,000 
62,000 
20,000 
10,000 
10,000 
Source: UN population database at  
http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/wpp2008/wpp2008_text_tables.pdf. (accessed January 5, 
 2010) 
 
 
(b) Why Microstates? 
 Microstates as the Commonwealth Secretariat stated (Bray and Hui 1989:130) “…are not 
simply a scaled a scaled down version of large countries. They have an ecology of their 
own…there is a cluster of factors which suggest particular strategies in the smaller states of the 
world.” Microstates, even within the cluster of the developing world, remain on the periphery 
because of their size, economic potential and geographical isolation for non-contiguous states 
(Quester 1983). The last factor is particularly salient for the microstates of Oceania who find 
themselves geographically isolated and increasingly marginalized in the new global economy. 
While not discounting the calculations of power and national interests exercised by nations 
beyond the cluster of microstates, this research will demonstrate that even very small economies 
share a similar logic and desire to construct strategies within their polities for investments and 
economic opportunities (Crawford 1989). 
 The microstates in Oceania while diverse in size and population still share important 
attributes as a cluster and validate a closer examination of any one of these Islands as 
representative of this cohort. My reasons for investigating the Fiji Islands as the locus of a case 
study is predicated on my deep familiarity with the country as well as with the widely accepted 
consensus on the centrality and importance of the Fiji Islands within Oceania, especially among 
the other microstates. The microstates of Oceania are all geographically non-contiguous and with 
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the exception of Tonga were until recently colonial outposts. Secondly, the five largest Islands 
(Fiji, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Samoa and Tonga)
15
 have experienced political conflicts and 
tensions within their societies (see Table 1.5), and finally all of these microstates, while 
predominantly agricultural, have via the state attempting to develop mechanisms to diversify 
their economies. This project aims to explain the development and implementation of these 
investment policies through a focused case study on the Fiji Islands. 
Table 1.5: Politics and Governance in Microstates 
COUNTRY GOVERNANCE 
FIJI Military Junta (from Dec 2006) (excluded from seasonal worker scheme as 
developed by Australia and New Zealand) 
VANUATU Parliamentary democracy (political instability last 15 years). 
SAMOA Parliamentary democracy (NZ provides defense) special quota for NZ residency 
and seasonal employment. 
SOLOMON ISLANDS Parliamentary democracy (political instability from 1998-2003) Australia/NZ 
have troops on the ground. 
TONGA Constitutional monarchy (political instability in 2006) NZ seasonal employment 
benefit. 
KIRIBATI Democratic republic. 
NAURU Democratic republic (Australia provides defense) 
TUVALU Constitutional monarchy. 
MICRONESIA (FSO) Democratic republic (free compact with US) relaxed entry and employment 
privileges in USA. 
PALAU Democratic republic (free compact with US) relaxed entry and employment 
privileges in USA. 
MARSHALL 
ISLANDS 
Democratic republic (free compact with US) relaxed entry and employment 
privileges in USA. 
Sources: New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade at www.mfat.govt.nz and Australian Dept of  
 Foreign Affairs and Trade at  www.dfat.gov.au . (accessed January 5, 2010) 
 
                                                          
15
 I have excluded the Federated States of Micronesia (FSO), Palau and Marshall Islands because of its peculiar 
political status with the United States.  Niue, Cook Islands enjoy full citizenship with New Zealand while Samoa is 
beneficiary of a quota system). Nauru’s defense is provided by Australia so I am not sure if it qualifies as a fully 
sovereign state. 
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(c) Fiji Islands as a Typical (and important) Microstate 
 The microstates of Oceania are at the periphery of global concern and awareness and as 
this project demonstrates, remain under-researched in a variety of areas.
16
 The one area that has 
received substantial scholarly attention has been on political developments in Fiji, most notably 
the events of 1987 (B. Lal 1988; Robertson and Tamanisau 1988; V. Lal 1988; Sharpham 2000). 
The focus on the politics of Fiji reiterated the strategic importance and influence of the Islands 
within the South Pacific (Ball 1973) and the obvious regional implications of domestic 
developments. Not only is Fiji strategically located, but economically, politically and culturally, 
Fiji is recognized as a regional leader and partner in the success and failures of other microstates 
in the region (Hayward-Jones 2009). 
In an effort to develop regional relationships, the first Fijian Prime Minister Ratu Mara 
led in the formation of the Pacific Islands Producers’ Association (PIPA)17 in 1967, the Pacific 
Island Leaders Forum (Mara 1997), The South Pacific Bureau for Economic Cooperation (later 
the Forum Secretariat)
18
 in 1971, and The South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic 
Cooperation Agreement (SPARTECA)
19
 in 1981, all of which are headquartered in Fiji. The 
influential Pacific Islands Development Program (PIDP)
20
 based at the East-West Center at the 
University of Hawaii was also a Fijian initiative and has traditionally been headed by a Fijian 
academic. 
                                                          
16
 One exception has been the periodic reports issued by the Pacific Island Development Program (PIDP); see 
Sturton and McGregor (1991) and Lal (1994). Jai Narayan (1984) study on the political economy of Fiji between the 
colonial eras (1874-1970) is a rare and comprehensive treatment of both politics and institutions see also Howe, 
Kiste and Lal (1994) on a general history of the Pacific Islands. 
17
 This was the first indigenous regional association in Oceania. See Neemia (1986) for an extended discussion of 
regionalism in the South Pacific. 
18
 The website for the Forum Secretariat is at http://www.forumsec.org. . (accessed January 5, 2010) 
19
 For a current report on the status of regional trade in Oceania, see website at http://www.forumsec.org. 
/_Resources/article/files/Pacific%20Regional%20Trade%20and%20Economic%20Cooperation_FINAL%20REPOR
T_December%2020071.pdf . (accessed January 5, 2010) 
20
 http://www.eastwestcenter.org/pacific-islands-development-program/ 
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The influence of Fiji in Oceania was further enhanced through the establishment of the 
regionally owned University of the South Pacific
21
 as well as schools of nursing and medicine, 
which trains the majority of healthcare professionals in the region. Furthermore, Fiji also serves 
as a regional base for most of the international institutions (IMF, UNDP) and foreign chanceries 
within the region, for example, the US mission based in Suva serves Fiji, Kiribati, Tuvalu, 
Tonga, French Polynesia, New Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna, making it geographically the 
largest consular section in the world. As early as the 1930 Fiji’s status as a leader among the 
many Islands of the Pacific was being debated between her colonial administrators (Hedstrom 
1930). 
 Beyond the strategic importance of Fiji as the subject of this case study is the theoretical 
value Fiji lends to the research question that makes it an ideal case. I postulate that understanding 
investment policy in microstates can best be explained through a systemic analysis of the 
theoretical rationale behind government policy, how and why it has developed investment 
incentives within institutional and resource limits, the interaction between state agencies and 
particular sectors, and the impact of political crisis on investment policy. The Fiji Islands fulfill 
all of the above criteria and allow the researcher within the parameters of this inquiry a unique 
opportunity to examine and explain investment policy in the microstates of Oceania. The 
government of Fiji for many years has been active in developing investment strategies (see Table 
1.6) through the Fiji Trade Investment Board (FTIB).  
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 http://www.usp.ac.fj/   
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Table 1.6: Fiji Islands Trade and Investment Board (FTIB) Incentive Targets 
FIJI ISLANDS: TRADE & INVESTMENT INCENTIVES 
SECTORAL TARGETS 
Natural Resources Service Transportation/SME Manufacturing 
Mining 
Fishing 
Agriculture 
Logging and 
Sawmilling 
Tourism 
Film Making and Audio 
Visual Productions 
Information 
Communication 
Technology (ICT) 
 
Bus Industry 
Small and Micro Enterprises 
Ship Building 
Manufacturing  
- Food Processing 
- Renewable Energy 
Projects and Power 
Generation 
- Bio-Fuel Production 
- Garment Industry 
Source: Fiji Trade and Investments Board at www.ftib.org.fj  
 
Secondly, Fiji has a well-developed bureaucracy
22
 and multiple stakeholders that help 
create a complex political environment and provide an opportunity to study the institutional 
dynamics of policy, strategy, power and influence. Investment policy, as I have argued, does not 
emerge out of a vacuum, but is a product of intense and complicated negotiations between 
various actors through time, and the recent history of Fiji is likely to yield a rich explanatory 
schema for understanding investment policy in microstates.  
The years in which this study is situated (1975-2010) are significant both in the design of 
this project and the puzzle that follows. The 1977 elections were pivotal in returning the 
incumbent political party (Alliance) to power with an ambitious plan to develop incentives, 
attract FDI and diversify the economy which was dominated by sugarcane farming (Levantis, 
Jotzo and Tulpule 2005; Narayan and Prasad 2005; Reddy 2003). Developing the tourism sector 
was paramount in the government’s five-year plan (Mara 1997) and established the template for 
investment policy for the next decade (Alliance also won the 1982 elections). In 1987, following 
the defeat of the Alliance party at the hands of the newly formed Fiji Labor Party (FLP), the 
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 The most significant work to date on state agencies from the perspective of labor in Fiji is by Jacqueline Leckie 
(1997) and as manifested by the title of her study, state agencies understood themselves as laboring with the State. 
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military staged a coup d’état and triggered a political crisis. This project will explain investment 
policy both prior to the crisis of 1987 and beyond through 2010 to examine the effect of the 
political crisis on policy.  
 Thirdly, Fiji has the most developed and robust tourism sector in the South Pacific and 
thus provides an ideal opportunity to examine the permutations of investment policies on an 
important sector of the economy (McDonnell 1998; Rao 2002). The efforts in developing a 
viable and thriving tourism industry among the microstates have not gone unnoticed, and 
governments in recent years have embarked on an ambitious effort to develop tourism within 
their countries.
23
 Also examining investment policy as applied to the tourism industry serves as a 
hard case example. Using Fiji as a case study provides a closer look at the effect of political 
crisis on investment policy in a specific sector in microstates. Among all the sectors that the 
FTIB (see Table 1.6) has targeted as part of its investment strategy, tourism is seen as the most 
vulnerable to political shocks and instability. David Beirman (2003) used a series of case studies 
(that included Fiji) to analyze policy shifts and market responses to crisis in the tourism industry. 
Tourists tend to leave, with their finances in the event of a national upheaval, and a cursory 
examination of any troubled region will indicate the lack of a robust trade in tourism (Faulkner 
2001; Ritchie 2004; Wang 2008). Analyzing impacts of shock events on tourism has recently 
focused on epidemics (Wen, Huimin and Kavanaugh 2005) on the SARS outbreak in Asia, or 
natural disasters (Huang and Min 2002) i.e. the 1999 earthquake that struck Taiwan and sent the 
tourism industry in a tailspin.
24
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 Similarly a sustained effort has been underway in Africa to develop a robust tourism market as part of its overall 
development strategy (Dieke 2000). 
24
 The Taiwanese government implemented series of aggressive investment strategies to revive the industry ranging 
from 30 second commercial spots on CNN to hosting a four day International Travel Fair, discounted travel program 
with major Japanese airlines and rebuilding scenic and recreational area through generous loans and grants for the 
travel industry (See Huang and Min 2002). 
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This project is predicated on the premise that investment policy is an important 
component of states developmental strategy, and that given the limited resources these small 
economies have, structuring prudent policy instruments entails not only being cognizant of the 
dynamic between agencies and sectors but understanding the impact of political crisis on 
investment policy. Is the state’s investment in tourism a reliable measure of where limited 
resources should be allocated? What role did domestic coalitions play in the formation of 
investment policy? Are state agencies that oversee investment strategies capable of withstanding 
institutional manipulation in the formation of policy in these small states, especially regarding 
the powerful tourism industry? This project is undertaken in hopes of responding to these 
questions, objectively, fairly and thoroughly and contributes to our understanding of investment 
policy in microstates. 
 (d) Case Study 
Globally, national governments employ a wide array of incentives and policies to attract 
investments and promote development. The case study on the Fiji Islands in explaining 
investment policy in microstates fills a theoretical lacuna on how very small and non-contiguous 
states use policy instruments to develop investment strategies. While the expansive use of 
government measures to encourage investment is widely acknowledged, there has not been any 
systemic study of investment policy in microstates as far as I can ascertain.  
 However the use of case studies in political science has raised some objections, especially 
in possible violations of important assumptions in scientific research. I posit that it is desirable 
within the scope of this research to use the case study method and that the methodological 
literature provides ample support to overcome the most important objections that may possibly 
impair scientific investigation of this project. 
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 Lijphart (1971) argued that one of the advantages of pursuing a case study was the ability 
of the researcher to focus on a salient issue of interest given the constraints of time and resource. 
This could he stated “make an important contribution to the establishment of general 
propositions and thus to theory building in political science” (Lijphart 1971:691). Similarly, 
Alston (2008) stipulates that case studies “allow the analyst to isolate the impacts of a theoretical 
concept in a more detailed and compelling manner” (Alston 2008, 103) through examining the 
specific policy and institutional arrangements of individual societies. As Lijphart (1971) 
observes, case study is one of several methods used in political science (Lijphart 1971:682) and 
therefore not exclusive of quantitative analysis (King, Keohane, Verba (1994:43-46), but as 
Alexander George and Andrew Bennett (2005:20) suggest, statistical research is frequently 
preceded by case studies. The goal of case studies outlined by Alston (2008:121) and salient for 
this project is that (a) to understand an issue prior to modeling it (b) the ability to test theoretical 
hypothesis (see Lijphart 1971:691) and (c) to shed credible light on the workings of institutions 
and economic working of society. 
 The specific loci of investigation in case study make generalizability problematic and, as 
Yin (2003:10-11) states, imprecise research could be easily collapsed into mere narratives. I 
concede that examination of a single anomalous event cannot contribute to an overall 
understanding of political phenomena, but a study of Fiji within a cluster of microstates is 
scientifically valid. While theories generated from a case study of Fiji may not be applicable to 
OECD countries, it should reliably contribute to an understating of investment policies in 
microstates.
25
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 One possible mechanism to overcome the problem of generalizability is through Lieberman’s (2005:436) theory 
of nested analysis which allows researchers to “explore general relationships and explanations” without eschewing 
the “specific explanations of individual cases.”  
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 Ancillary to the problem of generalizability in case studies is issue of “conceptual 
stretching” (Sartori 1970) that authors George and Bennett (2005, 19-21)) argue could be 
substantially attenuated through case studies. Instead of “lumping together dissimilar cases to get 
a larger sample” they suggest that case studies allow for a finer grained analysis of questions 
under investigation. This observation is significant for the study of microstates in Oceania, which 
while part of a larger cohort of sovereign states with populations below the one million mark 
share unique attributes of geography, history and capabilities that creates opportunities for a 
focused study in of itself. Even among microstates one has to be wary of drawing conclusions 
between contiguous and developed economies such as Brunei or Iceland and the remote islands 
of the pacific with very low levels of development. Case studies therefore “identify the universe 
or group under investigation” (George and Bennett 2008:25, 69-70) and allow the researcher to 
craft a focused and precise research objective, case studies they argue are “stronger at 
determining whether and how a variable mattered than at assessing how much it mattered.”  
 Case studies are prone to the problem of selection bias (King, Keohane and Verba 
(1994:128-132) which “is commonly understood as occurring when some form of selection 
process in either the design of the study or the real-world phenomena under investigation results 
in inferences that suffer from systematic error” (Collier and Mahoney 1996:59). An example 
would be investigating the relationship between democracy and economic development using 
OECD countries as observations and extrapolating the results to the general population. While 
the observations for this project are circumscribed, there is no intrinsic assumption about a 
relationship between size and policy, only in explaining how and what factors are engaged in the 
structuring of investment incentives within microstates. The focused nature of this investigation 
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make the results applicable to other microstates that share similar attributes as opposed to being 
generalizable to states that are vastly dissimilar in size and endowments (McKeown 1999).  
The lack of representativeness in comparison to statistical analysis  can be overcome by 
making a trade-off between parsimony and broad applicability with explanatory richness and 
fine-grained analysis of the case under investigation. Case study researchers, argue George and 
Bennett (2008:31-32), “are more interested in finding the conditions under which specified 
outcomes occur, and the mechanisms through which they occur, rather than uncovering the 
frequency with which these conditions and their outcomes arise.” Selection bias could be 
problematic if microstates were the dependent variable in this investigation, which it is not but 
rather investment policy as the variable under inquiry (Dion 1998).  
 However simply observing the movement of independent variables in explaining 
investment policy seems reductionist and lacks the ability to provide a more nuanced analysis of 
affective forces involved in the formulation and implementation of a significant policy. Without 
negating the importance of quantitative measurements, the purpose of this inquiry is explaining 
investment policies in microstates through a careful examination of the different units of analysis 
and the possible effect of a severe exogenous crisis, i.e. the military coup d’état of 1987. A better 
model would be to use the case study method to explain in detail the permutations and 
trajectories of investment policy of microstates in Oceania by examining the experience of Fiji. 
Case studies suggest George and Bennett (2008:25) “are stronger at determining whether and 
how a variable mattered, than at assessing how much it mattered,” which has deep implications 
for the study of investment policy in microstates. 
Robert Yin (2003:3-5) uses the example of Allison and Zelikow’s Essence of Decision, 
Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis as a model of how case studies can move beyond the 
  33 
exploratory stage and into the explanatory phase and “can be the basis for significant 
explanations and generalizations” through the creative and successful use of multiple 
perspectives and institutional constraints in explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. Prudent use of 
case studies such as the embedded design model (Yin 2003:19-56) have the potential to unravel 
complex policy formulations through its emphasis on examining different units of analysis 
individually and in toto (Ragin 1994:101-102; 2004:123-138). 
 As a caveat, I am aware of important quantitative studies on investment policy in 
microstates, which has helped me refine my research agenda throughout this project.
26
 I am also 
cognizant of the use of the case study method to study microstates, investment policy, 
institutions and crisis which validates the appropriateness of utilizing case study methodology for 
this project.
27
 
Table 1.7: Design & Data: Explaining Investment Policy in Microstates of Oceania 
Unit of Analysis Extant Institutions Research Questions Data Methods of Inquiry 
Microstate (Fiji 
Islands) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
State Agencies 
 
Domestic environment 
(constituency 
pressures) Regional 
environment 
(SPARTECA-South 
Pacific Regional Trade 
and Economic 
Cooperation 
Agreement) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Departmental 
Ministries (Tourism, 
How did investment 
policies emerge? 
What were the 
political and 
economic factors that 
led to the 
development of 
specific investment 
incentives? Are this 
incentives elite 
driven, part of a 
regional trend or a 
“race to the bottom” 
dynamic”? 
 
How did these 
institutional 
Legislative record 
(Hansard documents), 
Regional policy 
formulations (South 
Pacific Forum 
databank). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ministerial directives 
and government 
Archival analysis of 
historical record on the 
genesis of investment 
policy in microstates, 
explore patterns and 
overall trends. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Process tracing to 
determine how and if 
                                                          
26
 Some notable studies that I have greatly benefited have been Jayaraman and Choong (2006), Gani (1999) on the 
determinants of FDI in Fiji and Clague, Gleason and Knack on the determinants of lasting democracy in poor 
countries. Also studies in tourism and economic performance by Rosentraub and Joo (2008), and Brau, Lanza and 
Pigliaru (2003) have been helpful in showing estimated changes in the dependent variable and linear relationships. 
27
 On development in small economies, see Winslow (1991-92), Bray and Hui (1989), Anckar (2002), Storey and 
Murray (2001), Baldacchino (1999), Thomas (2002). For case studies on institutions, see Cortell and Peterson 
(1999), Peters, Pierre and King (2005), Tien-Lung Liu (1998) and sector research; see O’Donnell (2005), Vassiliou 
(1995), Kersell (1987) and Agor (1981). 
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Sectors (Tourism, 
Agriculture and 
Garment 
Manufacturing) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1987 Political Crisis 
Lands) 
Fiji Trade Investments 
Board (FTIB), Native 
Land Trust Board 
(NLTB), Fiji 
Development Bank 
(FDB) 
 
 
 
Fiji Tourism Board, 
Fiji Visitors Board, 
Fiji Hoteliers 
Association, 
Individual Resorts, Fiji 
Sugar Corporation, 
Fiji Development 
Bank,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tourism Industry, 
FTIB 
arrangements affect 
investment policies? 
What roles do state 
agencies in 
microstates play in 
formulating 
investment policies? 
Is the pressure upward 
or downward? 
 
How has the tourism 
industry benefitted 
from investment 
incentives? What role 
has it played in the 
structuring of 
investment policy in 
Fiji? What is the role 
of sectoral elites in 
microstates over 
investment strategy? 
 
 
 
What was the effect 
of the political crisis 
on investment policy? 
Are microstates, by 
virtue of size, 
insulated from 
permanent effects of 
political shocks? How 
was the tourism sector 
affected by the coup? 
records. 
Public Service 
Commission rules that 
regulate interaction 
over policy formation 
and implementation.  
 
 
 
 
Fiji Trade Investment 
Board (FTIB) data on 
investments in the 
tourism sector, Tax 
incentive data from the 
Reserve Bank of Fiji 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Newspaper reports on 
the political crisis, 
tourism data from Fiji 
Bureau of Statistics, 
and economic data 
from the Reserve Bank 
of Fiji. 
bureaucratic agencies 
affect investment 
policy in microstates. 
What are the limits of 
institutional power in 
microstates on 
investment policy?   
 
 
 
Data analysis on the 
effects of investment 
policy as implemented 
within the tourism 
sector over time (total 
subsidies received, tax 
benefits, duty 
concessions, etc) 
comparative analysis 
between the tourism 
sector and other 
sectors regarding 
incentives. 
 
Comparative analysis 
of investment policy 
before and after the 
political crisis; what 
changed and how? 
Interviews with agency 
and trade 
representatives on the 
effects and long-term 
consequences of the 
political crisis of 1987. 
 
 
 (e) Hypothesis Testing 
 
 The Fiji Islands like other small states in Oceania face deep resource, capital and 
demographic limitations yet have managed to reasonably negotiate through the global economy 
by developing tourism as a natural extension of their location, natural beauty and languid 
surroundings. I explore these developments by examining the formation and implementation of 
investment policy in the tourism from the genesis of the industry through periods of crises and 
beyond. 
 In order to successfully prosecute my hypothesis that comparative advantage is a better 
theory in explaining microstate behavior in the international system than MIRAB, I will need 
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demonstrate the specific role that various stakeholders, institutions and agencies played in 
securing the success of the tourism industry. This will entail documenting policies, legislation, 
debates, subsidies, funds, land, resources, etc by the Fijian government from 1975-2010 that 
ensured the success of tourism in the islands. If it can be demonstrated that the Fijian 
government played an active and direct role in the development of the tourism sector in 
collaboration with key stakeholders and interest groups over time, than my hypothesis that 
microstates are capable of developing policies congruent with their comparative advantage is 
vindicated. The alternative is that the limitations inherent to microstates are too great to 
overcome, and racked with political instability, economically inefficient, and institutionally weak 
and therefore MIRAB may ultimately be a better explanation of how microstates can survive in 
the global economy. 
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Chapter Two 
Tourism as a Developmental Strategy 
Introduction 
 This section provides an overview of the competing models of tourism development and 
the externalities that emerge from them. Large scale development projects in tourism have 
ranged from exclusive and isolated resorts to urban hotels and niche ecotourism. The myriad of 
travel products reflect the diversity of consumer tastes and purchasing power and the ability of 
host economies to cater to the needs of an expanding market. The sharp variation in the demand 
for tourism in the Pacific explicates the complexity of geography and the level of tourism 
development in these microstates (see Table 2.1) but the costs associated with utilizing tourism 
as a conduit for development are neither exclusive nor unique to each of these islands. The 
pressure on fragile ecosystems and the possible changes to culture and society have to be taken 
into account to ensure that tourism development fulfills its strategic potential within national 
priorities.  
Table 2.1 Tourism Demand in Oceania-Number of Visitors (1996-2001) 
COUNTRY 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
COOK ISLANDS 48,354 49,866 48,630 55,599 72,994 74,575 
FIJI 339,560 359,441 371,342 409,955 294,070 348,014 
KIRIBATI 4,206 5,054 5,679 3,112 4,829 4,574 
MARSHALL ISLANDS 6,116 6,254 5,727 4,622 5,246 5,399 
NIUE 1,522 1,820 1,736 1,870 1,647 1,407 
NOTHERN MARIANA 736,517 726,690 526,298 491,602 526,111 497,685 
PALAU 69,330 73,719 64,194 55,493 57,732 54,111 
SAMOA 73,155 67,960 77,926 85,124 87,688 88,263 
SOLOMON ISLANDS 10,290 13,807 15,802 6,224 2,427 3,418 
TONGA 26,642 26,162 27,102 30,949 34,694 32,386 
TUVALU 898 1,000 1,100 1,000 1,000 1,140 
VANUATU 46,123 49,624 52,085 50,746 57,364 53,300 
Source: Treloar and Hall (2005: 171) 
  37 
 The different models of tourism development that could be beneficial for host economies 
are often determined by factors beyond the control of these islands because international tourism 
is managed by entities outside the reach of these economies. The stenopeic choices available to 
microstates by virtue of their size and endowment capabilities indubitably make the structuring 
of a tourism based economy an attractive and viable model for development. The different 
trajectories of tourism development in these islands often determine whether industry is 
successfully integrated into national economies, as well as whether these societies are able to 
manage the negative externalities that arise as a consequence of large influxes of outsiders in 
small communities.  
 Developing tourism involves both tangible and intangible costs, the former through 
building infrastructure, creating organizations, subsidizing incentives (Eadington and Redman 
1991) while the later includes problems of cultural disintegration, social and ethnic 
stratifications, crime and the erosion of informal institutions, etc. While the focus of this project 
is on the tangible aspects of tourism and the institutional and developmental challenges facing 
microstates, I am cognizant of the valuable contributions by anthropologists and sociologists 
(examined later in this chapter) who have made salient critiques of tourism and its negative 
social and cultural effects on host communities. An empirical examination of changes in 
attitudes, psychology, culture, norms, values, etc. of tourists and hosts is a vast and complex 
undertaking and beyond the scope of this project. In spite of the vast scholarship in this area, 
there is a paucity of actual ground level study of residents who are most directly affected by the 
changes from tourism and is an opportunity for further enquiry. One of the few case studies that 
explore the cultural and social effects of tourism in the South Pacific disputes the assertions 
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made by anthropologists and sociologists about tourisms deleterious effects, but a lack of 
comparative data makes it unhelpful to generalize (King, Pizam and Milman 1993). 
The Advent of Mass Tourism 
 In the era of mass tourism, international travel is no longer a province of the privileged 
but accessible to citizens of advanced capitalist societies, many of whom had now inherited a 
new “culture of mobility” (Bianchi 2006). International travel in a previous era was mainly 
undertaken by wealthy individuals in an ad hoc fashion and commonly referred to as the “Grand 
Tour” (Brennan 2004), while the current wave of tourism is a highly structured product packaged 
for mass consumption. Freya Higgins-Desbiolles (2006) in Table 2.2 provides a timeline of the 
evolution of travel, with particular emphasis in the postwar era. International travel in the 
succeeding decade was increasingly articulated and facilitated through international norms and 
institutions within the context of an intertwined globalized economy. The bourgeoning travel 
industry has enabled societies in the periphery to engage in the global economy through the 
provision of goods and services specific to international tourism, notwithstanding the criticism 
that this is a debatable proposition because peripheral societies are too marginal to dictate the 
terms of exchange (Goodwin 2007; Wu 1982).  Providing the essential accoutrements associated 
with tourism is an expensive and complex undertaking and requires systemic policies and 
organizational structures for successful prosecution of developmental objectives (Diamond 
1977:552; Sautter and Leisen 1999; Gearing, Swart and Var 1976).  
Table 2.2: Milestones in the Human Right to Travel and Tourism in the Modern era 
TIMELINE MILESTONE DETAIL OF EVENT 
16–19th centuries 
 
 
1841  
 
 
End of World War I  
Travel for the Elite 
 
 
Travel for the workers and 
masses 
 
Passport as travel requisite  
Grand Tour used by European elite as educational 
experience 
 
Cook’s Tours are born when Thomas Cook organizes 
rail journey between Leicester and Loughborough, UK 
 
To consolidate nation states and deal with global war, 
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1948  
 
 
1954  
 
 
 
 
1963  
 
 
1976  
 
 
 
1980  
 
 
 
 
 
 
1985  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1990s  
 
 
 
 
1999  
September 11, 2001  
 
 
 
UN Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights 
 
World passport initiative 
 
 
 
 
International Bureau of Social 
Tourism 
 
UN International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights 
 
WTO’s Manila Declaration 
on World Tourism 
 
 
 
 
 
WTO’s Tourism Bill of Rights and 
Tourist Code 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Human Development Index 
drops in 3rd world 
 
 
 
WTO’s Global Code of Ethics 
for Tourism 
 
Attack on USA and 
subsequent ‘‘War on Terror 
passports become widespread (O’Byrne, 2000) 
 
Declaration which states the basic rights to travel, rest, 
leisure and paid holidays 
 
Travel document for ‘‘world citizens’’ created by 
World Movement for World Citizens to enable the 
realization of the right to travel as stated in the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
 
Organization founded in Belgium chartered to promote 
‘‘access to travel and leisure opportunities for all’’ 
 
Document which reiterates the rights to rest, leisure 
and paid holidays 
 
 
Document which states: ‘‘tourism is considered an 
activity essential to the life of nations…Its 
development is linked to the social and economic 
development of nations and can only be possible if man 
[sic] has access to creative rest and holidays and enjoys 
freedom to travel’’ 
 
Document which states: ‘‘the right of everyone to rest 
and leisure…periodic leave with pay and freedom of 
movement without limitation, within the bounds of 
law, is universally recognized. The exercise of this 
right constitutes a factor of social balance and 
enhancement 
of national and universal awareness’’ 
 
Human Development Report describes ‘‘unprecedented 
reversals of the 1990s’’ as development went 
backwards in dozens of countries (UNDP, 2004, p. 
132) 
 
Document includes Article 7 on the ‘‘Right to 
Tourism’’ which states ‘‘the prospect of direct and 
personal access to the discovery and enjoyment of the 
planet’s resources constitutes a right equally open to all 
of the world’s inhabitants’’. It also calls on the public 
authorities to support social tourism 
 
Implementation of universal right to travel is set back 
with tighter border security, travel advisories and 
heightened international tensions 
Source: Higgins-Desbiolles, Freya (2006: 1199) 
 
 The case study of Fiji challenges the notion of impotency endemic to peripheral 
economies and demonstrates how it has been able to organize its policies in order to capture its 
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share of the global market in travel. Both the World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) and the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) recognizes that tourism can be harnessed for social and 
economic ends and contributes towards national development if properly organized by all 
stakeholders (UNWTO 2004; Honeck 2008). Tourism can either mimic the predictable contours 
of the global economy as an exploitative and ultimately destructive enterprise for host 
economies, or it can ceteris paribus generate development, employment and opportunity. The 
logic of utilizing tourism as a developmental strategy is, I believe, a reasonable policy within the 
scope of endowments available to microstates such as the Fiji Islands. The following section 
examines the competing theories of tourism development and addresses the criticisms pertaining 
to the asymmetrical relationship between the core and the periphery within the context of the 
global economy. 
 Globalization has intensified the pressure on economies to develop policy instruments 
that are commensurate with this new reality, or face the danger of being left behind. The survival 
of microstates is therefore predicated on their ability to organize their economies in ways that 
will maximize their natural and geographical advantages, albeit there are fundamental limitations 
intrinsic to the small islands of Oceania. Thus the development of tourism has been the preferred 
route of small island economies to optimize their comparative advantage in order to survive and 
flourish in the global economy. The MIRAB model grossly underestimates the extraordinary 
efforts that microstates in general and the Fiji Islands in particular have undertaken over the last 
several decades to develop institutions and structures in order to capture the gains from tourism 
for national development.  
 The physical dimensions of tourism require substantial investments to meet supply 
conditions in order to create a product that is essentially amorphous and liminal. The economic, 
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environmental and cultural challenges wrought by international tourism are insurmountable for 
small economies, argue critics for using tourism as a conduit for development, and point to the 
creation of enclave sites as indicative of the exploitative nature of global tourism (Taylor 2001; 
Mbaiwa 2005; Freitag 1994). The creation of locales in the periphery to deliver a contrived travel 
experience for consumers in the core is financially irresponsible, environmentally destructive and 
culturally corrosive. The payoffs for host communities in the form of employment, opportunity 
and development are negligible and scarce resources would be better allocated elsewhere. 
Alternatively, the functional approach concedes the pervasive and complex influence of tourism 
on societies but rejects the implicit assumption that host communities are passive agents lacking 
the capacity to direct development and manage the industry consistent with its social and 
national objectives.  
 The competing models of tourism within the literature illuminate the complexity of the 
travel industry and expose the deep contested issues inherent in the nature of the sector itself. 
Table 2.3 provides a sampling of the expansive literature on the competing arguments regarding 
the tourism industry. As Lea (1988: 2) states, “…There is no other international trading activity 
which involves such critical interplay among economic, political, environmental and social 
elements as tourism…” Both the political economy approach and the functional model enable 
theorists and policy analysts to develop a nuanced and critical understanding of the complexity 
of international tourism and situate it within the broader currents of development and 
globalization (Lea 1988: 10).  
Table 2.3 Competing Theories of Tourism Development 
Political Economy Approach Functionalist Approach 
Tourism development reflecting colonial 
relationships (Britton 1980,1982); The socio-
spatial nature of tourism development between 
Tourism as a rational development strategy 
(Wilkinson 1989; Rosentraub and Joo 2010): 
Croes 2004: McElroy 2003); Advantages of 
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the core and the periphery (Husbands 1981; 
Oppermann 1995); Enclave structures (Freitag 
1994; Jaakson 2004; Mbaiwa 2005); High costs 
of infrastructure development and low skilled 
employment opportunities (Diamond 1977); 
Unequal dispersal of benefits from tourism 
(Brougham and Butler 1981): Negative cultural 
impact on host communities (Macnaught 1982; 
Wu 1982 Goodwin 2007; Haralambopoulos 
and Pizam 1996; Yang 2011); Inauthentic 
social construction of the “Other” (Silver 1993; 
Wang 1999: Chabra, Healy and Sills 2003: 
Taylor 2001Tourism as a “plantation economy” 
(Hall 1994); Negative environmental impact of 
tourism (Cohen1978; Romeril 1989) 
community based tourism (Sebele 2010; Binns 
and Nelt 2002); Tourism and poverty 
alleviation (Honeck 2008; Hampton 2003); 
Tourism as an integrative enterprise (Pearce 
2001); Tourism and the diversity of consumer 
behavior (Goosens 2000; Gnoth 1997; Chen, 
Mak and McKercher 2011); State capacity to 
manage tourism (Sautter and Leisen 1999); 
Resident attitudes towards enclave resorts 
(Hernandez, Cohen and Garcia 1996); Neutral 
social impacts of tourism (King, Pizam and 
Milman 1993); Tourism as a positive social 
force (Higgins-Desbiolles 2006); Sustainable 
tourism (Bramwell and Lane 2010; Weaver 
2010; Brohman 1996; Beaumont and Dredge 
2010).    
 
Political Economy Approach 
 The political economy model (Britton 1981; King, Pizam, Milman 1993; Baldacchino 
1993; Harrison 2004) emplaced tourism in the developing world as an extension of historical ties 
between former colonies and their metropolitan overseers. The political and military dependency 
that once characterized the relationship between the developing world and Europeans was now 
protracted through the market for travel and associated sectors. The tourism industries these 
scholars argued perpetuated these asymmetrical relationships through established markets and 
investments in host economies and thus creating a new framework of economic and cultural 
dependency. The severing of political ties was replaced by tighter economic and cultural 
dependency that belied the promise of independence for many of these former colonies.  
 Criticism of tourism focused on the high capital demands required to meet supply 
conditions, the spatial concentration of tourist sites and the cultural construction of the other by 
the sending states (Oppermann 1995; Hanna and Casino Jr 2003, Britton 1982). International 
tourism is organized along parameters that may either attenuate economic inequalities or further 
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exacerbate the asymmetrical relationships that exist between host economies and the sending 
states. From a neoclassical perspective, the tourism market functions along a supply and demand 
frontier (see Table 2.4). This necessitates the hard investments required by host countries to 
provide the physical components if they desire to capture the market in international travel. As 
we will see in the case study on Fiji, microstates in particular have to rely on a combination of 
private and public resources to fulfill the supply conditions necessary for success or failure in 
developing their tourism industry. Tourism, as Sinclair (1998: 14) observes is a “composite 
product, involving transport, accommodation, entertainments, natural resources and other 
facilities and services such as shops and currency exchange.” The high capital intensity required 
for infrastructure projects such as building roads, electricity grids, communications, airports and 
accommodations to create conditions amenable for tourism place an unfair burden on receiving 
states, many of whom are developing low income economies (Jafari 1974). However countries 
desirous of acquiring market share in the intensely competitive travel industry cannot afford to 
lag behind in infrastructure development, and therefore feel compelled to undertake expensive 
tourism development projects. Freitag (1994: 541) recounts the example of the Dominican 
Republic to develop the Puerto Plata coast between 1974 and 1982 into a tourism enclave by 
borrowing $76 million dollars to build infrastructure, at the cost of other development priorities.    
Table 2.4: Conditions for Developing Tourism 
Demand Conditions Supply Conditions 
Exotic Experience 
Service 
Entertainment 
Accessibility 
Affordability 
Safety 
Infrastructure 
Accommodations 
Transportation 
Communication 
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 A possible alternative sketched by Rosentraub and Joo (2009: Diagram 2.1) is for 
governments to develop cooperative partnerships with the private sector and co-invest in 
infrastructure projects (Agor 1981), which has the potential for positive spillover effects. In Fiji, 
large resort developments receive incentive packages from the government to generate their own 
electricity which allows the resort to sell excess wattage to neighboring communities, allowing 
rural villagers access electric power. However, the scarcity of capital for developing tourism has 
sometimes caused host communities take imprudent risks and incur huge losses. The US1.2 
Billion dollar Costa Isabella Project in Puerto Rico which started twenty years ago has yet to be 
completed with mounting losses and periodic change in ownership (Hernandez, Cohen and 
Garcia 1996:757-759). The troubled Natadola and Momi Bay Project in Fiji is financed through 
the public pension fund and is losing almost three hundred million Fijian dollars (the next two 
chapters outlines the genesis and implications of these troubled tourism projects in Fiji). 
Diagram 2.1: Public Private Partnerships for Developing Tourism 
 
 
Source: Rosentraub & Joo (2009: 762) 
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Enclave Tourism  
 Tourism, as Lea (1988) has argued is a comprehensive project touching on both the 
temporal and intangible aspects of society. The temporal dimensions of tourism require 
substantial investments in supply conditions to meet acceptable standards in order to create a 
product that is essentially amorphous and liminal. The spatial concentration of the tourism 
industry is intensified by the creation of enclave communities and further exacerbates the 
exploitative nature of the relationship between the core and the periphery. Britton (1982:341) 
argues that;  
 In physical, commercial and socio-psychological terms, then, tourism in a peripheral economy  
 can be conceptualized as an enclave industry. Tourist arrivals  points in the periphery are  typically 
 the primary urban centers of ex-colonies, now functioning as political and economic centers of 
 independent countries…If on package tours, tourist will be transported  from international transport 
 terminals to hotels and resort enclaves. The transport, tour organization and accommodation phases of their 
 itineraries will be confined largely to formal sector tourism companies. Tourists will then travel between 
 resort clusters and return to the primary urban areas for departure.  
Professor Britton’s critique of the enclave type of tourism development goes beyond the merely 
contrived “bubble” experience that self-contained places offer to consumers akin to being on a 
cruise ship (Jaakson 2004), into the very economic arrangements that are instrumental in creating 
the enclave model of tourism development. Similar to the colonial structures that once governed 
these Islands from afar, are now the new organizations that operate and regulate international 
tourism from the core, often located in the former metropoles (Husbands 1981). The tourism 
industry according to Britton (see Diagram 2.2) is disproportionately biased towards enclave 
types of development, for cultural and economic reasons. Operators of self-contained tourist 
areas are able to capture most of the tourist expenditures (Hernandez, Cohen and Garcia 1996; 
Jaackson 2004; Mbaiwa 2005) from the moment they book their travels to the final departure. 
Aside from bureaucratic expenses such as airport taxes or visa fees, guests at inclusive resorts 
have little incentive or opportunity to spend during their travels. International tourism is deeply 
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intertwined with the social and political structures of host economies and thereby exposes them 
to external manipulation by the core countries (Henderson and Ng 2004; Kim, Timothy and Han 
2007; Schwartz 1991; Freedman 2005). The promotional advantages enjoyed by enclave tourism 
through its close relationship with the metropole can easily be withdrawn over conflicts with 
policy and politics, allowing the core to retain political control over the developing world.
28
   
Diagram 2.2: Enclave Model of Third World Tourism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Britton (1982: 342) 
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 The discussion on travel warnings in chapter 5 discusses at length the complicated relationship between host 
economies and sending states, given the nature of the industry per se and the impacts of political instability on 
tourism. 
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 Furthermore, enclave models of tourism development have been notorious in the 
production of “staged authenticity” in the guise of creating sites that mimic the cultural heritage 
of host communities (Chabra, Healy and Sills 2003; Daniel 1996; Hughes 1995; MacCannell 
1979). Tourists do not have to venture out beyond the security of their all inclusive sites to 
“experience” the thrill of travel in a foreign and exotic location, essentially shielding them from 
the social and economic realities of the communities which they ostensibly are guests of. The 
desire on the part of the consumer to have an exotic experience and the willingness of the 
provider to package it for consumption creates a “reification of the other” argues Taylor (2001) 
and does not contribute to heightened awareness and sensitivity of societies different from the 
traveler and enlarges the sense of alienation and objectification (Silver 1993; Adams 1984; 
Bruner 1991).  
 An unintended consequence of enclave tourism seemingly overlooked by critics (Aili, 
Jiaming and Min 2007) is the ability of both the host community and the tourist sector to insulate 
each other from the negative social and cultural impacts of the industry. Whether that is a 
desirable proposition is debatable but it is my contention that scholars cannot have it both ways. 
Enclave tourism is problematic because its creates a superficial product for travelers, while an 
integrated travel experience is detrimental to host culture and society 
Functional Approach 
 
 In the second conceptual model, Mathieson and Wall (1982), McElroy (2003), Agor 
(1981) argue from a functional perspective that tourism as a unique activity should be examined 
intrinsically on how it impacts individuals, society, culture and the environment rather than 
merely as a tool for political and economic domination. This is not to extricate tourism from the 
larger currents of the global economy, but rather to situate the phenomena of international 
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tourism within the context of national economies and the ways in which host economies manage 
and develop this trade in services (Lea 1988: 10). The functional approach towards tourism 
posits the State as an active player in the organization of the tourist industry within its national 
development objectives. In contrast to the pessimism of the political economy model in which 
tourism is “imposed” on economies (Sautter and Leisen 1999: 312-313), the functional model 
attributes agency to actors in the formation and development of tourism, even though it may 
occasionally underestimate the complicated historical realities and economic asymmetries (Lea 
1988: 16). A functional approach according to Sautter and Lesien (1999: 313) require “all 
parties-or stakeholders-interested in or affected by this business within a particular market or 
community…to collectively manage the tourism system.”  
I concur with John Lea (1988) that both models provide the researcher with an inadequate 
framework to understand the phenomena of global tourism. While the development of tourism 
has exploited historic relationships and exacerbated inequalities as articulated by the political 
economy approach of Britton et.al, developing countries have nonetheless adopted tourism as 
part of their development strategy.
29
 Host economies have invested substantial resources and 
capital to develop the tourism industry as a rational response to what they perceive as their 
comparative advantage in the global economy, as is the case of the Fiji Islands. This project 
situates the development of tourism in the Fiji Islands within the functional model as it most 
closely approximates the institutional and organizational diastole of the travel industry. The 
focus of our enquiry is from the perspective of the host economy i.e. the microstate instead of the 
metropole on which the Britton’s enclave model is biased towards (Lea 1988:11).  
                                                          
29
 This is not to suggest that global economic realities and factor endowments may not have constricted their 
capacities to choose otherwise, but this project seeks to examine the impact of tourism per se, within the Fiji Islands. 
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 Table 2.5 illustrates the many possible ways in which host countries can develop tourism 
that is consistent with their resource and structural capabilities. Host communities can develop a 
fairly diversified and sustainable tourism industry as demonstrated by the Fijian experience. The 
complicated nature of the industry requires institutions, incentives and organizational structure to 
develop and adapt to the changing consumer needs, environmental pressures and political 
instability. Scholars that deny the positive role that tourism can potentially play in developing 
peripheral economies make similar assumptions of MIRAB theorists, i.e. that (1) microstates by 
virtue of size and endowments lack agency and consigned to a permanent dependent status (2) 
tourism is a top down process imposed on the periphery (3) the ability to negotiated pathways to 
development is severely compromised or absent (4) incapable of building the necessary 
institutions required for policy (5) lack an interest in preserving the environment (6) culture is 
either unchanging and frozen for posterity or fragile and susceptible to irreparable damage from 
exogenous factors. 
Table 2.5: Range of Development Options 
Approach to Tourism Types of Development Infrastructure 
Political Economy  Enclave Full service luxury Resorts 
Self-contained Boutique 
accommodations 
Island Getaways 
Secluded private Resorts 
 
Functional  Integrated Urban Hotels 
Motels/Day Inns 
Home stays 
Backpackers accommodations 
Adventure Tourism 
Camping sites 
Ecotourism 
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The Fijian case study challenges these assumptions and situates the development of 
tourism within the broader context of challenges facing small economies. Fiji enjoys a 
comparative advantage in tourism because of its location and accessibility to larger and affluent 
neighbors, as well as a carefully cultivated image of an island paradise, but also because it has 
successfully built the institutional structure required for the industry to take flight. Furthermore, 
tourism in Fiji has endured almost twenty-five of chronic political instability and most studies of 
tourism have failed to address the phenomena of tourism under crisis. The survival of tourism 
through the periods of crisis provides an opportunity to examine both the limits of small states in 
the global system and the appropriate policy responses required by them to retain market share, 
justify continued investments and minimize collateral damage to other sectors of the economy. 
Studies have demonstrated that safety and security play a crucial role in determining 
consumer choice about the locations travelers choose to visit. The development of tourism as 
well as the ongoing political crisis in Fiji provides an invaluable opportunity to examine the 
effect of crisis on the industry, the ability of the State to respond to the crisis and most 
surprisingly, the resiliency of the tourism industry to emerge from the political upheavals. 
Whether this is indicative of government foresight and commitment to investing in tourism, or 
the ability of the sector itself to adapt to crisis can only be determined after the case study on Fiji. 
Despite the coverage of the situation in Fiji about its so called “coup culture,” the political 
instability it has experienced, I will argue, has been quite benign in nature. In spite of travel 
warning and in some cases travel restrictions by sending countries, tourism in Fiji has not been 
irretrievably damaged. Consumers, unlike Foreign Service Offices, seem to have a more nuanced 
and sophisticated understanding of travel locations than official policies. 
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Developing Tourism 
John Bryden (1973) argues that tourism emerged as a viable strategy for development in 
small island economies within a specific political and economic framework (Bryden 1973:3) 
rather than as an ad hoc response to exogenous forces. The Caribbean Commonwealth, the site of 
Bryden’s inquiry, appropriated tourism as congruent with their development plans for reasons I 
suggest applies to the Fiji Islands. Bryden (1973) observed that the Caribbean Islands had long 
historical and political ties with the metropole, they suffered from geographical isolation, had 
limited resources and human capital. Survival in the early years following independence either 
meant reverting back to dependency with the metropole as implied by the MIRAB model or 
developing strategies to exploit their comparative advantage in tourism.  
Some possible benefits for development secured by tourism adumbrated by M. Thea 
Sinclair (1998:2) include (1) the provision of hard currency to alleviate a foreign exchange gap 
and to finance imports of capital goods (2) increase employment (3) increasing the GNP and 
personal incomes (4) increase in government tax revenues. Indirect benefits may also include 
informal employment, intercultural exchange, positive externalities from infrastructure 
developments and spillover effects such as skill formation and technical training.  
Data from the World Tourism Organization (WTO) shows that from 1975-2000, global 
tourism increased by 4.6 percent per annum (see Graph 2.1) and provided host countries with a 
new set of challenges and opportunities to expand their market share.  
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Graph 2.1: Worldwide Growth in Tourism 
 
 
Source: World Tourism Organization; International Monetary Fund 
 
Tourism is an important industry and for many microstates an essential component of 
economic development (Shareef and McAleer 2005; Croes 2006; Wilkinson 1989; Taylor 2006). 
This has far reaching implications for all stakeholders involved in this vital sector, especially the 
sending nations whose actions have extraordinary consequences over the economies and 
livelihoods of receiving states. While travel is not a general necessity for survival, the intake of 
tourists for many small economies is (Wang 2009; Narayan 2005; Causey 2007). The efforts in 
developing a viable and thriving tourism industry among the microstates have not gone 
unnoticed, and governments in recent years have embarked on an ambitious effort to develop 
tourism within their countries. However, incorporating tourism as part of a development strategy 
for small economies potentially created problems that could negate gains accrued from the 
expanding trade in services. The burgeoning tourist industry argues Britton (1982) and Wu 
(1982) that tourism foists new forms of dependency on former colonies by metropolitan powers 
through control and ownership of factor endowments integral to exploiting their comparative 
advantage in global tourism. 
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Tourism and Culture 
 Neither the insular mode of enclave development nor limiting the movement of peoples 
effectively addresses the possible consequences of international tourism on culture and the 
environment. Global institutions and norms regulating tourism have emphasized the specific 
responsibility of sending states; multinational corporations and travelers play in maintain the 
integrity of host cultures, the natural environment and social values. The United Nations 
Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in its 18
th
 General Conference in 
1975 adopted resolution 3.411which authorized the Director General to “undertake a study 
concerning the effects of tourism on socio-cultural values” (UNESCO 1976: 75). The UNESCO 
study chided theorists of tourism who exclusively focused on its developmental and economic 
potential (Bryden 1973: 82) and argued instead that “tourism is something more than an 
economic phenomenon with sociological and cultural effects; it has become a phenomenon of 
civilization” (UNESCO 1975: 99). Cognizant of tourisms expansive role in host economies, the 
World Tourism Organization (WTO) drew from existing norms and institutions ratified in 1999 a 
Global Code of Ethics for tourism, with emphasis on the safety of travelers, protection of 
indigenous cultures, economic opportunity for host communities and sustainable development 
(World  Tourism Organization Global Code of Ethics for Tourism:2001). 
 Tourism as a “phenomenon of civilization” therefore remains a fertile area of scholarship 
beyond its institutional and developmental nexus (the focus of this project) by scholars in 
sociology and anthropology who seek to understand the effect of tourism on societies, culture, 
people, language, food, religion, etc. This section will outline the broad contours of the debate on 
the impact of tourism on culture and discuss the findings of few specific case studies as it relates 
to the experience of the Fiji Islands and the microstates of Oceania.   
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 The French, who often admit an acute sensitivity to American tastes and mores, have 
occasionally complained about American cultural imperialism (Time Magazine 1995; Powell 
1995). Culture, they argue cannot be reduced to its simplest verities because it is not only a 
repository of a peoples history, but also their inheritance and identity whether its language, 
creed, ritual or food. These essential components of culture however form the core demands of 
tourism and make international travel the most expansive exercise in intercultural incursion. 
While travel has allowed more people access to other peoples in other places, to explore and to 
learn, it is not without its costs. Critics argue that cultural engagement seeks not to explore but to 
exploit, for profit and gain, and sending States as capitalist economies seek to comodify and 
overwhelm other cultures on its march to maintain economic dominance (Watson and 
Kopachevsky 1994). This form of cultural dominance is quite unique, both in its subtlety and 
pervasiveness, unlike in previous eras of forced conformity under kings and emperors guided by 
the maxim cuius regio, eius religio (whose realm, his religion). International tourism within the 
narrative of capitalism wraps its goods and services inside specific cultural contexts, whether 
hawking sacred sites in South America or traditional art and music in the South Pacific, brought 
to you by Hilton Hotels. International tourism driven by the market imperatives of capitalism 
integrates itself to host communities and cultures in order to provide a “unique” product for 
consumers eager for an “exotic” travel experience (Crick 1989). 
 Sociological and anthropological enquiry into tourism is conceptually organized around 
the psycho-social motivations of tourists and their encounter with the “other” within a specific 
cultural, social and economic milieu. Core issues that are of primary concern to scholars are 
according to Cohen (1984: 374-376) are: (1) Tourism as a commercialized hospitality (2) 
Tourism as democratized travel (3) Tourism as a modern leisure activity (4) Tourism as a 
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modern variety of the traditional pilgrimage (5) Tourism as an expression of basic cultural 
themes (6) Tourism as an acculturative process (7) Tourism as a type of ethnic relations (8) 
Tourism as a form of neocolonialism. International tourism seen through these lenses emerges as 
a problematic and incursive enterprise that objectifies people and their cultures through 
comodification and consumerism (Dogan 1989). The tourist (often western) goes off in search of 
the exotic and the novel in order to discover oneself and ends up projecting on the other his own 
values and priorities, often subconsciously argue Laing and Crouch (2009) and Cater and Cloke 
(2007) in their study of tourists rationales for international travel. International travel goes 
beyond the prosaic need for rest and relaxation and into the realm of an “extraordinary travel 
experience” (Laing and Crouch 2009: 127) through the production of myth, fantasy and 
adventure for individuals in search of a unique exploration of the self (Curtin 2010). 
International travel as an existential phenomenon belies the socio-cultural examination of 
tourism and provides a necessary counterweight against the notion that tourism is merely an 
economic and developmental enterprise. 
 There are few regions in the world that are as emblematic as the South Pacific in 
constructing a desirable and evocative image of place and experience. Farrell (1979: 124) wrote, 
“Each tourist arrives at a Pacific country or in an island group with his or her preconceived 
construction of local life and landscape. This is a very imperfect model, but, nevertheless, it is 
for the tourist his gestalt-external, artificial and contrived.” The mystique of the Pacific Islands 
are eagerly packaged and promoted by the state and sector for tourists yearning to experience the 
myth and mystery of travel to these far flung regions of the globe (Farrell 1979: 125, 128-129). 
Farrell’s argument coincides with the arguments by Watson and Llewellyn (1994), Leiper 
(1997), Nash (1996/7), Jafari (1986) and Diedrich and Garcia-Buades (2009) that international 
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tourism has a deleterious effect on culture for the following reasons (1) the tourist constructs a 
false and misleading image of the host culture (2) that mass tourism has an “invasive” character 
which deforms host communities through new modes of habits and being. There is a legitimate 
concern for microstates in Oceania that visitors, which often outnumber locals given the slight 
demographics of these islands, will introduce changes inimical to traditional communities, such 
as ways of dress, entertainment and social intercourse. Increases in crime, drug and alcohol 
abuse, sexual promiscuity and prostitution are therefore cited as incidences of negative 
externalities resulting from an influx of visitors via tourism. In one of the most comprehensive 
case studies that examined the relationship between crime and tourism, Australian scholars 
Walmsley, Bokovic and Pigram (1981) lamented the lack of research on the effect of tourism on 
host communities in spite of the intuitive relationship between the two phenomena (Walmsley, 
Bokovic and Pigram 1981: 5-6). Most studies have focused on the effect of crime on tourists 
(Brunt and Shepherd 2004; Chesney-Lind and Lind 1986; Brunt, Mawby and Hambly 2000; 
Garofalo 1979; Ryan 1993; Mawby 2000). Pizam (1982) failed to find a strong relationship 
between crime and tourism development in his case study of all fifty states whereas Fujii and 
Mak (1980) Hawaiian case study from the mid seventies revealed higher incidences of property 
crimes in tourist areas when compared to other regions. Albuquerque and McElroy (1999) 
revealed a similar pattern in the Caribbean where property crimes outnumbered other offenses in 
tourist dominated areas. Current research on tourism and casino development by Park (2011)  
failed to account for a strong relationship between the two either, and instead hypothesizes that 
crime is too complex a phenomenon and cannot be attributed to just one targeted variable. An 
obvious limitation of these studies is their focus on the safety and security of tourists abroad 
rather than the negative or illicit effects of tourism on host communities. Case studies that have 
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sought to empirically examine how tourism actually affects host cultures have been circumspect 
in their results on the interaction between tourism, culture and community by King, Pizam and 
Milman (1993) on Nadi in the Fiji Islands or the Samos Island in Greece by Haralambopoulos 
and Pizam (1996). Casino development in Connecticut was examined by Carmichael (2000) and 
the pilgrimage site in Pushkar, India by Joseph and Kavoori (2001) and Andereck, Valentine, 
Knopf and Vogt’s (2005) statewide study of host community attitudes towards tourism 
development in Arizona and its cultural impacts have all contributed to a better understanding of 
the ways in which mass tourism affects host societies (Lindberg and Johnson 1997).  
 Residents attitudes towards tourism and its perceived effect on their community and 
culture are circumscribed by three important factors argue Andereck, Valentine, Knopf and 
Vogt’s (2005: 1057). These are (1) the derivation of economic benefits through jobs and taxes 
for people and the region (2) socio-cultural production and income opportunities through craft-
making and ceremonies and (3) environmental accouterments such as wildlife parks and nature 
developments. Host communities who directly benefit from tourism and related services have an 
acquiescent attitude towards the sector as borne out by King, Pizam and Milman’s important 
case study of Nadi in the Fiji Islands. Nadi town with its heavy concentration of tourism facilities 
and proximity to the international airport was an ideal site to examine many of the assertions 
regarding the negative impacts of tourism on the community. A series of extensive interviews 
was conducted in collaboration with the University of the South Pacific in English and 
vernacular languages to gauge the attitudes, feelings and perspectives of households, individuals 
and people directly, indirectly or outside the tourism sector on the impact of tourism on their 
community, culture, morals and way of life (King, Pizam and Milman 1993: 654-655). Results 
showed that while there were some concerns about drugs and alcohol abuse, increased crime, 
  58 
sexual promiscuity and traffic congestion, many of the benefits accrued from tourism such as 
employment opportunities, increased tax revenues, income from tourism related industry, 
hospitality to strangers and increased confidence among locals in dealing with others 
significantly outweighed any negative externalities (King, Pizam and Milman 1993:663). 
Unsurprisingly, the tabulated data showed an almost 80% favorable attitude towards tourism 
among the inhabitants of Nadi and pride in the fact that the large presence of tourists actually 
enhanced the image of their town from being just another rural backwater (King, Pizam and 
Milman 1993:656-657). 
 I am unaware of any current research available which builds on the work by King, Pizam 
and Milman regarding changes in attitudes towards tourism in Fiji in the years since they 
undertook their study. However, I spent considerable time in Nadi in summer 2010 collecting 
data for this project and in numerous informal conversations with individuals directly and 
indirectly involved in the tourism industry confirmed the earlier findings by King, Pizam and 
Milman. 
 While it is indisputable that tourism affects culture in profound ways and a fertile area of 
scholarship, this project disputes some core claims that are implicit in the literature. (1) One 
could reasonably postulate that cultural erosion in societies affected by globalization is not the 
fault of the West or the United States, but can directly be attributed to defects intrinsic to the host 
culture itself. (2) It is possible that the particular cultural mores and values no longer have the 
legitimacy to sustain itself, and when finally confronted with exogenous force, collapsed under 
the weight of its own irrelevancy. Furthermore, cultures, like societies are organic and change 
and grow, discarding outmoded habits while adopting new modes of being (Rothkopf 1997). (3) 
It is reductionist to imagine that cultures would remain untouched through space and time and 
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quite unfair to criticize outside forces for affecting the way people live and respond in other 
places. Globalization provides a unique opportunity to engage with other cultures and bring to 
them the benefits of modernity, whether it is ideas, trade or technology. (4) Finally, one could 
argue that tourism provides necessary resources for host communities to develop heritage sites 
and fund cultural programs which would otherwise remain in decline. 
 Generating tourist attractions through cultural intercourse and infrastructure is a complex 
undertaking requiring a delicate balance between resource constraints and consumer demands. 
What do tourists want when they travel abroad? Is it cost prohibitive to build museums’ and 
substitute instead with guided tours of traditional villages and sacred sites? Will intensified 
cultural incursions between sending states and host economies erode indigenous society and 
irreparably harm flora and fauna? Is traditional culture permanently deformed as a consequence 
of this cultural intercourse? These a legitimate issues raised by scholars concerned with the 
impact of tourism on culture, but the inordinate bias on tourism as a merely monogystic 
enterprise diminishes the reciprocal nature of international travel. As Gearing, Swart and Var 
(1976: Table 2.6) argue, the criterion for attracting tourists is as varied as individual tastes and 
preferences. 
Table 2.6: Tourist Attraction Criterion 
Group Heading Criterion Considerations 
Natural Factors Natural Beauty 
 
 
 
Climate 
General topography: flora 
and fauna, proximity to lakes, 
rivers, sea; Islands and Islets; 
hot and mineral water 
springs; caverns, waterfalls 
Amount of sunshine; 
temperature; winds, 
precipitation, discomfort 
index 
 
Social Factors Artistic and architectural features 
 
Festivals 
Local architecture; mosques, 
monuments; art museums 
Music and dance festivals; 
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Distinctive local features 
 
 
 
Fairs and exhibits 
 
Attitudes towards tourists 
sports events and 
competitions 
Folk dress; folk music and 
dances (not organized); local 
cuisine; folk handicrafts, 
specialized products 
Normally of a commercial 
nature 
Local congeniality and 
treatment of tourists 
 
Historical Factors Ancient ruins 
 
Religious significance 
 
 
Historical prominence 
Existence, condition and 
accessibility of ancient ruins 
Religious importance, in 
terms of present religious 
observances and practices 
Extent to which a site may be 
well known because of 
important historical events 
and/or legends 
 
Recreational and Shopping Facilities Sports facilities 
 
Educational facilities 
 
 
Facilities conducive to health, rest 
and tranquility 
 
Nighttime recreation 
 
 
Shopping facilities 
 
 
 
 
 
Hunting, fishing; swimming; 
skiing; golf; horseback riding 
Archaeological and 
ethnographic museums; zoos; 
botanical gardens, aquariums 
Mineral-water spas; hot-water 
spas; hiking trails, picnic 
grounds 
Gambling casinos, 
discotheques; theatres; 
cinemas 
Souvenir and gift shops; 
handicraft shops; auto service 
facilities (beyond gasoline 
dispensing stations): 
groceries and necessities 
Infrastructure and Food and Shelter Infrastructure above “minimal 
touristic quality” 
 
 
 
Food and lodging facilities above 
“minimal touristic quality” 
Highways and roads; water; 
electricity, and gas; safety 
services; health services; 
communication; public 
transportation facilities 
Hotels; restaurants; vacation 
villages; bungalows; motels; 
camping facilities 
 
Source: Gearing, Swart & Var (1976: 93) 
Tourism and the Environment 
 
 Unlike the latent cultural changes that occur in society in its encounter with tourism, 
there is nothing subtle about the physical impact on the environment because of tourist industry.  
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Accommodating larges influxes of people inevitably impose extraordinary demands on the 
environment, from developing infrastructure to providing food, entertainment and all that entails 
in making a host economy a desirable travel destination (Doggart and Doggart 1996). What are 
the environmental limits to tourism and how can we account for negative externalities, while 
maintaining that tourism is a legitimate strategy for development in Fiji and similar microstates 
in Oceania? 
 The scope and diversity of internationalism tourism reveal crucial variations of how 
tourism impacts the environment that ultimately determines the policy needs of host 
communities. The environmental impact of tourism on London will differ from the challenges to 
the environment by visitors to the plains of the Serengeti or the small islands of the South 
Pacific. Erik Cohen (1978) provides an excellent four-factor type framework to isolate the 
divergent ways in which tourism impacts the environment and situate tourism within the 
differentiated challenges facing host economies. Cohen (1978: 220-225) argues that the 
environmental impact can only be understood if (a) we know the intensity of tourist site-use and 
development, “the number of tourists visiting a locality, the length of their stay, the things they 
do and the facilities at their disposal determine the intensity and of the accompanying 
development” (b) the resiliency of the eco-system, and its ability to sustain large groups of 
people, i.e. is it a huge metropolis like London, the Australian Outback or small islands? (c) The 
time-perspective of the tourist developer, are investments predicated with “short-run profits in 
mind” or is there a regulatory framework that minimizes the negative externalities brought on by 
tourist developments? (d) the transformational nature of tourist development, large scale tourism 
ultimately changes the environmental landscape, especially “contrived attractions” like 
amusement parks and shopping malls, international tourism as Cohen argues is not confined to 
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merely nature spectacles and untouched environs. The debate between the industry demands and 
environmental concerns have according to Cohen (1978: 215) coalesced around either protecting 
the environment for tourism or protecting the environment from tourism.  
 That tourism imposes an enormous stress on the environment, often with permanent 
consequences is not a debatable proposition, nor is the need for host economies to develop the 
necessary infrastructure required to meet the supply conditions for attracting international 
tourism, which inevitably impacts the environment. This debate has in recent years shifted 
towards sustainable tourism in which national governments are called to play a greater role to 
ensure that the integrity of the physical environment is maintained amidst the challenge of 
national development strategies. Bramwell and Lane (2010:1) have recently argued that 
“Effective management systems for sustainable tourism are, however, likely to require 
intervention and regulation by the state.” Quoting a review on sectoral self regulation by 
Williams and Montanari (1999:38), they concluded that such an effort was largely insufficient 
and short-term. This coincides with Cohen’s argument that the profit-driven time perspective of 
the developer is often in opposition to the longer-term sustainability of the environment and the 
needs of future generations within host communities. The evolution of ecotourism is an attempt 
to maintain the balance between development and the environment and creates opportunities for 
stakeholders to develop innovative products beyond the contrived and often ugly tourist clusters 
that often symbolize the industry. The success of this policy however is largely predicated on the 
ability of governments to oversee tourism development that is sensitive to its environmental 
concerns. 
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Defining Sustainable Tourism 
   
 Sustainable tourism is a mode of travel and development that recognizes the aesthetic 
element inherent in nature as well as the contextual and physical limitations within which the 
activity takes place (Buckley 2004: 1-4; United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and 
Conservation International (CI) 2003; Romeril 1985). In 1993, Valentine took up the challenge 
of defining sustainable tourism as comprising of four essential components: (1) it was based on 
relatively undisturbed natural areas (2) it was non-damaging, non-degrading, ecologically 
sustainable (3) it directly contributed to the continued protection and management of the natural 
areas used, and (4) it was subject to an adequate and appropriate management regime (Valentine 
1993:108-109). The exclusion of human rights concerns and values prompted Honey (2008) to 
argue for the necessity of sustainable tourism respecting and preserving local cultures and 
supporting political rights and democratic aspirations, perhaps a well intentioned but an 
impractical and contentious emendation. The Fijian government defined sustainable tourism in 
its white paper as “a form of nature-based tourism which involves responsible travel to relatively 
undeveloped areas to foster an appreciation of nature and local cultures, while conserving the 
physical and social environment, respecting the aspirations and traditions of those who are 
visited and improving the welfare of local communities” (ESCAP 2003:14). 
 To better meet the challenge of tourism development and environmental sustainability, 
islands nations in the Pacific have begun to craft policies and build institutions to ensure that 
their one comparative advantage which is their location and geography is preserved while 
providing economic opportunities through the tourist sector. A sampling of microstates in 
Oceania (see Table 2.7) outlines initiatives applicable to these islands in order to balance tourism 
development whilst preserving their natural and physical endowments.  
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Table 2.7: Ecotourism and Development in the Pacific 
COUNTRY POLICY and INSTITUTIONS 
American Samoa 
 
 
 
 
 
Fiji 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kiribati 
 
 
 
 
Solomon Islands 
Local and federal laws prohibit construction on archaeological sites 
The creation of the American Samoa National Park 
The establishment of the Historic Preservation Office 
The United States Coral Reef Initiative assists in the area of coastal 
management 
 
Government white paper in 1995 on “Ecotourism and Village-based Tourism” 
The establishment of the Fiji Ecotourism Association to promote ecotourism 
projects 
The first Tourism Resources Owners Conference in 2000 to build on 
government white paper 
The establishment of an Ecotourism Development Unit inside the Ministry of 
Tourism  
The Environmental Act of 2005 that regulates sustainable projects in the tourism 
sector 
 
The establishment of the National Tourism Marketing and Development Plan 
The introduction by the government of a Wildlife Act that prohibits killing birds 
indigenous to the Island 
The creation of marine conservation areas 
 
The formation of the Solomon Islands Ecotourism Association to promote and 
encourage sustainable tourist development 
The establishment of  “Ecolodges” at UNESCO world heritage sites 
Collaborative partnerships between Solomon Islands Development Trust and 
The World Fund for Nature, Conservation International and the Nature 
Conservancy to develop tourism in protected areas such as the Guadalcanal 
Province 
  Source: Ecotourism Development in the Pacific Islands (2003) United Nations Economic and Social     
 Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The debate over tourism is essentially between microstates and the tourist industry on 
ways to develop policies and allocate resources that will maximize national development 
priorities and minimize negative externalities, and not on whether one should encourage tourism 
for developing island economies. The argument presented here suggests that the small islands in 
Oceania are quite aware of the fundamental challenges facing their societies and the costs 
involved in developing tourism. In contrast to the MIRAB thesis which asserts that microstates 
lack any institutional and organizational capacity to organize their economies other than beg, 
borrow or leave, these small economies are doing the best they can to exploit their comparative 
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advantage through developing a tourism based economy while fully cognizant of the negative 
externalities that will ineluctably emerge. 
 The development of tourism in the Fiji Islands as a typical microstate therefore 
encompass many of the challenges that are unique to small island developing states in the global 
economy even though the necessity for social and economic development are not exclusive to 
these islands alone. The political economy of tourism in Fiji emerged between two substantial 
issues that could not have been foreseen at Independence in 1970, first, the irrevocable decline of 
sugar production, long a mainstay of the national economy and secondly, the ongoing political 
instability brought on by four coup d’états since 1987. While tourism has gradually overtaken 
sugar production in earnings, it has done so in often difficult and complex situation compelling 
actors and institutions in Fiji to calibrate resources and policy in lieu of changed circumstances. 
 The next chapter delineates the institutional framework that is responsible for the 
emergence of tourism in Fiji, from uncertain beginnings during the colonial era to its dominant 
status today. Over the last two decades the Fijian government, forced by exigent circumstances, 
went beyond the regime of incentives and inducements for private investments in the tourism 
industry to becoming a direct investor with public funds in it. Chapter five chronicles the reasons 
and consequences of State involvement in the sector and how tourism in Fiji could possibly have 
transitioned into an industry “too big to fail.” Both State and industry in Fiji have had to respond 
to the ongoing political instability in Fiji as well as the environmental challenges facing small 
island economies. Chapter six examines the existential threat posed by politics and nature to 
tourism and the policy responses by stakeholders to confront these crises.  
  Neither costs nor externalities can be obviated regardless of which model of tourism a 
community chooses to develop (see Diagram 2.3). An enclave model of tourism may insulate the 
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host community from social or cultural externalities but at the cost of minimizing benefits for 
locals through high leakages, spillover trading opportunities and enclosed infrastructure 
development. A more integrated functional model of tourism development has greater negative 
externalities but increases the potential a better accrual of benefits for communities. Only when 
benefits outweigh costs and externalities could one posit that developing tourism in microstates 
has been a reasonably good proposition. Chapter six concludes with a summation on whether 
comparative advantage is a better theoretical explanation of microstates survival in the global 
economy as opposed to scholars who argue that migration, remittances and foreign aid (MIRAB) 
is the best plausible reason that we have that explains the existence of small island economies.   
Diagram 2.3: Developing Tourism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Costs: Infrastructure, Promotional, 
Institutional, Political, Developing 
Human Capital 
Externalities 
Social/Cultural, Environmental 
Benefits 
Employment, Small business opportunities, Foreign Exchange 
earnings, Infrastructural spillover, Training and development 
Functional 
Tourism 
Enclave 
Tourism 
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Chapter Three 
The Development of Tourism in Fiji 
Introduction 
 The bourgeoning tourism industry in Fiji today could hardly been envisioned decades ago 
when the Fiji Islands was a colony of Great Britain. While assorted groups of explorers, 
adventurers, sailors and merchants often traversed the vast and hostile Pacific Ocean, few if any 
did so for purposes of pleasure or respite.
30
 The emergence of mass international tourism has 
transformed the image of the Pacific Islands as places of escape from a harried world (Laing and 
Crouch 2009) on languid beaches and comfortable accommodations with marquee names 
familiar to most travelers. International tourism arrived in Fiji, albeit with uncertain origins and 
this chapter explores the crucial role that the State played in tourisms emergence in Fiji and the 
ensuing impact that the sector had in the development of the economy. This project has 
consistently argued that the survival of microstates in the global economy is directly related in its 
ability to exploit its comparative advantage within fairly circumscribed parameters. This section 
draws on primary documents to delineate the first original examination of the institutional 
development of tourism in the Fiji Islands and its investment strategies. The following chapter 
will analyze the opportunity costs and consequences of Fiji’s investment policies in tourism 
within the context of national developmental priorities and the limitations faced by microstates. 
The Fijian case study reiterates a countervailing argument peculiar to microstates against the 
dependency model (MIRAB) in the ability of small oceanic states to institutionally develop and 
manage their economies. Microstates could either organize national economies through 
                                                          
30
 The celebrated travels of Robert Louis Stevenson to the Samoan Islands in the 1880s or Gauguin in Tahiti around 
the same time as Stevenson were more exceptions than the rule as individuals who went to the South Pacific Islands 
for recreational purposes. 
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expanding sources of foreign aid and remittances through labor migration and increased 
dependency with former metropoles and regional powers or create the structures necessary for 
exploiting their comparative advantage. The case study on the Fiji Islands argues that in spite of 
modest beginnings and few resources, small islands could over time develop institutions and 
strategies congruent with its endowments and national development.      
Historical Origins of Tourism 
 
 The development of tourism in the Fiji Islands evolved through four distinct phases (see 
Ministry of Tourism General Information on Tourism in Fiji) from its primitive beginnings until 
1964 to the birth of mass tourism in the early seventies. From 1973 through 1986 the tourist 
industry experienced steady growth only to be disrupted by the ongoing political instability 
engulfing Fiji since the first coup d’état of 1987. In a later section I will examine the impact of 
crisis and instability on the tourism sector in Fiji and the possible modes in which the industry 
had successfully negotiated its way through them.     
 Most of the old colonial structures in the capital city of Suva in Fiji has now been 
replaced by the ubiquitous cinderblock and assorted skyscrapers, but just from the old 
Government building in Suva, facing the ocean stands a dilapidated structure that was a jewel in 
a neighborhood once strictly reserved for the colonial elite. Named the Grand Pacific Hotel, it 
was completed in 1914 to expand the stock of available accommodations for tourists and 
travelers to Fiji and those crossing the pacific, via the Islands. The Hotel exuded a certain 
charm
31
 which years later author James Michener (1992: 28-29) would recount his experience of 
staying at the Grand Pacific: 
                                                          
31
 I had once attended a function at the Grand Pacific Hotel almost 30 years ago and it was as impressive an 
experience as Michener described, evocative of the colonial experience and heritage in the Fiji Islands. 
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"And then came the target of my trip I would ever make to Fiji: one of the memorable hotels of the world, 
not majestic and not particularly spacious, but a haven to all who crossed the Pacific on tourist ships or who 
now came by airplane. It was the Grand Pacific Hotel, famed G.P.H of the travel books, a big squarish 
building of several floors, with a huge central dining area filled with small tables, each meticulously fitted 
with fine silver and china, bud vases, and a facing porch leading out to the lawn that went down to the sea. 
It was grand, and it certainly was pacific, and the barefoot Indians who served the meals had a grace that 
few hotels in the world could offer and none surpass." 
 
A decade after the opening of the Grand Pacific Hotel, the White Settlement League convinced 
the colonial government to establish a tourist bureau to promote tourism to the islands and in 
February 1924 the Fiji Publicity Board was formed to “make recommendations with a view to 
popularizing the colony to tourists, to provide facilities to tourists to visit places of interest, to 
consider the best suitable methods of providing funds for the objects it desired to attain.” 
(Ministry of Tourism General Information on Tourism). In 1931, the government according to 
the Tourism Ministry report allocated 535 pounds to advertise Fiji abroad as well as producing 
literature promoting the colony as a travel destination. Reserved in the National Library of 
Australia are the earliest records of these efforts in developing a tourism market by the Fiji 
Publicity Board in cooperation with the colonial government of the time with publications such 
as “Fifty Trips in Fair Fiji” a souvenir program on the visit of the R.M.S. Strathaird to Suva in 
1936 or “How to Spend a Day in Suva” and “How to Spend a Holiday in Fiji” (the former two 
published sometime in the 1930’s). These early attempts in developing tourism underscored the 
collaborative relationship between the State and the tourism sector and a harbinger of the 
complex dependency between the two over the years. Following the Second World War the Fiji 
Publicity Board recognized that infrastructure limitations presented substantial obstacles to 
expanding the market for tourism in Fiji and lobbied the government to improve the country’s 
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only airport
32
 and build roads between towns and hotels. In 1952 the Fiji Publicity Board 
changed to its current name “Fiji Visitors Bureau” and became formally incorporated into the 
tourism ministry portfolio of the government.  
Institutional Development of Tourism in Fiji 
 
 In 1958 the United States Department of Commerce with the Pacific Area Travel 
Association (PATA) which Fiji was a founding member sponsored the first comprehensive study 
of tourism as a potential vehicle for economic development in the Pacific and the Far East. The 
results published in 1961 and known as the “Checchi Report” (Clement 1961) explicated in its 
recommendations that Fiji was ideally located geographically to develop a robust tourist market. 
The Fiji Islands had easy access by sea and air as well as available markets for tourists due to its 
proximity to New Zealand and Australia. Fiji furthermore had a vibrant indigenous culture, 
relatively developed and stable and therefore could be the foundation on which to build the 
tourism industry (Clement, 1961: 157). The report forecasted that by 1968 with increased state 
investments in tourism, Fiji could increase its 1958 visitor arrivals of some 12,000 to 45,000 
travelers bringing in receipts from $2.5M (USD) up to $10M (USD) within a decade. This 
fourfold increase in visitors and receipts seemed overly optimistic at the time when the tourism 
industry in the Islands was still in its formative stages. Fiji astonishingly exceeded both these 
benchmarks, with 67,467 visitors to Fiji in 1968 and tourist expenditures totaling $20M U.S. 
dollars. Data on visitor arrivals to Fiji from 1960 to 1970 (see Table 3.1) reveal a steady increase 
in tourist traffic to the islands across the main sending countries. These results were a 
consequence of a calibrated strategy by the State and industry stakeholders to develop an 
                                                          
32
 The only international Airport in Nadi was until 1970 managed by the New Zealand government and subsequently 
purchased by the Government after Independence. 
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institutional structure that would enable Fiji to capture the gains from the emerging travel 
industry.   
Table 3.1: Visitor Arrivals to Fiji: 1960-1970 
YEAR Australia NZ USA Canada UK Cont. Eur Pacific Is. Others TOTAL 
1960 2241 3186 3414 333 1477  1837 1784 14272 
1961 2129 2924 4330 339 997  1885 2118 14722 
1962 2715 3624 5444 542 2009  2449 1472 18255 
1963 4795 5705 6023 679 1849  3366 1829 24246 
1964 7496 7839 7848 880 2148 1723 2969 721 31624 
1965 9092 11169 9535 1293 3018 1606 3236 1186 40135 
1966 10056 12342 10204 1299 4017 1963 3772 908 44561 
1967 14928 14830 12754 1653 3698 2012 4423 1723 56021 
1968 21402 13239 16650 2277 3896 1783 5764 1447 66458 
1969 26884 15779 22276 3679 5658 2893 6368 1626 85163 
1970 34409 19070 31257 5574 6491 3439 7436 2366 110042 
Source: Fiji Bureau of Statistics 
 
 The first regulation endorsed by the legislative council to encourage tourism in the 
Islands was in 1962 when a duty free ordinance was passed to exempt luxury goods such as 
cameras, telescopes and tape recorders. With increased visitors from abroad, namely Australia 
and New Zealand, this was seen as an attractive measure to promote Fiji as a shopping 
destination. Complementing the duty free ordinance was the hugely influential Hotels Aid 
Ordinance of 1964 designed specifically to assist the building of new hotels in Fiji. This 
legislation remains the institutional benchmark for the expansion and emergence of a serious 
tourism industry in Fiji and the site for all incentive mechanisms and structures that the State has 
undertaken on behalf of the tourism industry. 
 The 1964 hotel ordinance was explicitly stipulated as an “Act to provide for the 
encouragement of hotels in Fiji by the provision of financial inducements” (Hotels Aid Act: 
1964). These included a “cash subsidy of 7 percent of total capital investment, excluding the cost 
of land and an accelerated depreciation allowance over a period of 15 years”. Included also was a 
  72 
“55 percent investment allowance which in effect meant that 55 percent of the total capital cost 
of the project [could] be written off against profits as free of tax” (Hotels Aid Act 1975). These 
provisions remained virtually unchanged when the Act came up for debate in Parliament in 1975 
and the only significant amendment added in that period was the institution of a new schedule for 
the “turnover tax.”33 The consensus amongst both the government of the day and the opposition 
was that the incentive structure produced the desired outcome of increasing both facilities and 
visitors to Fiji as stated by the Minister of Finance E. J. Beddoes during hearings in Parliament 
on the Hotel Aid Act: 
“As you are aware Sir, the Ordinance was enacted in 1964 and has been instrumental in assisting the 
growth of accommodation facilities and tourism generally. Consequently, we now have accommodation 
facilities comparable to the best in the world, ranging from the modest and inexpensive to the luxurious. 
There are now over 5,000 hotel rooms and in excess of 12, 000 beds available in the country” (Hansard 
Parliamentary Papers 1888:1975).  
 
The Hotel Aid Act was extended by parliament in 1976, 1981 and 1986 remained essentially 
unchanged and established the parameters for investment, development and strategies between 
the State and the tourism industry in the Fiji Islands.  
 The first major change to the Hotel Aid Act transpired in 1996 when it was amended to 
include a “short life investment” provision for the construction of new hotels. The shift to an 
enclave model requiring substantial capital investment compelled the government to expand the 
incentive package. The “short life investment” package was specifically designed to encourage 
the development of large scale hotels that would facilitate the rapid increase in visitor arrivals to 
Fiji (see Table 2) as well as accommodate the future growth of the industry. The amendment 
stipulated that:  
                                                          
33
 “turnover” means all sums or amounts received or receivable by a hotel for accommodation and refreshment and 
all other sums or amounts debited to and included in a hotel guest’s bill” this amounted to a 3% sales tax (See 
appendix for the full schedule). 
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(a) With a minimum capital investment of not less than F$40 million exclusive of the cost of land, but 
including the cost of support infrastructure and overseas consulting fees; and 
(b) With a minimum room capacity (in the new hotel) of not less than 200 bedrooms; and 
(c) Where the building of the hotel commences at anytime on or after 13 February 1996 and is completed 
on or before 30 June 2000. 
“Short life investment package” means the various exemptions, concessions, and allowances provided for 
by sections 21 to 24 inclusive in respect of a short life investment. 
 
The new amendments to the Hotel Aid Act also replaced the previous year tax exemption with a 
new schedule, a special depreciation allowance, carry forward of losses and license to hotels to 
generate its own electricity. The following are the details pertaining to section 21-24; 
Income Tax Exemption 
21. (1) notwithstanding anything in the Income Tax Act the income of the company derived from the 
operation of the hotel shall be exempt from the income tax for a period of 20 years. 
(2) The Minister shall notify the Commissioner of Inland Revenue when final approval is given. 
Special Depreciation Allowance 
22. (1) The company shall be entitled in any one of the eight years immediately succeeding the tax free 
period to in section 21 to claim a special depreciation allowance against the income arising from the 
operation of the hotel of up to the total amount of the capital expenditure incurred in the short life 
investment excluding the cost of land. 
(2) The special depreciation allowance provided for by subsection (1) shall be an alternative and not in 
addition to any claim for depreciation otherwise available under the Income Tax Act. 
Carry Forward of Losses 
23. Subject to the provisions of the Income Tax Act any loss incurred by the company in the operation of 
the hotel may be set off against its income from other sources for the same year or may be carried forward 
and set of against what would otherwise have been the total income of the company for the next six years in 
succession.  
Electricity Generation 
24. (1) The company shall be entitled to be issued with a license under the Electricity Act to operate a 
generating station for the purpose of providing electricity for the hotel. 
(2) Any electricity generated by the company and surplus to the company’s requirement may be sold. 
(3) For the avoidance of doubt the company shall comply with all requirements of the Electricity Act in 
respect of its generating station. 
 
Table 3.2: Visitor Arrivals to Fiji: 1991-1999 
YEAR AUST NZ USA Canada UK Europe Japan Asia Pac  Is Others TOTAL 
1991 86625 30631 31842 15242 16555 26265 27802 7420 16227 741 259350 
1992 87395 37227 34802 12602 16795 29513 35960 7206 15627 949 278534 
1993 77609 40778 42557 12447 20233 29786 38203 7731 16985 113 287462 
1994 85532 53495 45351 12018 23915 31004 39782 8370 17931 1476 318874 
1995 78503 59019 39736 10412 24409 30968 45300 11335 17461 1352 318495 
1996 79534 63430 38707 11431 28907 31875 44598 21104 18545 1429 339560 
1997 80351 68116 44376 13359 35019 32806 44783 18556 20381 1724 359441 
1998 100756 70840 48390 12837 39341 29334 35833 9321 22850 1840 371342 
1999 118272 72156 62131 13552 40316 28371 37930 9286 26090 1851 409955 
Source: Fiji Bureau of Statistics 
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It can be argued that the new incentive structure promulgated by the State was in 
response to the exponential growth of tourism and the corresponding pressures put on existing 
facilities. While reliable data is lacking on whom benefited from the previous financial 
inducements, it can be reasonably adduced from the 1996 amendment that most of the subsidies 
had traditionally been utilized towards constructing small to medium tourist accommodations. 
One could postulate that local entrepreneurs had an opportunity to capitalize on State 
inducements to become operators of small boutique hotels before the State shifted its investment 
policies in favor of larger and more capital intensive projects. In a later section (Chapter 5) data 
will show that Fiji has a fairly even distribution of hotel ownership between locals and foreign 
nationals in spite of some incentives biased towards enclave type of projects. The parliament in 
1999 further amended the Act by splitting the Income Tax provision of the “short life 
investment” incentive structure to 10 years for capital investments under F$40 million while 
retaining the 20 year tax exemption for capital investments over F$40 million (Amendment Act 
1999). 
Organizational Structure of Tourism  
 
The anemic organizational capabilities of microstates particularly in the management of 
complex sectors such as international tourism pose a significant challenge that is difficult to 
overcome. While there has been a gradual localization of professional positions, many island 
economies still rely on external expertise and resources for administrative and technical 
projects.
34
 The complications of developing a service industry that is closely intertwined with 
global economic forces cannot be exaggerated, nor the many domestic challenges that inevitably 
                                                          
34
 A recent example is the formation of an anti-corruption body in Fiji in 2007, the Fiji Independent Commission 
Against Corruption (FICAC) and its inability to find personnel with specialized skills to fill key positions (such as 
forensic accountants). 
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emerge in these traditional and fairly isolated societies. International tourism is a complex 
industry and poses significant obstacles for governments in small states to manage the numerous 
competing interests and organizations that have a stake in the sector. Both the paucity of 
organizational capabilities and the presence of sectoral complexity create insurmountable 
barriers according to the MIRAB model for microstates to overcome and successfully execute 
their development objectives. An example of organizational complexity required of international 
tourism is illustrated in the following report on the effect of climate change on tourism in Fiji 
(Table 3.3) and demonstrates the interlocking relationship between multiple stakeholders with 
competing agendas in the tourism industry, and the ability of the government to negotiate and 
address the issue at hand: 
Table 3.3: Summary Report on Effect of Climate Change in the Tourism Sector in Fiji 
ORGANIZATION ROLE RELEVANT PARTNERSHIP/RELATIONSHIP 
Ministry of 
Tourism 
Advocates sustainable tourism, 
supports small (eco)tourism, 
operations, policy development and 
recommendations: new Master Plan 
Department of Environment, Ministry of Health, 
Fiji Visitors Bureau, University of the South Pacific 
Department of 
Environment 
Focal point for UNFCCC, National 
Communications, Approve 
Environmental Impact Assessments 
(EIA), climate change policy, 
Environmental Act 
Ministry of Health, Disaster Management Office, 
Ministry of Agriculture, Lands Department, 
Meteorological Service, Ministry of Forestry and 
Fisheries, SPREP 
Meteorological 
Service 
Climate observation; issue warnings, 
work with sectors on climate change 
issues 
Department of Environment, Disaster Management 
Office, Fiji Visitors Bureau, FIHTA, agriculture 
(e.g. food for tourists), hydrology (water), public 
works (roads, etc), FEA etc. 
Disaster 
Management 
Office 
Responsible for disaster 
management, work closely with 
SOPAC, implement CHARM, 
training activities 
Department of Environment, SOPAC, 
Meteorological Service, Local Town Councils  
Department of 
Town and Country 
Planning 
Approve developments (inc. set back 
from shore); depend on EIAs 
undertaken, require good supply of 
information for their approval 
process 
Department of Environment, Department of Mineral 
Resources 
Ministry of Health Administer building codes, work 
with border control on diseases, food 
Department of Environment, Local Town Councils 
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hygiene, water quality monitoring 
University of the 
South Pacific 
Research on climate change, 
modeling/adaptation, cyclones, 
erosion, marine issues and 
sustainable tourism, involved in 
tourism Master Plan 
Ministry of Health, Disaster Management Office, 
Department of Environment, WWF, SPREP 
SOPAC Risk/disaster management, mapping: 
CHARM, cost benefit analysis 
Department of Environment, Disaster Management 
Office, Department of Lands 
WWF South 
Pacific 
Awareness raising for climate 
change: start marine based GEF 
project 
University of the South Pacific 
Councils Local issues; can recommend on new 
developments; have health 
inspectors, local infrastructure, e.g. 
drainage 
Ministry of Health, Disaster Management Office 
Department of 
Lands 
Involved in new development (when 
land is claimed), role for new policy 
re overwater bungalows 
Department of Mineral Resources, Department of 
Town and Country Planning, SOPAC 
SPREP Regional climate change framework Department of Environment 
Ministry of 
Agriculture 
Erosion, sedimentation, climate 
change will affect crop/yield/land use 
Meteorological Service, Department of 
Environment 
Ministry of 
Fisheries and 
Forestry 
Fisheries deal with marine 
biodiversity, coral reefs 
Department of Environment, Meteorological 
Service, WWF South Pacific 
SPTO Regional marketing organization, 
develop new strategies 
Fiji Visitor Bureau, SPREP 
Fiji Visitor Bureau National marketing agency, work 
closely with businesses on disaster 
management 
Meteorological Service, FIHTA, tourism operators 
Fiji Hotel and 
Tourism 
Association 
(FIHTA) 
Represent hotel and diving industry; 
lobby at government level; short term 
concerns including some aspect of 
sustainability 
Fiji Visitors Bureau, Meteorological Service, hotel 
and dive operators 
Fiji Ecotourism 
Association 
Represent 60 small businesses Small tourism operators (mainly outer Islands, 
Yasawas) 
Native Land Trust 
Board (NLTB) 
Manage land on behalf of native 
landowners, negotiate with 
developers 
Native landowners 
Fiji Trade 
Investment Board 
(FTIB) 
Issue investment certificate for new 
developments 
 
Source: Ministry of Tourism 
 
While institutions create the necessary structure for microstates to fully exploit their 
comparative advantage in tourism, it is the evolution of mediating organizations that plays a 
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pivotal role on behalf of both public and private interests in Fiji to promote, nurture and develop 
the industry. Tourism in Fiji is a complex industry with multiple stakeholders, special interests 
with substantial foreign and local investments in a country that has experienced significant 
political crisis since independence. This interlocking relationship between differentiated actors is 
not unique to Fiji as governments across the South Pacific have often collaborated with various 
representatives on issues pertaining to social and economic development. For example, land 
management in microstates according to Peter Lamour (Ghai 1990:27) is “managed by three 
methods: by bureaucracies, by markets and by communities.” In a similar study on foreign 
investors, Anthony Hughes examined the role that multiple stakeholders played in microstates in 
Oceania to create an environment amenable for investment (Ghai 1990:210).  
It is a central thesis of this project that microstates have the ability to successfully 
construct institutions and organizations to capture the gains from tourism in order to survive in 
the global economy despite low administrative capacities. An examination of the principal actors 
that facilitate the tourist economy in Fiji will yield important insights into how small states 
exploit their comparative advantage and execute the policy initiatives and promote economic 
development and the intricate relationship between varied organizations which have a stake in 
tourism in Fiji. 
The Role of the Fiji Islands Trade and Investment Board (FTIB) 
 
 The principle agency responsible for overseeing the investment incentives in Fiji for all 
sectors of the economy is the Fiji Islands Trade and Investment Board (FTIB). The agency was 
formally created in 1980 through the “Economic Development Board Act (EDB) No. 11 and 
amended in 1999 to become FTIB “to promote, stimulate and facilitate economic development in 
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Fiji.”35 The establishment of the FTIB signaled a systematic approach by the state to attract 
foreign investments through incentives across all the major sectors of the Fijian economy. The 
1999 Foreign Investment Act (Amended 2004) and the current Foreign Investment Regulation 
(2009) provide the parameters for FDI in Fiji such as the following guarantees, competitive 
taxation, investment allowances, freedom to repatriate funds, investment financing and work 
permits: 
Table 3.4: Policies and Incentives (FTIB) 
Policies Incentives 
Guarantees Protection regarding the compulsory acquisition of property.  
The right to repatriate or remit funds.  
Competitive Taxation for Investors Corporate and income tax of 28%;  
Tax holidays for a period of 13 years for NEW investments in the tax free 
regions;  
Exemptions of custom duty on equipments;  
Export Income Deduction of 50%; 
Investment Allowances Industry specific incentives (tourism, ICT, mining, audio visual, ship 
building, fishing, agriculture, bio fuel production, and the bus industry);  
Dividend exemption scheme – corporate dividends are taxed only once, 
avoiding the duplication involved with taxing both corporate profits and 
shareholder incomes.  
Double taxation agreements – Fiji has concluded double taxation 
agreements with major trading partners, including Australia, Japan, 
Malaysia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the Republic of Korea and the 
United Kingdom. Double tax agreements with Australia, Japan, New 
Zealand and the United Kingdom contain specific guarantees that tax 
incentives and concessions granted by the Fiji Islands will not be by the 
other party’s taxation.  
All investors are required to lodge an application for a tax identification 
number to the Chief Executive Officer, Fiji Island Revenue and Customs 
Authority. This provides the basis for investors to pay taxes on their 
business earnings, pay as you earn (PAYE) tax on behalf of their employees 
and value added tax (VAT) on the products and services it sells in the 
country. 
Freedom to Repatriate Funds Under the current exchange control regulations, local investors are free to 
remit funds abroad to meet the costs of obligations incurred overseas. 
In addition, foreign investors are able to remit profits and capital earned 
from its operations in Fiji. At present, there are no limits to the amount that 
can be repatriated as profits and earnings, subject to application to the 
Reserve Bank of Fiji.  
                                                          
35
 See website at http://www.ftib.org.fj/pages.cfm/ftiborgfj/ (accessed May 10, 2011). 
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The Reserve Bank officials can readily provide investors with complete 
information on the requirements relating to remittances offshore. 
Financing Investment Government encourages a competitive domestic financial market. Local 
investors are freely able to seek finance for their investments from domestic 
financial institutions, ranging from fully commercial banking institutions to 
concessionary development financiers.  
Foreign investors (companies) are allowed to borrow $3 for every $1 
invested in Fiji and up to a total of F$10m from local lending institutions 
without the approval of the Reserve Bank of Fiji. Foreign investors wishing 
to borrow more than this delegated limit must apply to the Reserve Bank of 
Fiji through their designated lending institution.  
Individual foreign investors may also borrow locally up to F$0.5m without 
the approval of the Reserve Bank of Fiji. 
Entitlement to Work Permits The Department of Immigration administers the Immigration Act, and its 
officers will provide investors with any information they require on its 
legislative provisions. All applications for work permits should be made to 
the Department of Immigration, in accordance with the forms and 
procedures specified therein. In addition, the Department of Immigration 
has within it a special unit that specifically handles the processing of all 
investment related work permits.  
All investors, local and foreign, may apply to the Department of 
Immigration for work permits to employ expatriate skilled technical 
personnel. In accordance with the provisions of the Immigration Act, work 
permits for up to a maximum of three years may be granted at any one time 
to expatriates, whose skills are unavailable in the domestic labor market. 
Investors are expected to develop and implement plans to train locals to 
understudy, these expatriate employees.  
Government therefore welcomes equally local and foreign private investors. 
Government is also strongly committed to stimulating and facilitating all 
private investment, whether from local or foreign sources. 
Source: Fiji Islands Trade and Investment Board (FTIB) 
 
The incentive policies articulated by the state through the FTIB projected the vision of 
Fiji as an ideal location for investment opportunities and special packages for the tourism sector 
(Hotels Aid Act, Short Life Investment) and encouraged foreign incursion into the tourist 
market. The State argued that the positive spillovers accrued in the form of employment, 
increased market share, improved infrastructure and destination branding
36
 outweighed the fiscal 
                                                          
36
 See government media release at 
http://www.fiji.gov.fj/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3624:government-to-continue-to-boost-
tourism&catid=71:press-releases&Itemid=155  and National Tourism Summit report at 
http://www.internetpacific.com/tes/docs/speeches/tony_01.pdf. (accessed October 9, 2011). 
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and opportunity costs associated with the generous incentive packages, especially for the tourism 
sector.
37
  
Five Year Development Plans 
 
Legislatively, the government incorporated tourism into its annual development plan in 
recognition of its increasing role in Fiji’s economic strategy. In Fiji’s Seventh Development Plan 
(1976-1980), the government justified its direct involvement by stating that the “…contribution 
of tourism to the economy is substantial, some 13% in 1975…” and projected that growth in 
tourism will most likely outpace the rest of the economy as a whole and “…it is expected that in 
1980, it will represent a bigger share of national income” (Fiji Seventh Development Plan 
1975:170). The development plan in this period focused on three core areas related to tourism; 
encouraging the use of local products, increasing local equity and ownership and developing 
scenic infrastructure.  
The government attempted to minimize some of the foreign exchange leakages due to 
high rates of food imports by boosting local producers and commodities. The agriculture and 
fisheries department helped local farmers and cooperatives to market their products to major 
hotels and resorts, as well as educate domestic producers to the needs of the industry.
38
 While the 
tax incentive packages (The Hotel Aid Act) encouraged the construction of new tourist sites, the 
government began to invest in scenic infrastructure such as parks, beaches and other natural 
attractions and continued underwriting the promotion of tourism through the Fiji Visitors 
                                                          
37
 The FTIB has a special section dedicated just to Tourism, see http://www.ftib.org.fj/pages.cfm/for-
investors/sector-industry-profiles/tourism-sector.html(accessed May 10, 2011) 
38
 On a personal note, I clearly recall in the mid seventies at the time of this development plan helping my Uncle on 
the farm to harvest local fruits and vegetables for the large tourist hotels in town. He had divided part of his land 
from sugar cane to planting produce for the hotels as part of a cooperative arrangement. Unfortunately, I have not 
been able to trace hard data that would track the scope of this policy and the precise incentive package offered to 
local producers. 
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Bureau. Table 3.5 shows the projected size of Governments capital expenditure for the industry 
during the Seventh Plan period (Fiji Seventh Development Plan 1975:173).  
Table 3.5: Capital Expenditure Program: Tourism (Thousands) 
 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 TOTAL 
Resort infrastructure development 10.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 210.0 
Development of beaches, scenic resorts and 
other natural attractions 
20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 
TOTAL 30.0 70.0 70.0 70.0 70.0 310.0 
Source: Fiji Seventh Development Plan 
 
The high capital requirements posed a barrier to entry for local entrepreneurs to enter the tourism 
sector and could potentially create a skewed ownership of the industry. The government as part 
of its development plan floated the possibility of establishing a unit trust that would invest in the 
tourism sector with shares that could be sold to the public at a later date, however, nothing 
definitive was promulgated. 
 By 1979, tourism was Fiji’s second largest industry and the Eighth Development Plan 
(1981-1985) looked to diversify the industry beyond its concentrated centers in the western part 
of the main island. According to the Central Planning Office, the tourism sector had contributed 
almost $16 million (1980 FD) to the regional GDP, not including the multiplier effect and other 
tourist related benefits such as transportation, personal services and construction (Fiji Eighth 
Development Plan 1980: 67). The focus was on expanding tourism to the outer islands and in 
areas within the mainland that could benefit from the industry. However, not all islands were 
determined to be adequate sites for tourism according to criteria established by the government, 
only “Tourist Resort Islands” and “Day Visit Islands” were designated as suitable locations for 
tourist development, whereas “Local Subsistence Islands” (indigenously populated islands 
engaging in agricultural and fishing activities) and “Island Reserves” (possessing specific and 
unique features of importance for the country as a whole which could be irreversibly damaged 
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with large scale human activity) were off-limits for tourism (Fiji Eighth Development Plan 1980: 
69). Similarly, tourism development in the mainland had to be sensitive to the interest of native 
culture, environment and government objectives. Tourist development was primarily based on 
the concept of “Visitor Accommodation Regions” first proposed in the 1973 UN Tourism 
Development Program for Fiji, where government provided the infrastructure for specific 
locations amenable for tourism (Fiji Eighth Development Plan 1980: 70). The time was ripe for 
government to consider tourism development beyond these well established areas, albeit with the 
following restrictions, native villages, scenic areas and country parks and national reserves were 
off-limits for tourist developments. The following table (3.6) illustrated the government’s criteria 
for possible tourist development: 
Table 3.6: Types of Tourism Destinations 
  International Tourism Type Alternative Low Key Tourism 
Islands Tourist Resorts 
Subsistence Islands 
Day Visit Islands 
Island Reserves 
H 
C 
C 
C 
C 
H 
H 
C 
Mainland Resort Areas 
Native Villages 
Scenic Areas/Country Parks 
Reserves 
H 
C 
C 
C 
 
C 
H 
C 
Source: Fiji Eighth Development Plan 
 Notes: C indicates a potential conflict 
            H indicates the possible harmony of development 
 
Tourism in Fiji during the Ninth Development Period (1986-1990) played an increasing 
role in generating employment opportunities either directly or indirectly. Government 
projections estimated that an increase of about 12-13 additional visitors would create one 
additional job in the tourism sector by 1990, an increase of almost 13,000 new employees (see 
Table 3.7). 
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Table 3.7: Potential for Labor Absorption in Tourism during Development Plan 9 
 1985 1990 Additional Employment 
Hotels and Restaurants 
Wholesale and Retail Trade 
Transport 
Other Sectors 
3,832 
1,104 
1,533 
1,195 
6,616 
1,905 
2,646 
2,064 
2,784 
801 
1,113 
869 
Direct Employment 
Indirect and Induced Employment 
7,664 
10,159 
13,231 
17,538 
5,567 
7,379 
TOTAL 17,823 30,769 12,946 
Source: Fiji Ninth Development Plan 
Note: Indirect and induced employment shows employment generated in all the other sectors of the economy through the multiplier 
effect for tourism expenditure. 
 
Driven by the exigencies of creating jobs, government in these years boosted its 
investment in the tourism sector through new sources of funding. The Fiji Development Bank, 
(FDB) which traditionally served agricultural and small business needs of locals, could now 
become a source of funding for tourism development and “where necessary, Government 
guarantee will be given for the FDB to raise the additional resources” (Fiji Ninth Development 
Plan 1985: 89). Also with unforeseen consequences, the government permitted funds from the 
national retirement scheme, the Fiji National Provident Fund (FNPF) to be channeled through the 
FDB to support tourist development projects. The government believed that the projected 
increase in visitor arrivals required the State to take a more proactive role in the construction of 
3000 additional rooms during this period and therefore investment in tourism was congruent with 
its policy of economic development via the tourism sector.  
 The public face of Fiji tourism was the Fiji Visitors Bureau (FVB), from its earlier 
incarnation as the Fiji Publicity Board. The FVB is a statutory body operating under the Fiji 
Tourist Commission and Visitor Bureau Act of 1978, and administratively situated in the Fiji 
Ministry of Tourism. Among its key responsibilities is to promote Fiji as a tourist destination 
through advertising and establishing overseas linkages with firms and agencies involved in travel 
and tourism. While the private tourism sector in Fiji is involved in promoting its own individual 
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brands and product, the Fiji Visitors Bureau promotes “Fiji” as a whole and is fully funded by 
the State to carry out its stated objectives, I was, however, unable to secure the total amount of 
funding that the Bureau had received from the State in the period pertinent to this project (1975-
2000) when I visited the FVB headquarters in Fiji last summer (2010). I have therefore gleaned 
from the Government of Fiji’s annual budget summaries (the only available years were from 
1981-1993) of amounts given to the Fiji Visitors Bureau and supporting projects in the form of 
grants for the tourism sector. This provides an insight in the direct financial investment that the 
government undertook in the tourism industry in Fiji (see Table 3.8). These financial 
contributions by government to the industry belied the importance that the State placed in the 
sector and its role in the national economy. 
Table 3.8: Government Grants to the Fiji Visitors Bureau and Related Agencies 1981-1993 
Year FVB Grant Parks/Beaches Media/Film/Surveys/
Tourism Council 
Joint Promotion/Air 
Pacific/Qantas 
Foreign Aid for 
Tourism Dev. 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
725,000 
760,000 
800,000 
800,000 
800,000 
1,000,000 
1,425,000 
1,300,000 
1,300,000 
1,500,000 
1,500,000 
2,000,000 
2,000,000 
3,500 
3,500 
3,500 
3,500 
3,500 
10,000 
30,000 
 
 
 
180,000 
 
20,000 
95,000 
66,000 
66,000 
100,000 
204,000 
232,700 
250,000 
 
 
 
 
200,000 
250,000 
250,000 
1,000,000 
1,700,000 
2,000,000 
2,500,000 
2,277,500 
2,500,000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
133,000 
460,000 
 
525,000 
 
Total 15,910,000 57,500 1,213,700 12,677,500 1,118,000 
Total Government Direct Financial Contribution in the Tourism Sector 1981-1993 30,976,700 
Source: Fiji Islands Annual Budget Summary 1981-1993 
Note: All amounts in Fijian Dollars. 
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Brief Analysis of the Development of Tourism in Fiji 
 
 Three salient issues emerge when examining the pathways that tourism took in Fiji as it 
developed in to a mature industry in these years.  
(1) First, the record indicates that tourism in Fiji was far from an ad hoc experience and that 
both industry and government calibrated the limits and possibilities of their involvement. 
However, a closer analysis of data will determine if the projections and assumptions 
made by both parties stand up and justify the enormous investments in the tourism 
industry. Furthermore, how a change in rules for capital availability led the 
superannuation scheme (FNPF) to invest in major tourism projects and subsequently 
incur heavy losses decades later. This fundamental institutional shift in the financing of 
tourism projects has had profound pecuniary implications, most notably the failed Momi 
Bay project in 2008. 
(2) The optimistic projections by the government and industry failed to account for the 
political crisis in 1987 that devastated the tourism sector and compelled stakeholders to 
reexamine their strategies. 
(3) Why tourism ultimately survived and became a better conduit for economic development 
in Fiji in comparison to the other main sector (Agriculture) despite the significant 
obstacles that it had to overcome. 
The next chapter will examine the role that the political crisis of 1987 played and the effect it had 
on the industry. It is my contention that having survived the most serious challenge the country 
had experienced since independence in 1970, the tourism sector demonstrated a resiliency 
befitting society that had matured institutionally and thus overtime were able to adequately 
address the many post-coup challenges it faced. The Fiji Islands despite its small-state status 
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rebounded from its political crisis and reestablished its presence in the international travel 
market. This is not to negate the serious challenges that political instability imposed on the 
industry or the subsequent collateral damage done to Fiji’s image as a safe place to visit. The 
policy lessons drawn from this event is on how tourism in Fiji survived, and why political crisis 
impacts the sector more than it does other traditional industries in Fiji. 
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Chapter Four 
Analyzing Investment Strategies in the Fiji Islands 
Introduction 
 Unlike Sugar production in the Fiji Islands, which was a direct result of colonialism, 
tourism remained in the early decades an uncertain and tentative industry and essentially a 
geographical stopover rather than a destination for travelers. The recognition by the State over 
time of the economic potential of tourism ineluctably led to the evolution of institutions, 
investments and the organization of formal structures to make tourism the dominant sector by the 
beginning of the third millennium. The Fijian government by the 1990’s turned its focus on 
direct investments in the tourism sector with far-reaching and problematic consequences. I will 
explore two major investment failures by the government in its tourism ventures, but given the 
choices Fiji was facing it was not an entirely unreasonable course of action.  
 I argue that the long decline of Sugar production in Fiji increasingly focused the States 
attention on tourism and that the rise of the tourism industry can only be understood within the 
changing agricultural fortunes of Fiji, dynamics that are similar to other microstates in Oceania.  
 The final section investigates the impact of political instability on tourism in Fiji and the 
foreign policy responses from sending states. The variations in visitor arrivals as a consequence 
of the military coups in 1987, 2000 and 2006 in Fiji suggest the complexity of the different crises 
and the usefulness of the external policy responses by sending states, particularly Australia and 
New Zealand.  
State Investments in Tourism 
 Microstates in Oceania often lack substantial private capital to develop the necessary 
infrastructure needed for economic development and investment opportunities. The imperatives 
of meeting the needs of an expanding tourism market compelled the Fijian government to create 
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innovative funding mechanisms that would provide a ready source of capital for large scale 
tourist projects. In Fiji’s Ninth Development Plan beginning in 1986, the government channeled 
funds through the Fiji Development Bank (FDB) out of the Fiji National Provident Fund (FNPF) 
for selected resort construction.
39
 This institutional shift in the financing of tourism development 
would not be without serious consequences two decades later, and a substantial challenge to the 
efficacy of using public funds for private enterprise. On the western side of the main Island (Viti 
Levu), a comprehensive resort facility was envisioned to include private villas, professional golf 
course and all the amenities ostensibly demanded by tourists, known as the “Natadola Tourism 
Development.” The Fiji National Provident Fund (FNPF) wholly invested in the project (FNPF 
Annual Report 2007: 13) but for reasons that remain unclear the development forced the FNPF 
in 2009 to write off F302 million dollars

 from its books and prompted the FNPF board to hire 
Deloitte to open an investigation of these losses.
40
 
 The centerpiece of this troubled project was a F47 million dollar golf course designed by 
the Fijian golfer Vijay Singh, a one time number one ranked player in the world.
41
 The project, 
which took ten years to design, began in 2004 and included marquee accommodations such as 
the five star Intercontinental Resorts and other high-end ancillary features such as spas, 
international cuisine and boutiques. Overseeing the construction of the project was Asia Pacific 
Resorts International (APRIL) with French national Louis Gerard Saliot as project manager. In 
May of 2007, the government of Fiji fired APRIL and its project manager which led Singh to 
                                                          
39
 I am unfamiliar of FNPF investments in tourism project prior to the Ninth Development Plan (1985-1990) and nor 
have I been able to uncover from Parliamentary records of any serious objection to this policy. 

 All amounts are in Fijian Dollars as of May 16, 2011 at 1.00FJD = 0.56 USD. 
40
 See official FNPF media release at 
http://www.myfnpf.com.fj/resources/uploads/embeds/file/FNPF%20appoints%20Deloitte.pdf. (accessed May 17, 
2011). 
41
 See the report at 
http://www.fijiworldnews.com/news/publish/News_1/Anthony_Accuses_Natadola_Chief_of_Stirring_Trouble_says
_Vijay_Singh_Endorsement_No_Loss_printer.shtml. (accessed May 17, 2011). 
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terminate his part in the project. The government cited cost overruns, delays, design flaws, 
financial irregularities and newly discovered criminal complaint against Louise Saliot to justify 
bringing in another firm to oversee the project.
42
 The Fiji government is nonetheless committed 
to finishing the project, albeit on a slower and smaller scale as indicated by Felix Anthony, the 
chairman of Natadola Bay Resort Limited at a tourism forum in Fiji in 2008.
43
 The government 
continues to make the case for tourism as a viable mechanism of economic development, 
regardless of the setbacks it faced in the “Natadola Project,” one of the largest tourist 
developments in the Pacific.
44
 
 A second major investment by FNPF in tourism development in Fiji was in the “Momi 
Bay Integrated Resort Development” with a price tag of F225 million dollars (Fiji Times June 9 
2009).
45
 Major investors included the Fiji Development Bank (FDB) with F18 million dollars 
stake, the FNPF with F112 million dollars and New Zealand based Bridgecorp at F100 million 
dollars (Fiji Times Online June 22 2010).
46
 Bridgecorp collapsed in 2007 as a result of massive 
financial irregularities leading to criminal charges against its executives by the New Zealand 
government (New Zealand Herald Online June 5 2009).
47
  The collapse of Bridgecorp led to the 
failure of the “Momi” project leaving both the FDB and the FNPF with massive exposure of their 
investments. The Fiji government in 2010 promulgated the “Momi Bay Development Decree” 
                                                          
42
 “Waiting with Bated Breath” in Island Business at: 
http://www.islandsbusiness.com/fiji_business/index_dynamic/containerNameToReplace=MiddleMiddle/focusModu
leID=18133/overideSkinName=issueArticle-full.tpl. (accessed May 17, 2011).See also 
http://www.radiofiji.com.fj/fiji2/fullstory.php?id=6031.  (accessed May 17, 2011). 
43
 See “Talking Points” at http://www.fijime.com/tourism-resources/tourism-
forum/Mr%20Felix%20Anthony%20%20Chairman%20Natadola%20Resort%20Limited.pdf. (accessed May 17, 
2011). 
44
 See Felix Anthony at http://www.fijilive.com/news/2009/05/11/16046.Fijilive. (accessed May 17, 2011). 
45
 See Fiji Times article at http://www.fijitimes.com/print.aspx?id=123145. (accessed May 17, 2011). 
46
 See Fiji Times article at http://www.fijitimes.com/print.aspx?id=150577. (accessed May 17, 2011). 
47
 See New Zealand Herald article at http://www.nzherald.co.nz/news/print.cfm?objectid=10576539. (accessed May 
17, 2011) 
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after it failed to secure a buyer for the project.
48
 The decree allowed the Fiji National Provident 
Fund (FNPF) to assume sole ownership of the project and begin strategizing on ways to recoup 
its losses (Island Business Online June 21 2010)
49
. The Pacific Islands Report (April 7 2011) 
indicated that the FNPF as of April 2011 was finalizing details on resuming development of the 
project through new financing partners from Papua New Guinea with a possible set of new 
international operators such as IHG, Marriot, Carlson, Wyndham, Accor and Anantara to manage 
the tourist complex after completion.
50
 The decree however came at the expense of Bridgecorps 
overseas investors who lost up to F106 million dollars as a result of the Fiji government’s action 
(Otago Daily Times Online June 23 2010).
51
 
Preliminary Analysis 
 The catastrophic failure of these investments incurred by the FNPF and to a lesser extent, 
the FDB casts serious doubts on the governments’ policy to use public funds for what are 
ostensibly private entities. While it is acknowledged that the availability of significant capital for 
large projects is beyond the reach of private actors in small island states, it does not 
automatically mean that the State ought to be the default lender. The argument however has been 
that the tourism industry in Fiji was too important to not to invest for two important reasons, (1) 
the mainstay of the national economy, sugarcane production was in a precipitous decline, and (2) 
that tourism would continue to be a growth industry with consequent supply demands.  
                                                          
48
 At a highly publicized auction in 2009, the Momi Project failed to get a buyer even at the rock bottom price of 
F41 million dollars. See the National Business Review at http://www.nbr.co.nz/article/momi-bay-auction-passed-41-
million-negotiations-ongoing-109039.  (accessed May 17, 2011) 
49
 See article in Island Business at http://www.islandbusiness.com. (accessed May 17, 2011). The FNPF justified its 
takeover as “mortgagee in possession” following the decision by the Board to protect its assets. See official media 
release at http://www.myfnpf.com.fj/pages.cfm/about-fnpf/media-centre/news/2009/ref1309-fnpf-moves-on-momi-
bay-project.html. (accessed May 17, 2011) 
50
 See the report at http://pdip.eastwestcenter.org/pireport/2011/April/04-08-07.htm. (accessed May 17, 2011). 
51
 See article at http://www.odt.co.nz/news/business/112199/bridgecorp-receivers-stymied-fiji-move. (accessed May 
17, 2011). 
  91 
 However my focus is not on how badly the government failed in its investments, as 
important as they are for obvious reasons, the investigations as of now are still ongoing. With the 
exception of key personnel involved in the debacle, nobody really knows what actually happened 
(I accept the publicly verified account that the collapse of Bridgecorp led to the failure of the 
Momi Bay project, whereas I am unable to ascertain on why the Natadola project incurred such 
massive losses. I await the Deloitte and Touche report as well as other FNPF enquiries to 
become available to piece together on how things went as badly as it did. The lack of internal 
data and information simply makes it impossible to develop a reasoned analysis on an 
extraordinary series of financial failures for a small economy. I have no doubt that this episode 
will yield many studies for future research and contribute to the bourgeoning literature on the 
subject. 
 Secondly, my argument thus far has been to suggest in the affirmative that national policy 
encouraging the development of tourism in microstates is a reasonable proposition given the 
intrinsic limitations faced by small island economies and the obvious geographical advantages 
they have. The financial failures do not negate the importance of maintaining the developmental 
strategy that Fiji has pursued thus far in spite of recent investment setbacks, but rather the need 
to come up with better funding mechanisms (rather than the public pension fund) for 
development projects. 
 The next section will examine the role of the sugar industry in Fiji and respond to why 
the State felt an urgent need to ramp up its investments in the tourism sector. The political crisis 
of 1987 and of 2000 will severely challenge the second assumption regarding the inevitable 
upward trajectory of tourism in Fiji as a result of political instability and the regional response to 
the crisis. 
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The Fiji Sugar Industry 
 In spite of the economic and social importance of cane farming in Fiji for over a century, 
sugar production has been in steadily decline in the last decade. The government of Fiji has 
highlighted the issue of technical deficiency of the four sugar mills, which either have to be 
replaced or modernized in order to boost production and efficiency as well as difficulties 
associated with the complicated land tenure system administered under the Agricultural Landlord 
and Tenant Act (ALTA) in Fiji (Naidu and Reddy 2002).  Economists and policy analysts have 
essentially focused on the system of price supports which has contributed to the lack of market 
discipline in the production of sugar in the Fiji Islands. From a high of 517 thousand tons in 
1994, sugar production fell to around 300 thousand in 2001 and to a large extant the mills are to 
be blamed. The average cost of production among the four mills fell between $340 (Penang) to 
$160 (Rarawai), whilst the average cost of production in most mills in India was at $70 a ton.  
(All monies here are in Fijian dollars). Frequent breakdowns, closures and lack of adequate parts 
for aging machinery resulted in delayed crushing, safety concerns, wastage, and delivery 
backlogs. The Fijian government hired a team of technical experts from India at a cost of F86 
million dollars to upgrade and modernize the four mills with hopes of lowering the cost of 
production. 
 Price support for sugar production in Fiji came under the sugar protocol agreement with 
the European Union. Under Article 1 of the sugar protocol agreement, the EU guaranteed 
according to fixed quotas imports of sugar from the ACP countries at a price that was normally 
set at 2-3 times the market price. For Fiji, this amounted to (2001 figures) some 195.6 thousand 
metric tons, roughly three quarters of the country’s total sugar exports, or in dollar terms the 
world market value for Fiji’s sugar exports in 2001 was at 62.9 million euro, but with EU 
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preferential pricing, Fiji received 120.7 million Euros for its sugar. The EU subsidy to Fiji came 
at 57.8 million Euros or 2.9 percent of its GDP.  Graph 4.1 illustrates the pricing mechanism 
under the sugar protocol between the world market price and the EU guaranteed price:  
 Graph 4.1: Fiji Sugar Protocol 
 
 Source: Levantis, Jotzo and Tulpule p.895 
 
Furthermore, sugar produced beyond the quota requirement set by the EU since 1995 
received another set of preferential agreements for ACP countries under the Special Preferential 
Sugar (SPS) agreement where price was set at 5 percent below the Sugar Protocol pricing 
system. For many ACP members only after the SPS allocations were met did they sell their sugar 
in the open market (See Table 4.1 on quota percentages and income transfers for the ACP 
countries and the economic significance of the Sugar Protocol Agreement, especially for Fiji).  
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Table 4.1: Quota Percentages and Income Transfers for ACP Countries 
Sugar Production and Income Transfers from Preferential Access to EU Markets, ACP Countries 
2001 
 EU Import Quota 
(Sugar Protocol Quotas plus 
SPS basic allocations) 
Income Transfer from the EU from 
Sugar Trade Preferences 
 Tons (white 
sugar 
equivalent)
a
 
Quota as a 
Share of Total 
Sugar Exports 
(Per cent)
b
 
Euro 
Million 
Euro 
Per 
Capita 
Per Cent  
of GDP
c
 
Mauritius 
Fiji 
Guyana 
Swaziland 
Jamaica 
Barbados 
Zimbabwe 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Belize 
Malawi 
Cote d’Ivoire 
St. Kitts and Nevis 
Madagascar 
Congo 
Tanzania 
Zambia 
Total 
580.9 
195.6 
188.6 
169.4 
140.4 
59.5 
60.8 
51.8 
47.7 
34.6 
22.1 
18.4 
12.7 
12.1 
12.1 
12.1 
1,619 
>100 
74 
78 
59 
94 
>100 
36 
91 
52 
63 
72 
89 
>100 
26 
27 
10 
73 
163.1 
54.9 
52.9 
46.9 
39.4 
16.7 
16.5 
14.5 
13.4 
9.5 
6.0 
5.2 
3.6 
3.4 
3.4 
3.1 
452.5 
137.5 
67.6 
69.6 
44.9 
15.0 
62.6 
1.3 
11.2 
55.8 
0.9 
0.4 
126.3 
0.2 
0.1 
0.1 
0.3 
2.9 
4.0 
2.9
d
 
8.1 
3.4 
0.6 
0.7 
0.2 
0.2 
1.8 
0.6 
0.1 
1.8 
0.1 
0.1 
0.04 
0.1 
0.7 
Sources: Levantis, et al. 2001 
Notes: 
a Preferential sugar import quotas and SPS basic allocation. 
b Percentages greater than 100 imply that the quota was not filled. Statistical discrepancies are possible due to conversion from raw sugar to 
white sugar equivalent weights. 
c GDP data (not PPP adjusted) for the year 2000. 
d GDP for year 2000 based on Fiji’s national accounts. 
 
Calculation based on a world market price of 238.78 euro per ton (2001 average price of London CIF price for no.7 raw sugar in bulk), a 
preferential sugar price of 523.70 euro per ton, and a minimum purchase price under special preferential arrangements of 496.80 euro per ton. 
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 Critics of the Sugar Protocol such as Mahendra Reddy (2003), Paresh Narayan and 
Biman Prasad (2005), Narendra Reddy (2003) and leading institutions like the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB 2002) have argued that inefficiencies in production and declining 
productivity caused by the EU subsidies and have thwarted the ability of market forces to 
discipline the sugar industry. However subsidies cannot be solely blamed for the concealing the 
actual price of producing sugar in Fiji; neither the lease agreements reflected the true value of 
agricultural land used for growing sugarcane, nor did the costs of a largely informal labor sector 
reflect the real price of growing and harvesting or the actual pricing mechanism used to award 
the proceeds of the sale of sugar to the farmers and the mills operated by the Fiji Sugar 
Corporation (FSC). In Fiji, the proceeds from the sale of sugar are determined by a third party, 
referred to as the Master Award. During the colonial era the mill determined the pricing formula 
often at the expense of the farmer who received his share after deduction of all costs. In the last 
three decades, power has shifted towards the farmer represented by two powerful unions, and in 
the current collective bargaining agreement the sugar proceed has been set at 70 percent for the 
farmer and 30 percent for the Mill (See Table 4.2). 
Table 4.2: Sugar Proceed Sharing Ratios (Master Award) 
TOTAL SUGAR PRODUCED GROWER’S SHARE MILLER’S SHARE 
Up to 325, 000 Tonnes 
325,000 – 350,000 Tonnes 
Tonnes in excess of 350,000 
70 percent 
72.5 percent 
75 percent 
30 percent 
27.5 percent 
25 percent 
Source: Reddy (2003) 
Note: These percentages are based on net proceeds on sugar and molasses sales after industry cost have been 
deducted. Industry costs are defined as those relating to sugar marketing, and other industry institutions such as the 
Sugar Commission of Fiji, and the Sugar Cane Research Centre (Source: Sugar Industry Tribunal). 
 
As Reddy (2003) has pointed out, it was impossible for the mills to sustain an efficient 
production schedule from its share of the proceeds, one could argue that as long as an artificial 
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price kept the sugar industry afloat and third parties determined the payouts, neither the grower 
nor the government (the mill owner) were willing to engage in corporative behavior, (the farmer 
would extract the maximum proceeds possible, whilst the government had no desire or cash to 
modernize equipment as it had very little leverage to increase its proceeds). Price supports 
according to Voorend (2005) yielded Fiji triple the value of its sugar exports to the European 
Union under the Sugar Protocol agreement. Koen Voorend (2005:55-56) illustrates in Table 4.3 
the price mechanism; “The first column shows the world price in US Dollars. The second 
column depicts the EU intervention price (the price that the ACP countries receive according to 
the Sugar Protocol) in Euro per ton. Converting at an exchange rate of US$1.00 per Euro, which 
is the exchange rate in December 2002, gives the third column, (The 1.1 exchange rate of 
December 2002 facilitates the estimation procedure extensively and is therefore taken as Base 
Exchange rate).” 
Table 4.3: Raw Sugar (EU Price vs. World Price) 
YEAR WORLD PRICE INTERVENTION PRICE WORLD PRICE 
 USD PER TONNE EURO PER TONNE EURO PER TONNE (DEC RATE) 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
180.8 
181.8 
200.7 
242.5 
268.7 
244.8 
241.2 
193.6 
130.7 
170.2 
182.3 
157.5 
439.4 
439.4 
439.4 
433.7 
523.7 
523.7 
523.7 
523.7 
523.7 
523.7 
523.7 
523.7 
180.8 
181.8 
200.7 
242.5 
268.7 
244.8 
241.2 
193.6 
130.7 
170.2 
182.3 
157.5 
Source: Voorend 2005 
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The End of the Sugar Protocol 
 
 The World Trade Organization’s (WTO) ruling on the legality of the Sugar Protocol in 
2003 amplified further the existing problems of leases and tenure amongst farmers and 
landowners in the troubled sugar sector in Fiji (discussed in greater detail in the next section). 
Australia, Brazil and Thailand filed a complaint against European Commissions sugar preference 
agreement with the African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) bloc of countries (see Table 4.1) that 
hurt large sugar producers like Brazil and Thailand by shutting them out of the European market 
(New York Times: April 28 2005). The WTO panel ruled that the EU subsidies on sugar exports 
exceeded the “commitment schedule” and thus a violation of the WTO Agreement on 
Agriculture (Conconi 2008: 2). Specifically, the panel findings concluded that (Oxfam 2004:2; 
Financial Times April 28 2005). 
1. EU exports of 2.7 million tonnes of unsubsidized sugar were in fact cross-subsidized by 
EU support provided for the production of quota sugar. 
2. EU contravened WTO commitments by subsidizing the re-export of amounts equivalent 
to imports of Sugar from the ACP and India, and these subsidized exports exceeded the 
EU’s permitted level of subsidized sugar exports (see Daugbjerg and Swinbank 
2009:105-120). 
The European Union in response put together a monetary package to aid sugar producers 
affected by the cessation of preferential pricing, but the military coup in 2006 in Fiji would 
complicate efforts to access those funds (Levantis, Jotzo and Tulpule 2003). 
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The Problem of Land in Fiji 
 
 According to farmers the issue of land tenure has caused the decline in sugar 
productivity.
52
 As a condition for Independence in 1970, the hastily arranged Agriculture Land 
and Tenant Act (ALTA) was enacted in 1967 to assure a 30-year lease for farmers. Great Britain 
with the connivance of domestic elites, crafted ALTA to satiate the immediate concerns of the 
landowners and the farmers under a colonial era property regime that should have been scraped 
in its entirety. 
 Not much is known about the prehistory of the Indigenous Fijian people before the arrival 
of the Europeans, but by the 1800’s Fiji had become an active route for trade, especially 
sandalwood, beechdemer, and whaling. By the 1840’s, a constant stream of missionaries began 
arriving in the islands and set up churches and convert the natives. By the late 1850’s, 
Christianity was accepted en masse as the religion of the indigenous people, and when Great 
Britain assumed control of the Fiji Islands in 1874, contact with the outside world was already 
established, especially amongst the native chiefs. 
 To offset the cost of maintaining an empire, Great Britain would attempt to foster 
domestic economies to generate income for the colonies as well as the mother country.
53
  The 
termination of the slave trade in 1835 threatened to stall the great imperial machine of the British 
Empire, now in her full stride. To counteract the closure of the slave trade, Britain instituted the 
Indentured Servitude Scheme, where labor from India would be dispersed throughout the Empire 
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 In Fiji almost all farmland is leased from the indigenous Fijians who posses the absolute right of ownership and 
the refusal to renew any lease cannot be vetoed. 
53
 The colonial economies of Great Britain were not particularly sophisticated, the industrial revolution was fine for 
London and Liverpool, but not for non-white third world outposts. Extracting raw material, producing food and 
meat, and ravaging forests and seas were good enough for Great Britain. Narayan, 27-60  
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to carry in the work of generating income and production.
54
 Most of the indentured workers 
would be sent to work in the plantations, mostly sugar,
55
 and a few lucky ones would become 
menial laborers and servants of the colonial masters. On May 15, 1879, five years after Great 
Britain officially colonized Fiji; the first group of Indians arrived on shore as indentured slaves 
to work in the sugar cane plantations.
56
   
 Soon after colonization, Fiji’s first governor general, Sir Arthur Gordon codified into law 
through a decree that 83 percent of all land was to remain in the hands of the indigenous Fijians 
in perpetuity (Heath 1974). Ownership of land was to be communal rather then individual, and in 
later years the Native Land Trust Board (NLTB) was set up to administrate all issues related to 
land in Fiji. The remaining 17 percent was for use by the crown, and that Britain would be a 
custodian of the land until such a time when it saw fit to allow the indigenous Fijian to assume 
control. This strategy allowed the British to minimize transaction costs associated with 
ownership, contracts, enforcement, or development of land. At Great Britain’s disposal were 
indentured workers who were housed on the edges of the fields they worked at, known as “coolie 
lines” in single ten by ten rooms with up to fifteen per room.57 Since there was no possibility of 
ever working up to owning a piece of land, and very little education available, mobility outside 
the farm was virtually non-existent, and hence the regular and predictable supply of constant 
                                                          
54
 This was one of the more ingenious schemes of the British to exploit free labor from its Indian colony, and keep 
the engine of imperialism and capitalism humming. The indentured scheme was a despicable system in application 
and practice and basically amounted to a kind of legalized slavery (see Vijay Naidu 1980:8).  
55
 Sugar cane as a labor intensive industry had proved to be quite a boon for the British as a cash crop. An unlimited 
supply of labor and land created optimum conditions for wealth; expansion and exploitation by the colonial masters 
(see Minitz 1985).  
56
 The indentured scheme continued until 1920, after which it was abolished in the British parliament when public 
outcry over the brutality of the system could no longer be ignored. In Fiji, by 1921, there were more then 60,000 
Indians with the overwhelming majority confined to the sugarcane fields. 
57
 The indentured servitude scheme was particularly appalling for women and children. For every 100 men sent, 40 
had to be women, and the devastating effect of gender disparity contributed to an increase in rape and suicides 
amongst the indentured population. The low percentage of women among the male population left them vulnerable 
in an already dehumanizing situation with very little opportunities for recourse (see Carter 1996:41). 
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labor. A cursory glance at the colonial policy would quickly reveal a glaring lacuna; close to 100 
percent of commercial sugar cane farming were done by Indo-Fijians in land that was not theirs, 
and could never be. (By the time of independence in 1970, Indo-Fijians were about 49% of the 
population, indigenous Fijians comprised about 47% and the rest were Whites, Chinese and other 
Island groups) Therefore, when discussions about independence began in the 1960’s, it was 
unsurprising that land quickly became the singular most vexing issue for all concerned. The 
Indo-Fijian tenants feared exploitation at the hands of their Indigenous landlords, as echoed by 
an early leader of the farmers, 
“…We were [brought] to work under a system that saved the indigenous Fijian from coming under…As a 
matter of fact, if anything, the coming of my people to this country gave the indigenous Fijians their honor, 
their prestige, nay indeed their very soul. Otherwise, I have no hesitation in saying that the native of this 
colony would have met the same fate that some other indigenous races in parts of Africa met. I would ask 
my honorable colleagues to consider the aspect of it before they condemn my people.”58   
Subsequently, in preparation for independence, the Agricultural Landlord Tenant Agreement 
(ALTA) was established in 1966, which would guarantee a twenty year lease to all farmers and 
an automatic extension of ten years. Others provisions of the ordinance included share-cropping 
and an assessment of the capital value of the land every five years. Understandably, the Indo-
Fijian farmers feared abuse on the provisions and they were suspicious of the land owners 
creating artificially high land values and raising rental rates. Nonetheless, the ALTA act was 
passed and ratified by the legislative council and remained the touchstone for all future 
negotiations on the issue of land tenure between the indigenous Fijians and the Indo-Fijians. 
Beginning in 1997, these leases began to expire creating a period of heightened tension 
and uncertainty not only in the sugar industry, but politically and socially. Table 4.4 below 
                                                          
58
 Statement by A.D. Patel, the first Indo-Fijian political leader of the National Federation Party, a predominantly 
farmers party. Quoted in Brij V. Lal (1992:143). 
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shows that only about a quarter of the expired leases had been renewed for existing tenants 
(almost always the new tenants were either the indigenous landowners themselves or members of 
their clan). Falling productivity has also being linked to inexperienced growers who lack the 
requisite skill of working the land with time honored techniques and knowledge (Reddy 2003:9). 
TABLE 4.4: Expiring Land Leases in Fiji (1997-2001) 
YEAR EXPIRED SUGAR 
CANE LEASES 
LEASES RENEWED NOT 
RENEWED 
  RENEWED TO 
EXISTING TENANT 
ISSUED TO NEW 
TENANT 
 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
TOTAL 
72 
157 
1073 
1708 
313 
457 
3323 
36 
45 
350 
311 
141 
na 
883 
31 
107 
511 
469 
14 
na 
1132 
5 
5 
212 
928 
158 
na 
1308 
Source: Native Land Trust Board 
Note: Totals up to 2001 only. 
 
As suggested earlier, the demise of the sugar industry would be devastating for political 
economy of the Fiji Islands. Cane Farming remains “the backbone of the Fijian economy” argues 
economist Narendra Reddy and not without justification. Almost a quarter of the workforce is 
employed in the sugar industry, 22 percent of export revenue is generated by sugar, almost 90 
percent raw sugar is exported to international markets (74% to the EU alone, see Table 1 above) 
and as well as the survival four major urban areas outside of the capital city known as the “sugar 
belt” (Narayan and Prasad 2005). 
 The political instability following the 2000 coup thwarted any possibility of a long term 
solution to the problem of land tenure in Fiji and the continuing instability wrought by the last 
coup in late 2006 has foreclosed any immediate solutions on how to rectify the vexing issue of 
land and equitable distribution of resources in the Fiji Islands. It is unlikely that the internal 
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issues (land tenure, financial compensation, low yield, or even technical efficiency) surrounding 
the Fijian sugar industry will be resolved anytime soon, and the cessation of preferential prices 
and set quotas by the EU in 2007 have only intensified the dilemma surrounding the sugar 
industry in Fiji (Mahadevan 2009; Oxfam 2005). The Fijian government in 2005 acknowledged 
that the survival of the sugar industry in Fiji was in serious jeopardy without a comparable trade 
package to replace the Sugar Protocol Agreement with the EU (Parliament Papers 2005).
59
 
However a series of political events in 2006 overtook the necessity of securing new trade pacts 
for the sugar industry in Fiji, the government of Lasenia Qarase abruptly called for elections in 
June which thrust the country into a divisive and contentious political season followed by a 
drawn out public conflict with the military resulting in Fiji’s fourth coup in twenty years in 
December of 2006. 
The immediate consequences of the 2006 military coup became painfully clear when the 
European Union suspended its “stabilization funds” in October of 2007, with a caveat that only a 
return to democratic rule and structural reforms in the Sugar industry would enable the release of 
funds (Official Journal of the European Union 2011). As part of a negotiated settlement to ease 
the pain of losing the highly lucrative Sugar Protocol Agreement, the European Union had 
promised to provide financial aid to Fiji (and selected ACP members) under the Sugar 
Readjustment Fund (Fiji Island Business 2007), this would amount to €60.024M (F120 million 
dollars) over three years, substantially less than the €161M (F350 million) requested by Prime 
Minister Qarase. Fiji received the fifth highest allocation after Mauritius (€127.541M), Guyana 
                                                          
59
 See document at http://www.parliament.gov.fj/publications/viewResearch.aspx?research=21. (accessed  May 18, 
2011) 
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(€84.170M), Jamaica (€77.547M) and Swaziland at €69.895M.60 According to reports in the Fiji 
Sun (8/26/2008) the EU had planned another allocation of F132.6 million for 2011-2013 after the 
first tranche of aid to farmers, but the failure of the Fijian government to transition towards 
democratic elections have forced Brussels hand to freeze all financial assistance (The Australian 
May 19, 2009).
61
  
 The declining fortunes and uncertain future of Fiji’s sugar industry placed extraordinary 
pressures on other sectors of the economy to contribute towards development. The national focus 
towards tourism seemed almost inevitable given the diminished stature of cane farming in Fiji 
beset by intractable issues and without many resolutions in sight. The political events of 1987 
and 2000 permanently shelved any steps towards solving the problem of land tenure in Fiji, and 
the continued political instability, which culminated in the 2006 coup d’état further distracted 
key actors in government to plan the ineluctable demise of cane farming as Fiji’s bell-weather 
industry. Thus given the paucity of choices available to the government, it perhaps seemed 
inexorable that state would ratchet up its investments in the tourism sector. Rapid increases in 
visitor arrivals and tourism related products bore some justification for tourism in Fiji to become 
a conduit for development and the State obliged by creating the organizational and institutional 
structures to facilitate investments in tourism. The political crises that would hit Fiji in 1987 and 
2000 would test these assumptions, of the desirability of investing in an image conscious 
industry susceptible to shocks. The following section examines both the viability of tourism 
under crisis and analyzes the policy response by the State, industry stakeholders and sending 
states, specifically the role played by regional powerbrokers, Australia and New Zealand. 
                                                          
60
 The Fijian conversion is for exchange rates that existed in April 2007. The currency rate as of May 18, 2011 is 1€ 
= 2.557FJD. 
61
 See article at http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/eu-backs-away-from-fiji-sugar-support/story-e6frg6sx-
1225713297817. (accessed  May 18, 2011) 
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Political Instability in Fiji 
 
 Fiji has experienced four coup d’états beginning in May 1987 followed by a second one 
in late September, then the putsch in 2000 culminating in the latest military coup of December of 
2006. All of these non-democratic takeovers of the State have had competing objectives with 
multiple objectives and allegiances. Within the parameters of this project, the political crisis in 
Fiji will only be examined for its effect on the Tourism sector, and the possible policy responses 
that were available to the various stakeholders in the industry.  
 The military coup in Fiji on May 14, 1987 shattered the idyllic image of the Pacific 
Islands as places untouched by the realities of political strife and instability (Scarr 1988; 
Robertson and Tamanisau 1988). The year began with general elections being scheduled for 
early April in a contest largely fought between the incumbent Alliance Party and the newly 
formed Fiji Labor Party. Fiji had undergone four previous general elections since Independence 
in 1970, in (1972, 1977-twice and 1982) with remarkable ease and professionalism, and the 1987 
elections promised the same.
62
 While it is beyond the scope of this enquiry to unravel the 
complicated strands of Fijian politics that may have contributed to the beginnings of a twenty-
five year political crisis, the events of May 14, 1987 set it motion a series of events whose end is 
still not in sight.  
 The unexpected defeat of the incumbent Alliance Party in the general elections thrust the 
Fiji Labor Party into power and ushered in the first overhaul in the administration of the country 
since acquiring independence. The weakness of a nascent democracy became apparent when 
social and political events overtook the euphoria of Labor’s win and set the stage for a military 
takeover (Lawson 1991; Kaplan 1987; Van Fossen 1987). Senior members of the losing Alliance 
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 On a personal note, I worked as a volunteer campaign staffer for the local branch of the Fiji Labor Party, the 
campaigns and elections were quite free and fair and nothing could portend the crisis that followed.  
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Party refused to concede their Party’s defeat and to publicly acknowledge the legitimacy of the 
results of the ballot box
63
, secondly, the sudden rise of ethno-nationalism among the most fervent 
supporters of the losing party undermined the delicate religious and racial pluralism of a 
multicultural society, and finally the failure of the Fiji Labor Party to assuage the fears and 
concerns of the fifty percent of people that did not vote for them.
64
 Within this toxic 
environment, the Fijian military, which had historically remained aloof from national politics, 
executed the first coup d’état in the South Pacific.65 
  The political crisis of 1987 could not have come at a more inopportune time in Fiji, 
especially in economic terms. The erratic oscillations of GDP data reflected the underlying 
reality of an economy largely dependent on agricultural exports (See Table 4.5).  
Table 4.5: GDP Fiji Islands 1980-1988 
Year GDP 
(million) 
Growth Rate 
(%) 
GDP Per Capita 
(thousand) 
Growth GDP Per Capita 
(%) 
1980 910.0 15.6 1421 13.2 
1981 953.6 5.3 1476 3.9 
1982 1020.5 7.0 1551 5.1 
1983 1031.8 1.1 1535 -1.0 
1984 1151.7 11.6 1678 9.3 
1985 1177.7 2.3 1690 0.7 
1986 1326.1 12.6 1857 9.9 
1987 1329.2 0.2 1844 -0.7 
1988 1433.3 7.8 1993 8.1 
Source: Fiji Bureau of Statistics 
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 There is a marked variance between the leader of the Alliance Party and defeated Prime Minister Ratu Mara 
accepting the results of the elections and those of his Party who refused the legitimacy of the new incoming 
administration (Mara 1997:191). This marked inconsistency was evident when Ratu Mara happily came back into 
government at the beckoning of the military following the coup.  
64
 The Alliance Party lost in spite garnering 48.5 percent of the vote to Labor Party’s 46 percent (See Mara 1997: 
190). A lamentable oversight by democracy scholars is the role played by losing parties in elections, especially in 
ethnically divided societies and emerging democracies. Legitimacy is not only granted through the ballot box but 
also by the public acknowledgement of the fact by the defeated parties and candidates. Conceding and election is 
often as important as winning one, as the events in Fiji in 1987 demonstrated. See Anderson et al (2005) for a 
current exposition on this important facet of electoral democracy. 
65
 The two national newspapers chronicled the aggressive rhetoric and marches by supporters of the losing party 
through the streets of the capital Suva in the weeks and days leading up to the Coup on May 14, events which I 
personally witnessed (See Fiji Times April 16 1987, p. 3, Fiji Sun April 21 1987 p. 2; Fiji Sun April 22 1987; Fiji 
Times April 26 1987, p.1) 
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Sugar production in 1983 declined by 46 percent because of devastating hurricanes in the 
sugar growing regions and causing damages estimated at F150 million dollars (Lal 2010: 308). 
With the exception of the Monasavu Hydro-Electric Scheme
66
 the government was redirected 
funds away from public structure development and towards relief and rehabilitation. Further 
austerity measures included a national wage freeze in 1984 in defiance of collective bargaining 
agreements and over the objections of the Fiji Trade Union Congress (FTUC) (Lal 2010: 308-
309). The governments’ repudiation of consensual labor relations led to the formation of the Fiji 
Labor Party (FLP) under the patronage of the FTUC in 1985, which would sweep into power two 
years later, only to be overthrown in the coup after only four weeks in office. However, neither 
politics nor natural disasters attenuated the flow of foreign visitors to Fiji during this period 
according to Sturton and McGregor (1991), and growth in the tourism sector held steady, until 
the political crisis of May 1987 (See Table 4.6 on tourist arrivals to Fiji between 1980-1990. 
Table 4.6: Visitor Arrivals to Fiji (1980-1990) 
Year Aust. NZ USA Canada UK Eur. Asia Pac. Is Others Total 
1980 72260 36389 30137 13386 5244 8990 7141 10137 6312 189996 
1981 80912 32490 24164 15708 4814 6921 10606 9617 4703 189935 
1982 95455 28304 23211 13698 4332 6111 18029 9970 4526 203636 
1983 85027 24048 25636 13037 5888 8330 14401 10588 4661 191616 
1984 101413 26803 37285 16522 8569 11283 14864 13178 5320 235227 
1985 89459 19540 49557 18908 7707 12667 12601 11936 5800 228175 
1986 86297 22720 69732 23651 9972 15088 11801 12815 5748 257824 
1987 65382 16197 47037 16819 8511 14726 5487 11217 4490 189866 
1988 75264 21507 42144 16883 8464 20498 3425 14219 5751 208155 
1989 96992 28128 34425 16536 11404 23916 16015 18064 5085 250565 
1990 103535 29432 36928 18438 16773 27211 27874 17528 1277 278996 
Source: Fiji Bureau of Statistics 
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 Funding came from a combination of internal and external sources such as the World Bank, Australian 
Development Assistance Bank (ADAB), the Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC), The European 
Investment Bank (EIB), The Fiji National Provident Fund (FNPF) and the Government of Fiji. Although initially 
projected at US64 million dollars (Mara 1997:190), the final cost came to F240 million dollars (See World Bank 
Report 1978:23). 
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 It would be not until 1990 that visitor arrivals to Fiji would exceed pre-1987 levels as 
political instability disrupted tourism and stunted its growth trajectory. The Pacific Islands first 
coup had shorn Fiji’s carefully cultivated image of a safe and secure haven for visitors to escape 
to, from a harried and troubled world. International tourism, I posit, is an industry highly 
susceptible to disruptions which greatly impacts societies that have a substantial stake in the 
sector such as Fiji. The following section will examine the relationship between crisis and 
tourism and the impact of political instability in the tourism sector in Fiji.  
 Tourism under crisis has largely been considered as a marketing problem (Beirman 2003) 
rather than interpreted through the lens of policy and politics. The challenge to tourism in Fiji 
was political, the external response to the crisis that gravely affected the tourism sector was 
political and therefore the domestic response by the State and industry stakeholders had to be 
political. I shall further argue that the articulation of policy and the organizational response by 
the government and the tourism sector saved the industry from irreparable damage and ensured a 
full recovery and demonstrated the institutional capacity of even small island states to manage 
severe exogenous shocks. 
Tourism and Political Instability 
Each successive political crisis in Fiji (1987, 2000 and 2006) triggered a series of travel 
warnings by foreign office with profound social and economic consequences for the tourism 
industry and ordinary Fijians whose livelihood depended on a thriving tourist sector. Substantial 
investments by the State in the sector seemed to be negated by the episodic political instability as 
well as Fiji’s international reputation and credibility. The international reaction to the political 
events in Fiji illustrated the intricate web of economic relationships that small states have to 
negotiate in the global economy (Fletcher and Morakabati 2008; Sonmez 1998). The adverse 
effect of travel warnings in response to the crisis in Fiji further reinforced the ability of sending 
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States to influence economics and politics of host economies. The Fijian government was during 
the period of political crisis caught in an economic dilemma; it had institutionally organized its 
development priorities around international tourism with substantial investments in the industry, 
and therefore had exposed itself to international reactions regarding domestic events. Neither the 
State nor the industry could insulate itself from external backlash that ensued after each coup in 
Fiji (Burns 1995).  
However data on visitor arrivals (Table 4.7) indicate that after an initial period of 
recovery following the coups, tourism in Fiji has generally recovered to previous levels, which 
suggests that (1) the nature of the crisis in Fiji has been misunderstood, (2) international response 
is largely driven by political concerns and therefore is not commensurate with the reality on the 
ground in Fiji and (3) the ability of industry stakeholders and the government to adequately 
respond to the challenges facing the industry through innovative policy mechanisms which 
enabled it to “bounce back” from fatally damaging tourism in Fiji. Travel warnings are often a 
brusque response to situations that often require nuance, subtlety and divers actions to events that 
are fluid and quite complex. They may serve to mollify partisan interests in governments that 
have a stake in the domestic politics of the region as seemed to be the case between Fiji and the 
two regional powers, New Zealand and Australia. These were also countries from which Fiji 
traditionally drew a significant portion of international travelers and thus the issuance of travel 
warnings by them significantly impacted travel to Fiji.  
It is my assertion that the internal logic of travel warnings is fundamentally flawed and in 
the case of Fiji, was unnecessarily alarmist when compared to available data on the political 
situation in the ground. This is not to imply that travel advisories and warning are unjustified, 
only that an imprudent application of a powerful instrument is harmful if it fails to delineate the 
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multiple permutations of foreign office announcements to the specific contexts in which they are 
applied. In the era of mass tourism, international travel is no longer a province of the privileged, 
but accessible to citizens of advanced capitalist societies many of whom have now inherited a 
new “culture of mobility” (Bianchi 2007). The theoretical rationale for travel warnings, if 
examined at all have essentially been accepted prima facie by sending States as a public service 
announcement for its citizens. An analysis of Fijian tourism during these periods of crises 
suggests that travel advisories can also be understood within the framework of national interests 
by the issuing countries and therefore interpreted as a politically motivated act, rather than a 
spirited act of public service.  
TABLE 4.7: Visitor Arrivals during Political Instability (1985-1990; 1998-2003; 2004-2010) 
Year Aust. NZ USA Canada UK Eur. Asia Pac. Is Others Total 
1985 89459 19540 49557 18908 7707 12667 12601 11936 5800 228175 
1986 86297 22720 69732 23651 9972 15088 11801 12815 5748 257824 
1987 65382 16197 47037 16819 8511 14726 5487 11217 4490 189866 
1988 75264 21507 42144 16883 8464 20498 3425 14219 5751 208155 
1989 96992 28128 34425 16536 11404 23916 16015 18064 5085 250565 
1990 103535 29432 36928 18438 16773 27211 27874 17528 1277 278996 
1998 100756 70840 48390 12837 39341 29334 45154 22850 1840 371342 
1999 118272 72156 62131 13552 40316 28371 47216 26090 1851 409955 
2000 76883 49470 52534 10532 29215 22506 29810 21534 1586 294070 
2001 98213 66472 57711 10752 30508 20917 37897 23608 1936 348014 
2002 123606 68293 58815 9802 43393 21654 45740 24051 2505 397859 
2003 141873 75016 58323 10990 49794 21847 43265 28167 1525 430800 
2004 176195 103900 65211 12435 47668 22720 46466 26182 3298 504075 
2005 203250 112932 62640 12625 44472 25123 44252 28476 11375 545145 
2006* 206529 107277 66631 14372 38239 26801 50463 29725 8552 548549 
2007* 207001 99744 64687 16992 34785 26311 46975 34221 9165 539881 
2008 247608 100018 63667 17871 33935 29512 47246 35936 9238 585031 
2009 248589 90898 51592 13452 26213 28926 40849 35078 6589 542186 
2010 318185 97857 53122 12970 28813 30088 50256 39198 6379 631868 
Source: Fiji Bureau of Statistics. Note: The last coup d’état occurred in December of 2006 and therefore visitor 
numbers from 2007 better reflect the fallout from the political upheavals in Fiji.  
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 Table 4.7 contains an interesting variation between visitor arrivals and the coups in Fiji 
that challenges the uniform sanctions imposed by host countries and why travel warnings have 
lost its potency following the events of 2006. The fallout from the last coup (2006) was almost 
negligible (2% decline in visitor arrivals) compared to the previous two coups in 1987 and 2000 
(30% drop in visitors). The 1987 coup as I have argued was a truly unique event, Fiji gave the 
Pacific Islands its first coup d’état and the shock of that event reverberated across all sections of 
Fijian society, and corresponding external response to the crisis which acutely affected the 
tourism industry with declining visitor arrivals. The second coup in 2000 took a more ominous 
turn unlike the previous one, which explains the significant decline in tourist arrivals; (1) the 
prolonged 56 day hostage of government MPs culminating in the storming of the Parliamentary 
Complex by the Fiji military, (2) the internal mutiny by soldiers of the Fiji military who were 
sympathetic to the coup plotters resulting in several fatalities, (3) the accessibility of real time 
information through the advent of internet technology which the 1987 coup lacked.  
 It has been my argument that the 2006 coup d’état was neither a unique (as in 1987) nor a 
violent (as in 2000) event and the subsequent consumer response vindicates it. The monolithic 
policy response of sending states like Australia and New Zealand towards Fiji had more to do 
with their own internal political machinations than with the actual reality on the ground in Fiji. It 
is reasonable to postulate that the national interest of Australia and New Zealand resides in not 
emphasizing the dissimilarities that exists between these different episodes spanning two 
decades, but rather project on to them a larger pattern of instability. What I aim to demonstrate 
within the scope of my research is (1) the negative impacts of political instability on tourism and 
attempts by stakeholders to minimize the collateral damage, and (2) that the tourism industry in 
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Fiji is a well developed, mature industry in spite of the chronic instability, remains an attractive 
vehicle for investments and national development. 
 The subtle nuances of domestic political crises were nonetheless overtaken by the quick 
and sharp policy reprisals from the major sending states in the form of travel warnings. State 
behavior in this instance, especially by Australia and New Zealand seemed largely dictated by 
realist assumptions, whereas consumer reaction could be properly interpreted as rational within 
strict epistemic limits. Island communities have long been on the receiving end of “regional 
realpolitik” by Australia and New Zealand who have essentially assumed “leadership” roles in 
governing their backyard (Dinnen 2004; Hayward-Jones 2008, 2009; Buchanan 2007; McGraw 
1995, 2005; O’Connor 2004; Kabutaulaka 2005. The ‘hard-line” policies pursued by New 
Zealand and Australia towards Fiji could only be understood within the rubric of realism, 
consistent with their approach in other troubled areas in Oceania. Judging from the behavior of 
New Zealand and Australia in the post-coup period, I can only assume that it is in their national 
interest to maintain a fairly belligerent and adversarial posture towards Fiji, perhaps as part of a 
long-term strategy of political realignment in the Pacific (Ratuva 2008). Secondly, assuming that 
consumers behave in a rational manner, it therefore follows that most would exercise caution 
when forewarned by their respective governments on traveling to an unsafe location. Individual 
cancellations of travel plans often rise to a “critical mass” level leading to industry wide 
disruptions affecting airlines, seaports, food and beverage markets, etc. While State policy and 
decision making may be driven by the imperatives of national interest, individual choices about 
government warnings are severely circumscribed, i.e. bounded by incomplete information often 
driven by media hysteria and State manipulation of actual events on the ground (the distortion 
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may not be deliberate, but governments have an implicit perspective they wish to emphasize 
which advances their policy objectives).  
 Robert Young Pelton’s (2000) intrepid travel guide to the world’s most dangerous places 
is a cult favorite among travel aficionados who prefer to wake up to the staccato of gunfire rather 
than the languid sounds of waves breaking upon the shore. For the majority of travelers it is 
reasonable to postulate that they will engage in risk aversive behavior and order their preferences 
accordingly.  Consumers who travel to new vistas will generally avoid locations that place them 
and their families at risk.  It is in the utility of individuals to secure and prioritize their safety and 
well being and thus rational for travelers to eschew places where self preservation and well being 
is compromised (Kozak, Crotts and Law 2007; Peattie, Clarke and Peattie 2005; Simpson and 
Siguaw 2008; Tasci and Boylu 2010; Fuchs and Reichel 2010; Yuksel and Yuksel 2007; Lepp 
and Gibson 2003). 
 In the case of Fiji, the coups renewed the “necessity” of Canberra and Wellington to 
assume a more activist role in managing the “failed” microstates of Oceania. This aggressive 
posture seems to be driven by the “Africanisation of the South Pacific” thesis (Reilly 2000) 
where political crises are endemic because ethnic considerations triumph pluralist virtues 
(Thomas 1990; Lawson 1991). The “realism” espoused by Australia and New Zealand towards 
the microstates of Oceania conveniently elides over the historical legacies of colonialism, 
asymmetrical factor endowments, nascent institutions and uneven economic opportunities.   
Tourism and the Construction of Risk 
Tourism is an important industry and for many microstates an essential component of 
economic development (Shareef and McAleer 2005; Croes 2006; Wilkinson 1989; Taylor 2006). 
This has far reaching implications for all stakeholders involved in this vital sector, especially the 
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sending nations whose actions have extraordinary consequences over the economies and 
livelihoods of receiving states. While travel is not a general necessity for survival, the intake of 
tourists for many small economies is (Wang 2009; Narayan 2005; Causey 2007). The efforts in 
developing a viable and thriving tourism industry among the microstates have not gone 
unnoticed, and governments in recent years have embarked on an ambitious effort to develop 
tourism within their countries. 
 It is often said that the first casualty of war is truth, but for the travel industry it is merely 
rumors of war that often damage communities that rely on trade in services. Tourism is 
vulnerable to political shocks and instability (Beirman 2003) since tourists leave with their 
resources in the event of a national upheaval or disruption (Faulkner 2001; Ritchie 2004; Wang 
2009). The nature of the industry makes it impossible to be insulated from the mercurial politics 
of host countries and the deleterious consequences that often ensue following a crisis. The 
tourism sector is deeply susceptible to both internal as well as external shocks and therefore 
minimizing disruptions and understanding risk is a central concern of tourism. (See Table 4.8 for 
a list of disruptions that occur in the tourism sector). A large body of work has been produced to 
isolate the complex levels of traumatic events that threaten the global trade travel and tourism 
(Prideaux, Laws and Faulkner 2003; Howard 2009; George 2009; Causey 2007; Bianchi 2007; 
Kozak, Crotts and Law 2007; Rittichainuwat and Chakraborty 2009; Lepp and Gibson 2003; 
Simpson and Siguaw 2008; Carter 1998).  
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Table 4.8: Disruptions to Tourism 
DISASATER   AREA AFFECTED 
 Natural Earthquakes 
Tsunami 
Hurricanes 
Fires 
Floods 
Volcanic 
Chile 
Indonesia 
South Pacific 
California 
Tennessee (Nashville) 
Iceland 
 Environmental Oil spills Gulf Coast 
Alaska 
 Health SARS 
H1N1 
China 
Violence War 
Terrorism 
Crime 
Tamil Insurgency 
IRA 
Drug War 
Sri Lanka 
Northern Ireland 
Mexico 
Instability Economic Asia 
Latin America 
Indonesia 
Argentina 
 Political Violent 
Non-violent 
Thailand 
Fiji 
 
Travel Warnings as Public Service Announcements 
 Nation-states have a fundamental responsibility to protect and warn its citizens about 
dangers abroad, and falling short of precluding travel, they use a variety of instruments to 
apprise, caution and inform its citizens about their travel destinations. Travel warnings are 
perhaps the most widely used informational tool sanctioned by the state to inform its citizens 
about dangers abroad and forewarn travelers about locations they ought to avoid, or take 
extraordinary health and safety measures if travel is unavoidable. Oded Lowenheim (2007:204) 
has argued that travel warnings can be properly understood as a heuristic device used by 
neoliberal societies to educate and “responsibilize” its citizens about how to manage risk in an 
increasingly complex and interconnected world. The modern state not only scans the horizon for 
possible and actual fires, it attempts to instruct its citizens on basic detection and risk 
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management. The assumption is that the international traveler is a savvy and responsible 
individual who values safety and security when abroad.  
 Travel warnings could therefore be understood as public service announcements; the 
modern state with its vast intelligence apparatus and technical capabilities has at its disposal 
information and data that is not available to the average traveler. Travel warnings perform a vital 
role in democratic societies by disseminating critical information to its citizens that may not be 
otherwise available about places beyond their borders. There are multiple reasons for transborder 
travel including business, pleasure, education, family, etc, each of which involve a series of 
complex decision-making process (Freedman 2005). One’s travel choices are often 
circumscribed by time, resources and available information, and given the scarcity of these 
goods the decision to travel will often be determined by any of these factors (Wong and Yeh 
2009; George 2009). It is therefore reasonable to postulate that consumer decision to invest time 
and resource will be determined by the available stock of information on the destination of 
choice. Travel warnings play a significant role in the decision-making process for travelers to 
potential locations by providing cues on where to best invest their time and resources (Castelltort 
and Mader 2007; Uriely, Maoz and Reichel 2007). 
Travel Warnings as Politically Motivated 
 Conversely, authors Richard Sharpley, Julia Sharpley and John Adams (1996) have 
argued that travel warnings should be construed as a form of trade embargo or a soft sanction. In 
reviewing the case of Gambia and the use of travel warnings by Great Britain following the Coup 
in 1994, they concluded that Great Britain used its economic leverage as a sending state to 
punish Gambia and transmit a message to the regime. In tracing the sequence of events in 
Gambia in late 1994, the authors conclude that the harsh travel warning issued by the British 
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Foreign Office was incongruent with the reality on the ground, the bloodless coup consisted of 
the “army taking over an empty State House, [while] the President and his entourage being 
guests at an American warship in Banjul Harbor…the trouble was restricted to one army base, all 
roads and airport remained open” (Sharpley, Sharpley and Adams 1996:3). Despite protests by 
the Gambian authorities about a realistic and truthful assessment of the situation on the ground, 
Great Britain persisted with its dire warnings about travel to Gambia resulting in the complete 
collapse of tourism, its most important industry for one of the smallest and poorest country in 
West Africa (Sharpley, Sharpley and Adams 1996:5). 
 Tourism is a fragile and volatile industry deeply susceptible to endogenous and 
exogenous components and often influenced by factors beyond its control. An overlooked issue 
that authors Bianchi (2007) and (Kim, Timothy and Han 2007) point out is the long political use 
of tourism by nation states in the international system. Among the more famous list includes the 
travel embargo on Cuba by successive American administrations and travel warnings against the 
Philippines by the US not because there was a threat on the safety and security of tourists, but 
because the Philippines had failed to renew the US Bases Treaty (Bianchi 2007).  
The Case of Fiji 
I argue that travel warnings are a powerful tool for governments to construct an image of 
a destination, not always for the purpose of safety and security but to maintain a specific policy 
objective congruent with its national interests. The imperative of nation-states to pursue its 
objectives is hardly a debatable proposition, but when it collides with interests beyond its 
domestic concerns, it becomes necessary to reexamine existing policies. The contention is not 
the issuance of travel warnings per se, by nation-states to protect its nationals in the event of a 
crisis abroad, but on the continuance of a state of hysteria and fear, once a clearer picture of 
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events on the ground emerge. Once it has been determined that the political situation in the 
country under crisis does not pose a discernible danger to visitors from abroad, than travel 
warnings move from being a public service announcement to a politically motivated act. 
 In the early days of the 2006 coup, the level of alarm and apprehension was 
understandable, but as in the previous coups it soon became apparent that events in Suva had 
absolutely nothing to do with tourists, visitors, hotels and resorts. However, I do not have access 
to data on crime and social unrest surrounding the previous coups in Fiji (1987 and 2000), but 
the political events of 2006 essentially followed a similar pattern i.e. bloodless coups followed 
by a military junta and thus it is fair to extrapolate that the resulting political crisis would have a 
comparable effect on tourists in Fiji during previous periods of instability. One could therefore 
argue that travel warnings against Fiji was justified following the 2006 coup because of the 
heightened risk to the safety and security of tourists as victims of crime in an unstable 
environment with a weakened law and order. However as Table 4.9 (lists all reported crimes 
against tourists from 34 hotels along the Coral Coast in Fiji from 2004-2009) shows, neither the 
safety nor the security of travelers was in jeopardy, nor did resorts become violent targets and 
centers of struggle. Among the possible disruptions that afflict the tourism industry (See Table 
4.8) the events in Fiji had been benign, contained and quite underwhelming.  
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Table 4.9: Tourism Related Offences- Coral Coast 2004-2009 
OFFENCE 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Harassment - - - 1 - - 
Indecent Assault - - 1 - - - 
Robbery - 1 1 - 1 1 
Rape 1 1 - - - 2 
Assault 1 1 3 1 1 2 
Trivial (Minor offense) 23 46 34 24 27 31 
Civil 4 2 3 2 2 1 
Lost & Found (Property) 73 67 41 30 37 35 
Theft/Breaking (Criminal offense) 20 17 9 9 11 10 
Undisclosed 5 6 6 4 2 2 
TOTAL 127 141 98 71 81 84 
Source: Republic of Fiji Police Force, Internal Report  
 While a sharp drop in reported crimes from 2006 onwards could be partly attributed to a 
decline in visitor arrivals to Fiji following the political crisis, the apparent consistency of data 
does seem to suggest that Fiji was no more a risky destination following the crisis in 2006 then it 
was prior to the political events. The actual reality on the ground is empirically at variance with 
both official announcements and media portrayals about the “worsening” situation in Fiji and as 
risky destination for travelers.
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 The argument thus far has not been on minimizing the deleterious effects of political 
instability on tourism in Fiji or the social and economic fallout as a result of the coup in Fiji. The 
loss of both formal and informal employment in the industry was immediate and devastating and 
contributed to further socio-economic immiseration of Fijian society. The difficulty is in 
explaining the long-term resiliency and success of tourism in Fiji in spite of the chronic political 
                                                          
67
 Sending nations have as much an ethical responsibility to accurately inform and educate its citizens about the risks 
and rewards of travel as receiving nations do to ensure the safety and security of visitors from abroad. Sending 
nations wield extraordinary power to construct risk and frame images of societies that lack resources to mount a 
counter-portrayal, especially if they have been unfairly portrayed. Image formation is not an ahistorical 
phenomenon, unencumbered by the realities on the ground. The travel literature is replete with narratives about 
exotic Asia, dangerous Africa, enchanting Oceania or the primitive Americas (Carter 1998). 
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instabilities that have challenged the industry over two decades. While the data on visitor arrivals 
to Fiji from sending states revealed the incongruence between official policy and individual 
choice, the deeper institutional factors have been overlooked. Microstates possess not only a 
greater sophistication in developing their economies than is often understood but have in the case 
of Fiji responded with policies to crisis that could have fatally damaged a valuable domestic 
industry. The survival of microstates in the global economy is not only predicated on their ability 
to exploit their comparative advantages, but also on their capacity to innovate and modulate to 
changing circumstances and political realities.  
Conclusion 
 The tourism industry in Fiji as this case study reveals is situated within a complicated 
socio-political context which exposes the industry to three intractable problems. The chronic 
political instability is not unique to Fiji, as other Pacific Islands have undergone similar 
difficulties with democratization, coup d’états and civil rebellions in the decades following their 
independence from former metropoles (McCusker 2006; Chauvet, Collier and Hoeffler 2010). 
There is an extraordinary variation in the nature and duration of these instabilities and the 
complex demographic and historical experiences of these Islands defy simple generalizations and 
monolithic interpretations. The “Africanization of the South Pacific” thesis (Reilly 2000) was 
justifiably criticized for imposing singular causal factors such as ethnicity as key drivers of 
conflict in the Pacific (Fraenkel 2004), and scholarship on conflicts in the region have greatly 
improved. Anemic central authority, geographical fragmentation and provincial autonomy 
doomed the prospects of the Solomon Islands to form a stable and cohesive nation-state, 
predicated on the Westminster Model (Dinnen 2002). The Solomon Islands comprise a chain of 
1,000 Islands stretching across 1,400 km of the Southwest Pacific with a population of half 
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million speaking some 80 different languages. In contrast, Fiji has a powerful central 
government, with the majority of the population of 800,000 clustered around two major Islands 
(the rest live in traditional villages in the 90 outer Islands) and most speak 1-2 of the three major 
languages (Finn and Smith 2000; Wainwright 2003). Issues of governance, corruption and rent-
seeking behavior have largely contributed to the turmoil in Nauru and Vanuatu (Henderson 
2003; van Fossen 2003; Firth 2001), societies that geographically and demographically different 
from each other.  
The inapplicability of the Westminster model in nascent democracies, the embedded 
tribal structures of these societies, the struggle for natural resources, the legacy of colonialism 
and difficulties of managing multiethnic communities have all played a role in destabilizing 
these Island Nations. The developmental and economic costs have been severe for these small 
economies demonstrated by the data from Fiji that followed each of the coup d’états. Issues 
pertaining to democratization and political development are long-term projects that will not be 
rectified anytime soon, but these microstates do not have the luxury of waiting to develop their 
economies until they get their political house in order. De-coupling economic development from 
political development allows these microstates to increase well being and opportunity for as 
many people as possible at a pace not determined by political events. Investing in tourism is not 
an unreasonable mode for development and it is possible that within a specified set of conditions 
i.e. the nature of the crisis, the quality of the organizations and the depth of the industry, tourism 
can survive and even thrive, in spite of serious political disruptions and negative externalities 
such as travel warnings. 
The second problematic issue highlighted in the case study is the declining sugar industry 
in Fiji. The collapse of the industry will engender severe socio-economic dislocations, yet there 
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is no current discussion on how to move beyond the day of its reckoning. The only significant 
proposal to date was by Oxfam (2005) that suggested converting the sugar mills to produce 
ethanol but I have been unable to locate any official policy on the governments’ response to the 
report. Thus far the government has been willing to prop up the sugar industry in Fiji with public 
funds (for 2010, the government loaned F$100 million dollars to the Fiji Sugar Corporation).
68
  
 Finally, the financial mishaps revealed the extent of State exposure to its investments in 
tourism in Fiji. This knotty issue facing tourism in Fiji is still being unraveled and remains 
unclear on how it will impact future investments in the tourist industry. I am skeptical about the 
necessary institutional changes that would prevent a reoccurrence of using public funds for 
private industry, especially in a small state like Fiji. These problems however do not negate the 
importance of cultivating tourism as a viable conduit for development in societies with deep 
factor limitations and lack of natural endowments. 
 Tourism in Fiji has had to endure twenty-five years of political turmoil as well as meet 
the challenges of sustainable development and the constant threat of natural disasters common to 
small islands in the South Pacific. The next chapter explains the resiliency of tourism in Fiji and 
the feasibility of microstates to organize their national priorities around the development of 
tourism based economy. Tourism is a complex industry and imposes extraordinary demands on 
host economies and while this project recognizes the limitations inherent in the nature of 
microstates, the case study on Fiji confirms the rationality of developing tourism as a reasonable 
tool for economic development. 
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 Fijian economist Wadan Narsey argues that Fiji Sugar Corporation is an instance of “too big to fail” as it’s 
collapse would cost the State around F300 million dollars. See report in Island Business at 
http://www.islandsbusiness.com/fiji_business/index_dynamic/containerNameToReplace=MiddleMiddle/focusModu
leID=19417/overideSkinName=issueArticle-full.tpl?PHPSESSID=8b1b9cb01cc99e0439e9460e42478937. 
(accessed  May 18, 2011) 
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Chapter Five 
Policy Challenges 
Introduction  
 This project demonstrates both the limits and possibilities in understanding the survival 
of microstates in the global system and fills the lacuna in our comprehension of how small states 
organize their economies in order to maximize their comparative advantage and fulfill the 
promise of sovereignty and independence. The competing hypothesis argues that these 
microstates in Oceania are severely circumscribed by geography, territory and demographics and 
therefore lack the structural capabilities needed to overcome their intrinsic limitations. 
Subsequently as a matter of national policy these small economies should reintegrate themselves 
closer to their former metropoles or regional hegemons for their survival. Scholars have therefore 
theorized that the continued existence and future prospects of these small islands ought to be 
interpreted as examples of MIRAB economies (Bertram and Waters 1985; Berno and Douglas 
1998; Milne 1992) in which the political economy of microstates are primarily organized around 
migration, remittances and foreign aid. The case of the Fiji Islands illustrates the inadequacy of 
the MIRAB model to explain the permutations of policy and institutions in microstates which 
strive to exploit their comparative advantage in the global economy.  
 The Fiji Islands as typical microstates have taken advantage of their location, size, and 
even low population density to construct a fairly sophisticated tourism industry within the global 
travel market. Tourism is by now deeply integrated into the Fijian economy and will remain so 
for the immediate future and carries important political and social consequences for these small 
islands. The tourism industry in Fiji has been surprisingly resilient despite the extraordinary 
challenges it has faced over the past twenty years and this section posits that the success of 
tourism in Fiji cannot be overstated for its economy (see Table 5.1). I will further explore the 
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political and environmental challenges facing the industry and the policy responses formulated to 
meet those challenges. Ceteris paribus, the Fiji Islands as a typical microstate in Oceania made a 
calculated decision within the limits of its resource capabilities and national priorities to invest in 
tourism. This case study on Fiji affirms the efficacy of comparative advantage as a better 
explanation of the survival of microstates than the prevailing MIRAB model. 
 Table 5.1: Comparative Gross Foreign Earnings 1975-2009 (FJD Millions) 
 MAJOR DOMESTIC EXPORT 
YEAR GROSS TOURIST RECEIPTS SUGAR 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
69.0 
76.0 
80.0 
86.0 
102.0 
108.0 
122.0 
142.0 
135.0 
161.0 
168.7 
185.0 
148.0 
186.0 
269.6 
294.6 
286.3 
328.1 
347.4 
392.5 
405.0 
414.5 
446.7 
482.5 
558.6 
397.0 
464.0 
563.0 
646.0 
725.0 
813.0 
823.0 
784.0 
854.0 
817.0 
94.7 
67.7 
93.6 
83.3 
117.0 
174.2 
131.6 
125.1 
111.9 
110.0 
111.8 
133.7 
186.1 
198.3 
228.3 
223.7 
220.4 
221.3 
230.7 
252.2 
276.1 
301.7 
213.4 
244.2 
263.2 
237.1 
225.2 
234.4 
225.7 
209.2 
223.7 
215.1 
185.0 
248.2 
187.1 
  Sources: Fiji Bureau of Statistics; The Reserve Bank of Fiji 
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 The growth of tourism occurred beneath the long shadow of sugar production and while 
the sugar industry retained its political and historical importance for the Fijian economy and 
society, it had nonetheless steadily lost its role as an income generator as the data on gross 
earnings in Table 6.1 demonstrate.  Beginning in 1989 receipts from tourism eclipsed earnings 
from sugar exports and by 2009, gross dollars from tourism were four times that of sugar cane 
and remained ahead of sugar production even after the serious political crises of 2000 or 2006 
when visitor arrivals plunged and revenues declined. The Fiji Islands would increasingly become 
a tourist based economy and its success would depend on the States ability to adequately respond 
to challenges unique to that sector. 
 The chronic political crises that afflicted Fiji since 1987 validated the MIRAB hypothesis 
of microstates as intrinsically unstable, but it couldn’t explain the sophisticated policy response 
by the state and industry stakeholders in sustaining tourism through periods of political 
instability. The ability of Fiji to successfully respond to a crisis that could have been fatal to 
tourism challenges the MIRAB model of microstates as fundamentally weak and lacking the 
institutional and organizational capabilities of larger and more complex societies. The policy 
response by the Fiji Islands following the 1987 and 2000 coups therefore provides valuable 
insight on how small states in similar situations could respond to crisis that affect their tourism 
sector. This section explores the three policy challenges facing Fijian tourism as a test of 
institutional and governance capabilities and provides a reasonable assessment of the future 
trajectory of tourism in Fiji. Political crises till now remain the most severe external challenge to 
Fijian tourism and an important case study for the rest of Oceania. Neither grave natural disasters 
nor public health outbreaks have threatened the tourism sector in Fiji or in the South Pacific 
(with the exception of civil conflict in Vanuatu and Solomon Islands, both of which have a vastly 
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underdeveloped tourism industry). Two further issues explored here which are intrinsic to the 
political economy of tourism in microstates are the high costs infrastructural development and 
environmental diversification in order to promote sustainable development. This section explains 
how Fiji has responded to each of these issues and opens pathways for other Island economies 
facing similar development challenges.    
Policy Response to Crisis 
 
 I have argued that the external response to the crisis in Fiji was unjustified and 
incommensurate with the reality on the ground. I postulate that much of the public posturing by 
regional powers (Australia and New Zealand) had much to do with internal politics of the region, 
and the perception of Oceania as intrinsically unstable and turbulent. One could argue that there 
was an asymmetric imposition of responsibility against micro-states like Fiji to demonstrate its 
commitment to democratic ideals or face severe consequences while larger states often violated 
international norms with impunity but the international system is neither fair nor altruistic and 
realism dictated that Fiji needed to move quickly to protect a valuable industry. 
 The exigent circumstances brought on by the coups necessitated a coordinated response 
by the state and the industry in Fiji, to minimize further collateral damage. The effect of coup 
d’états on tourism according to Teye’s “impact model” (1988: 344-345) is seen in three 
significant areas: 
(1) The effectiveness of the National Tourism Organization (NTO), in the case of Fiji, 
the efficacy of the Fiji Visitors Bureau and the Ministry of Tourism to respond to the 
crisis. 
(2) The flow of international tourists (demand for the tourism product), measured in 
visitor arrivals. 
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(3) The development of tourism resources and attractions (supply and delivery of tourism 
products). 
For non-contiguous locations like Fiji, with one international airport and two passenger wharves 
for cruise liners, it was crucial to maintain the flow and delivery of tourists and related products. 
Besides the adverse publicity resulting from coup d’états, other impacts on tourism included 
damage to parks and recreation areas, closure of entry points, violence against tourists and the 
subsequent degrading of tourist infrastructure (Teye 1988: 346). Professor Teye however 
attributes the collapse of tourism in Africa and specifically in Ghana following coup d’états as a 
consequence of anemic and ineffective management structures overseeing tourism (Teye: 234, 
244). National Tourism Organizations (NTO) argued Teye were largely underfunded and hostage 
to the political fortunes of the changing political climate which left them vulnerable to the 
frequent ebb and flow of policy, politics and leadership. In contrast, changes in the political 
landscape in Fiji have at least to my knowledge never had any bearing on the organization or 
management of the tourism sector in Fiji. Secondly, the Fijian government immediately stepped 
in to protect the industry and insulate it from possible negative externalities of the coups in Fiji 
by challenging the premise of travel warnings and providing additional security for resorts and 
hotels to assure guests and staff of their safety during the time of transition. The Republic of Fiji 
police officers had traditionally assisted tourist facilities security personnel as needed but by 
1998, the Cabinet approved the establishment of a Tourist Police Unit (TPU) in conjunction with 
the Fiji Visitors Bureau (FVB) to ensure the safety and security of tourist facilities, staff and 
visitors in Fiji. In 2004, the TPU became a full fledged Tourism Police Division (TPD) funded 
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by the government of Fiji to ensure that the tourism sector would not be any more victimized by 
the political upheavals wracking the country.
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 All manner of disasters have a way of testing the resolve and institutional capabilities of 
governments including microstates. The islands of the Pacific have an intimate familiarity with 
natural disasters and as shown in Table 5.1, governments and agencies have collaborated in 
formulating a fairly sophisticated response to climatic disruptions, just as it did when confronted 
with political trauma. This section provides an overview of state response to both natural and 
political crises and illustrates the institutional and organizational capacities of even small 
countries to manage disaster. Crisis often exposes institutional and organizational weakness (see 
Gros 2011) in societies ill-prepared to timely and effectively deal with traumatic disruptions with 
severe consequences. The empirical expectation under the MIRAB hypothesis would have seen a 
sharp degradation in the ability of microstates to adequately respond to crisis (natural or 
political). The experience of the Fiji Islands challenges the MIRAB assumption of institutional 
fragility, especially when the state is really needed.  
(a) Responding to Natural Crisis 
 The literature on disaster management at the macro-level is as expansive and specialized 
as the capability of international organizations, national governments and non-governmental 
organizations to respond to crisis anywhere in the globe today (Coppola 2007; Pirotte, Husson 
and Grunewald: 1999; Granger 1999; Brecher: 2008; Bremmer and Keat 2010). The global 
network of disaster relief agencies collaborate with national governments to secure supplies and 
in some cases technical expertise for people and places that are stricken and in need of 
assistance. The tourism industry in Fiji has a fairly comprehensive natural disaster preparedness 
                                                          
69
 See article at http://www.fiji.gov.fj/cgi-bin/cms/exec/view.cgi/12/1294/printer. (accessed June 4, 2011).  
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plan to cope with natural disasters managed by the Fiji Visitors Bureau (FVB) and the Disaster 
Management Office in cases of weather related emergencies (see Diagram 5.1).  
Diagram 5.1: Fiji Tourism Natural Disaster Management 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Fiji Visitors Bureau 
 
 The exigent circumstances of geography have made natural disaster management a 
national priority for Pacific Island countries that have to respond to tropical cyclones on a 
seasonal basis. The human dimension of tourism makes it imperative for host governments to 
effectively and quickly respond to the needs of visitors from abroad who may be vacationing in 
fairly remote and inaccessible areas. The safety and security of travelers enhances the intangible 
attributes necessary for host communities in the Pacific Islands to market themselves as the last 
bastion of safety and placidity amid the troubles and trauma of this world, and tourists trapped in 
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a hurricane on a remote island is hardly the image they would like to project. (Daily Mail Oct. 22 
2005; Telegraph Oct. 4 2011).
70
   
(b) Responding to Political Crisis 
 
Missing from the puzzle is the institutional and organizational ability of microstates to 
effectively respond to disruptions caused by political events.  This study provides an important 
insight in crisis management at the micro-level which required a set of effective political 
strategies by the State to minimize irrevocable damage to a vital domestic industry. The policy 
response by Fiji fills another gap in the existing literature on disaster management, albeit by 
small states that may not have the luxury of a “fallback” industry (Faulkner: 2001; Evans and 
Elphik 2005; Faulkner and Vikulov: 2001).  
 Three weeks after the first coup in Fiji in May 1987, the government announced an extra 
F500, 000 dollars to the Fiji Visitors Bureau in marketing, promotion and crisis management. 
The Fiji Tourism Convention which was slated for late June 1987 went ahead as scheduled to 
provide a sense of normalcy and business as usual. The then Governor General of Fiji (the 
Titular Head of State) addressed the convention highlighting the importance of the industry, the 
active role of the state in protecting the industry, and the formation of a Tourism Action Group 
(TAG) comprised of government and industry stakeholders to oversee the industry during this 
perilous time. The sole objective of the TAG group was “to arrest the decline of visitor arrivals 
to Fiji as effectively and quickly as possible” (Rao 2002: 421) and included four critical 
components (Berno and King 2001: 79), 
                                                          
70
 See http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-366221/Britons-trapped-Hurricane-Wilma-strikes.html 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/travelnews/8418356/Thailand-floods-stranded-tourists-criticise-lack-of-
information.html(accessed June 4, 2011). 
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(1) The removal of travel warnings and union bans in Australia and New Zealand 
(2) A doubling of the marketing budget for the Fiji Visitors Bureau 
(3) Familiarization visits from the main markets for trade representatives; and 
(4) Marketing of special airfares and packages to those markets. 
The Fiji Visitors Bureau (FVB) meanwhile targeted a marketing drive for the Australian market 
to revive Fiji’s image as a safe place for tourists, negotiated fare specials with the national carrier 
Air Pacific from Australia and developed a training program aptly called “Partners in Recovery” 
with the Fiji School of Hotel and Catering. The training program administered by the Fiji 
National Training Council and supported by the Fiji Hotel Association (the main trade group) 
took advantage of the downturn in the industry to assist managers and staff on how to negotiate 
in the changed climate. Within three months of its genesis, the Tourism Action Group (TAG) 
closed shop, secure that it had successfully prosecuted its core mission of retarding the negative 
consequences of the coup and its effect on the industry. Visitor arrivals in 1988 (See Table 5.7) 
were significantly up from the two target countries (Australia and New Zealand); although it 
would not be until 1990 that tourist arrivals would exceed pre-coup levels. The Fijian experience 
emphasized the active role of the state in responding to crisis with focused set of goals that could 
be realistically achieved.  
The template established by the Tourism Action Group (TAG) would again prove 
invaluable during the protracted political instability in 2000 following another coup d’état. The 
2000 TAG team included representatives from the Fiji Visitors Bureau (FVB), Air Pacific, Air 
New Zealand, the Fiji Hotel Association, and the Society of Fiji Travel Associates. After a 
successful lobby effort by TAG to the military government, it was able to secure F5 million 
  131 
dollars for a promotional campaign to militate against the damage done to the industry (Rao 
2002:422). These efforts included; 
(1) Seeking the services of a public relations and media management consulting firm to 
assist in the management of the recovery program; 
(2) Lobbying the governments and unions in Fiji’s key markets against sanctions and 
travel warnings on Fiji; 
(3) Coordination on advertising and promotional activities in proven media outlets in 
Fiji’s key markets of Australia and New Zealand, and North America, Europe and 
Japan; and  
(4) Devising special recovery fare packages.   
One notable strategy employed in 2000 which was not included in 1987 was the utilization of the 
internet as a marketing tool by the tourism industry in Fiji to promote and preserve its image as 
still an ideal place to visit (Beirman 2003:148). Rao (2002: 423) synthesizes the action plan 
formulated by TAG in response to the political events in Fiji in 2000 (see table 5.2) 
 Table 5.2: TAG Action Plan following the 2000 Coup 
May 19 2000 Attempted coup and seizure of Parliament 
May 20 2000 Crisis meeting of Fiji Visitors Bureau (FVB), Air Pacific and industry representatives to discuss 
the crisis. The decision is taken at this meeting to form the Tourism Action Group (TAG) and 
appoint Damend Gounder as Chairman. The first course of action for TAG is to seek 
international expertise on media management through the appointment of an international PR 
company. 
June 7 2000 Appointment of Hill & Knowlton, an international public relations consulting firm based in 
Australia to provide PR consultation for TAG. 
June 9 2000 Presentation to the Interim Military Government (IMG) formally seeking its assistance and 
support. 
June/July 2000 Monitoring of overseas media by Hill and Knowlton and lobbying with key union leaders in 
Australia and New Zealand to reconsider trade embargoes on Fiji. Circulation of accurate 
weekly news updates from TAG via FVB on the current situation to overseas media 
organizations along with positive experience statements from tourists who had stayed in Fiji 
during the crisis. TAG meeting with Fiji wholesalers to determine a recovery campaign in all 
the key source markets and to seek financial support from wholesalers for cooperative recovery 
marketing. 
August 2000 End of consultancy services by Hill & Knowlton. Continued lobbying of embassies by TAG to 
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revise travel restrictions for the Western region of the Fiji Islands, which had remained calm 
and peaceful throughout the crisis. 
September 2000 Capture and arrest of coup leaders. Modification of travel warnings by the Foreign Offices of 
the UK, the USA, Australia and New Zealand. Travel restrictions eased for the Western regions 
of the Fiji Islands. TAG meeting with the Interim Minister for Tourism and Transport to secure 
funding support to TAG and FVB in 2001. First phase of the TAG Recovery Campaign is 
launched in Australia and New Zealand with special recovery airfares and land content 
packages. 
October 2000 TAG continues lobbying through embassies to downgrade travel warnings on Fiji and to urge 
overseas unions to remove trade embargoes. 
November 2000 Announcement of FVB 2001 Marketing Budget of F11 million dollars. A total assistance 
package of F16 million dollars is announced by the Interim Minister of Finance as part of the 
Interim Government’s assistance in the revival of the local tourism industry. TAG launches the 
second phase of its Recovery Campaign, with emphasis on efforts in Fiji’s long-haul markets of 
Japan, North America, and Europe. Travel warnings on travel to Fiji were downgraded by the 
Foreign Offices of Australia, New Zealand and North America. 
December 2000 Second phase of TAG Recovery Campaign in full swing. Provisional results from the first phase 
indicate a good success rate in terms of visitor arrivals. TAG makes a presentation to the Fiji 
Tourism Forum with a summary report on its activities and the recommendation that TAG be 
disbanded. TAG Boxing Day Specials are launched in Australia and New Zealand to stimulate 
travel during this low season. 
January 2001 TAG Committee votes to keep TAG active through monthly meetings with a focus on assisting 
the Fiji Visitors Bureau (FVB) in its destination marketing efforts. 
Source: Rao (2002:423) 
 
 The latest coup d’état in December of 2006 re-activated the Tourism Action Group 
(TAG) to ensure that the tourism industry had the resources to manage the fallout from the 
ensuing political instability. Official reports from the government indicated that TAG was able to 
secure an initial tranche of F3.8 million dollars for marketing costs soon after the coup.
71
 
Included in the TAG team for 2006 was the Australian airline Qantas as the core target according 
to the Fiji Times report was the Australian market, a traditional sending state for Fijian tourism.
72
 
A slight decline in total arrivals in 2007 (see table 4.7) was effectively reversed and by 2010, 
tourist arrival in Fiji showed sustained growth across all major markets, especially Australia 
which accounted for almost fifty percent of all tourists to Fiji. The main stakeholders in Fijian 
tourism have thus far been successful in interrupting the deleterious effects of the coups on the 
                                                          
71
 See the news release by the Fijian Embassy in Washington D.C. at 
http://www.fijiembassydc.com/default.asp?contentID=695 (accessed June 6, 2011). 
72
 See article at http://www.fijitimes.com/story.aspx?id=55033 (accessed June 6, 2011). 
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industry. However, the perpetual cycle of crisis and reaction obscures more pressing issues 
facing the industry, its ability to diversify and adapt to the environmental challenges and 
demands imposed by an expanding tourism sector. 
Building Infrastructure  
 
 The expanding market in tourism in Fiji ineluctably increased transaction costs and 
externalities as it strove to meet the supply conditions demanded by the industry. Tourism in Fiji 
increased six-fold, from 110, 042 visitor arrivals in 1970 to 631,868 by 2010 imposing 
extraordinary demands on resources, manpower and infrastructure even when population only 
expanded from 520,304 to 883,125 during the same period. Following the criteria stipulated by 
Gearing, Swart and Var (1976: Table 3.2), host economies must satisfy the infrastructure criteria 
required by the tourism sector. Both the enclave and functional models of tourism generate 
resource constrains on host economies according to the unique attributes of the specific structural 
development. Large scale projects are biased towards resort type structures inside confined 
geographical locations often disconnected from host communities (such as the troubled 
government funded tourist projects in Fiji) and cater to a segment of the tourism market that 
favors comprehensive enclave types of structures. The more open functional model of tourist 
development caters to down-market travelers, adventure seekers, urban tourists and transient 
visitors and opens up opportunities for the tourism industry in Fiji to diversify its portfolio of 
alternative products to meet a wide range of consumer demands. But transitioning from only 
enclave types of resort developments puts pressures on host communities to engage in tourism 
that is sensitive to the environment, geography and culture requiring the implementation of new 
policies, institutions and political hurdles to overcome. 
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 Three ways in which Fiji attempted to equitably distribute the burden of infrastructural 
provision was through incentives, partnerships and diversified ownership. The report on 
infrastructure development by the Fiji Ministry of Tourism (2004) acknowledged the physical 
impact that tourism had on communities, both structurally and aesthetically. Baseline 
requirements for water, electricity, telecommunications, and waste management were necessary 
to prepare sites for tourist development and public utilities had yet to reach many rural and outer 
Island communities in Fiji. The government as part of its incentive package encouraged hotels 
and resorts to generate their own electricity and sell excess wattage to the Fiji Electricity 
Authority. Furthermore, the Fiji Tourist Development Plan (1998-2005) broadened the 
partnership between developers and Government to share in the costs of utility provision for new 
tourists sites. Table 5.3 shows that in the construction of water and waste management facilities 
for new developments as of 2004, 35% was funded by the state, 34% of costs were borne by the 
private sector and 31% of utilities construction was jointly financed. 
Table 5.3: Water and Sewage Construction for Tourist Sites-2004 
DEVELOPMENT WATER SEWERAGE 
Raffles Tradewinds 
Taunovo Bay 
Waidroka Bay 
Crusoe 
Warwick 
Mango Resort (Proposed) 
David Miller 
Naviti 
Hideaway 
Sovi Bay 
Malaqereqere 
Vuvale Resort (Proposed) 
Fisher Corporation 
Fijian Hotel 
Y.P. Reddy-Cuvu (Proposed) 
Natadola Marine Resort (Proposed) 
Momi Bay 
Sonaisali Island 
Public Works Department (Govt.) 
Public Works Department (Govt.) 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Public Works Department (Govt.) 
Public Works Department (Govt.) 
Private 
Public Works Department (Govt.) 
Public Works Department (Govt.) 
Public Works Department (Govt.) 
Public Works Department (Govt.) 
Public Works Department (Govt.) 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
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Vulani Island (Proposed) 
Anchorage 
First Landing 
Saweni Resort 
Yaqara Studio 
Rakiraki Hotel 
Wananavu Resort 
Reddy-Volivoli 
Harper Estate-Nananu I-Ra 
Mokusiga 
Morgan-Dawasamu (Proposed) 
Naigani Island 
Savusavu Bay and Buca Bay  
Taveuni Island 
Mamanuca Group 
Yasawa Group 
Wakaya Island 
Koro Island 
Kadavu Island 
Beqa Island 
Ugaga Island 
Vatulele Island 
Katafaga Island 
North Fiji Group ltd, Naduri, Macuata 
Public Works Department (Govt.) 
Public Works Department (Govt.) 
Public Works Department (Govt.) 
Public Works Department (Govt.) 
Private (Initial) 
Public Works Department (Govt.) 
Private 
Private 
Public Works Department (Govt.) 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private/PWD 
Public Works Department (Govt.) 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Public Works Department (Govt.) 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
 Source: Department of Town and Country Planning, Suva Fiji Islands 
  
 Developing tourism to meet demand conditions is an expensive undertaking for most 
economies especially for small islands in the Pacific. Host nations like the Fiji Islands  are 
meeting some of the challenges of an expanding tourism sector by creating incentives that 
promote collaborative partnerships between private and public entities to meet basic 
infrastructure needs (see Table 6.3). Furthermore, while the Fijian government has never 
discouraged enclave tourist structures especially in the outlying islands, it has in recent years 
encouraged private operators to become responsible for their own water needs. The provision of 
water in Fiji is a difficult public problem and very cost prohibitive for the outlying islands (Asian 
Development Bank 2002; South et.al. 2004), as is common with other islands in the Pacific (See 
Table 5.4). Ancillary to the debate on the ability of small economies to meet the high capital 
requirements needed for infrastructure in order to meet demand conditions of international 
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tourism is the question of ownership. Why should public funds go towards basic infrastructure in 
projects with a largely foreign ownership when access to clean water and sanitation facilities 
remain beyond the reach of inhabitants of these small islands? Establishing collaborative 
partnerships for basic projects with tourism developers allows the state to promote tourism 
without circumventing its obligations to develop its own communities and peoples. As Table 5.4 
demonstrates, meeting basic infrastructure needs for its own people is a difficult proposition for 
Pacific Island governments who must take innovative measures to balance investments and 
economic development with the legitimate needs of its citizens. 
Table 5.4: Selected Islands in Oceania with Access to Piped Water (% of Pop-1990, 2000, 2008) 
Countries Year Urban 
Pop 
Rural 
Pop 
Urban Piped Water 
(% of Pop) 
Rural Piped Water 
(% of Pop) 
Total Piped Water 
(% of Pop) 
 1990 42 58    
Fiji 2000 48 52 32 7 19 
 2008 52 48    
 1990 35 65 48 13 25 
Kiribati  2000 43 57 47 21 32 
 2008 50 50    
 1990 15 85 61 4 13 
PNG 2000 13 87 59 3 10 
 2008 12 88 57 3 10 
 1990 21 79    
Samoa 2000 22 78 75 52 57 
 2008 23 77    
 1990 14 86 77   
Solomon Islands 2000 16 84 77 1 13 
 2008 18 82    
 1990 23 77    
Tonga 2000 23 77 70 77 75 
 2008 25 75    
 1990 19 81 79 27 37 
Vanuatu 2000 22 78 80 31 42 
 2008 25 75 80 33 44 
Source: WHO and UNICEF 
 http://www.wssinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/resources/1278061137JMP_report_2010_en.pdf. (accessed 
 July 27, 2011). 
 
Building Accommodations 
 
 Hotel accommodations argue Sinclair (1998: 19) “are characterized by fixed capacity, 
associated fixed costs and economies of scale.” The globalized nature of international tourism 
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and the high capital requirements associated with tourism infrastructure often make it cost 
prohibitive for entrepreneurs in host communities to become operators (UN Report on 
Transnational Corporations in International Tourism 1982; Sinclair 1992; Cavlek 2002). The 
problem of ownership and control of hotels and resorts in international tourism validates many of 
the criticism against a tourist based economy particularly in the developing world (Husbands 
1981; Britton 1982; Brohman 1996; Shaw and Williams 2002). Data from individual websites 
and industry news release (see Table 5.5) show the global reach of hotel chains that dominate the 
accommodation component of tourism. Sinclair (1998: 19) posits that “the existence of 
economies of scale at the group level provides a rationale for horizontal integration in the form 
of common ownership or management control of hotels, while franchising arrangements provide 
a means of transferring specialist knowledge across the group of franchisees.” Furthermore, 
hotels in the developing world tend to also be more vertically integrated with airlines, rental cars, 
travel agents and other related products (Sinclair 1998: 20; Bryden 1973), especially with the 
phenomenon of enclave development and all inclusive resorts.  
Table 5.5: Ten Largest Hotel Groups (2010) 
NAME HEAD OFFICE OWNERSHIP COUNTRIES 
InterContinental Hotel Group UK Public 100 
Wyndham Hotel Group US Public 50 
Marriott International US Public 68 
Hilton US Private 76 
Accor France Public 100 
Choice Hotels US Public 40 
Best Western US Cooperative 80 
Starwood Hotels & Suites US Public 100 
Carlson US Private 150 
Global Hyatt US Public 45 
Sources: http://www.tourism-review.com and individual Hotel websites. 
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 Developing countries have a mixed record in penetrating the market for accommodations 
which has historically been dominated by transnational conglomerates (UN Report on 
Transnational Corporations in International Tourism 1982:9). Well established tourism based 
economies like Jamaica have not had it any easier in retaining market dominance in tourism 
ownership which dropped to 40% in 2009 from a majority position a decade earlier (The Gleaner 
Oct 25 2009).
73
 In country case studies by the United Nations Commission on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD 2008) did show robust local ownership of hotels in three African 
countries (see Table 5.6) with varying levels of foreign and joint ownership. However, 
significant disparity exists between both sizes and classes of accommodations in these countries 
indicative of the disparities that exist in international tourism. Domestically owned hotels in this 
study were generally smaller and inexpensive whereas the larger high-end although fewer hotels 
were either foreign owned or in a partnership with local investors. It was not specified in the 
report regarding the nature of joint partnerships or the level of management control and decision-
making assigned to the parties.
74
 In the case of Namibia, according to the Southern Africa 
Documentation and Cooperation Centre (SADOCC), only 90 out of the registered 1,361 tourism 
establishments were owned by Black Namibians while rest was either owned by White 
Namibians (927) or foreigners (344). 
Table 5.6: Hotel Ownership in Africa (2006) 
COUNTRY LOCAL OWNERSHIP JOINT VENTURE FOREIGN OWNERSHIP 
Botswana 247 128 81 
Kenya 107 38 23 
Tanzania 
Namibia* 
338 
90/927 
33 
na 
105 
344 
Source: UNCTAD at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/diaeia20086_en.pdf(accessed August 22, 2011). 
 *SADOCC at http://www.sadocc.at/news/2010/2010-155.shtml(accessed August 22, 2011). 
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 See http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20091025/business/business4.html (accessed August 22, 2011). 
74
 See Lin and Thomas (2008) for an analysis of management outsourcing in international tourism at 
http://poole.ncsu.edu/documents/thomas-paper.pdf. (accessed August 22, 2011). 
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 Building accommodations together with basic infrastructure is a necessary precondition 
for any host community that embarks on developing a tourist based economy. The Fijian 
government has employed a number of strategies to meet these challenges in the last few years 
with mixed results. Table 5.7 outlines the institutional response to the specific policy challenges 
regarding the infrastructural and accommodations needs in the tourism sector in Fiji; 
Table 5.7: State Response to Problems of Infrastructure Development in Tourism 
PROBLEM INSTITUTIONS POLICIES 
Tourism Development 
-accommodations, activities, 
entertainment, transportation 
 
Scenic Infrastructure 
 
 
Expanding Tourism in Fiji 
 
 
Capacity Enhancement 
 
 
 
Utilities 
-electricity 
 
Basic Infrastructure 
-water, waste management 
Hotel Ordinance Act (1964) 
Hotel Aids Act (1976, 1981, 1986, 
1996, 1999) 
 
Fiji Seventh Development Plan 
1976-1980) 
 
Fiji Eighth Development Plan 
(1981-1985) 
 
Fiji Ninth Development Plan 
(1986-1990) 
 
 
Fiji Tourist Development Plan 
(1998-2005) 
 
Infrastructure Development Plan 
(2004) 
Incentives, subsidies, tax abatements 
 
 
 
Direct investments in State Parks, 
Beaches 
 
State incentives for developing 
tourism in the outer Islands 
 
Government directly funding tourism 
projects 
 
 
Operational license to generate and 
sell access electricity for resorts 
 
Shared costs/Partnerships with tourism 
developers 
 
 Given the limitations unique to Small Islands in the Pacific, the Fijian government has 
quite successfully developed an institutional regime capable of meeting most of the 
infrastructural requirements necessary for tourism through partnerships and incentives between 
the State and the private sector. The most pronounced policy failure thus far is in the publicly 
funded tourism development projects it undertook in Natadola and Momi Bay with losses that 
are still under investigation but the underlying rationale for State investments in the projects was 
to enhance capacity and quality in the tourism sector and given the unavailability of private 
sources of capital compelled the government to become a direct investor in tourism development. 
Meeting the accommodations needs of travelers as a key component of global tourism poses 
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significant challenges for host economies and the integrative nature of the industry exacerbates 
disparities in ownership and management. Comparable data from other tourism based economies 
in Africa and Jamaica suggest variations in ownership and control of the accommodation 
component of international tourism and evidence from the Fiji Islands shows a similar 
distribution of ownership and international penetration in the tourism sector (see Tables 5.8 & 
5.9). 
Table 5.8: Hotel and Accommodation Ownership in the Fiji Tourism Industry 
 LOCAL OWNERSHIP FOREIGN OWNERSHIP 
HOTELS 187 179 
Beds 1-50 152 117 
Beds 51-100 20 22 
Beds 101-200 12 18 
Beds 201-300 3 9 
Beds 301+ 0 13 
Source: Office of the Attorney General, Suva. 
 
Table 5.9: Ten Largest Hotels in Fiji 
NAME BEDS PARENT COMPANY HEAD OFFICE 
Shangri-La 913 Shangri-La Hong Kong 
Radisson 860 Carlson USA 
Sofitel 598 Accor France 
Naviti 598 Warwick International France 
Warwick 529 Warwick International France 
Worldmark Denarau 478 Wyndham USA 
Hilton 447 Hilton Hotels USA 
Sheraton 420 Starwood Hotels USA 
Westin 383 Starwood Hotels USA 
InterContinental 366 InterContinental Group UK 
Source: Office of the Attorney General, Suva. 
  
 It is unlikely given the globalised nature of the tourist industry to foresee an abatement of 
multinational penetration or even the desirability of pursuing a policy that would restrict their 
presence in overseas markets. Data from Fiji suggest that even though local incursion in the 
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tourism sector is confined to smaller down-market properties, there is a fairly equitable 
distribution in ownership between foreign investors and domestic entrepreneurs. I do not have 
access to data to determine the distribution of incentives between national and international 
investors but evidence regarding ownership does imply that government policies has thus far 
created a diversified ownership in the tourist sector. Secondly, the robust penetration by 
international conglomerates situates Fiji within the global tourism market and signals to potential 
investors that Fiji is an attractive host community for travelling and investing.  
 Meeting the physical demands of tourism will remain a significant challenge for small 
economies with limited resources. The high capital requirements needed to construct acceptable 
accommodations and develop basic infrastructure will remain beyond the reach of many local 
investors. Government underwriting of major tourism development projects with public funds 
has not yielded the desired results when compared to incentives mechanisms and partnerships for 
tourism development in Fiji. A delicate balance will have to be maintained between large-scale 
projects and smaller locally owned initiatives, giving host communities a stake in the tourism 
sector and evidence suggests that opportunities exists across a range of proprietary possibilities. 
One avenue in which to involve local entrepreneurs in the tourism industry in Fiji and elsewhere 
in the Pacific that does not require substantial capital intake is through nature based ecotourism.  
Alternative Tourism    
 
 Minimizing the negative externalities associated with large influxes of people in small 
communities is a fundamental concern for Pacific Island communities engaged in the tourism 
industry (Fagence 2001; Stronza 2001; Tucker 2001). Commensurate with large-scale tourism 
projects are the associated costs of environmental degradation, pollution, waste management, 
resource allocation and physical vulnerability on fragile ecosystems. All the major industries in 
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the Pacific Islands such as tourism, agriculture, forestry, mining and fisheries generate waste 
either as a byproduct of activity or a necessary part of the product stream in a UNESCO study 
(2008: 27) by the Pacific Centre for Environment and Sustainable Development. Regional waste 
composition is broken into the following categories (see Table 5.10) from selected urban centers 
in four Pacific Island countries from 1990-1994. 
Table 5.10: Characteristics of Solid Waste in Selected Pacific Island Countries (1990-94) 
Waste Classification Honiara 
(Solomon Is.) 
Nukualofa 
(Tonga) 
Lautoka 
(Fiji Is.) 
Port Villa 
(Vanuatu) 
Average 
Weight% 
Paper 5.9 31.3 15.7 11.4 15.8 
Plastic 16.8 5.2 8.1 7.7 9.5 
Glass 4.5 3.3 2.7 3.3 3.5 
Metals 6.1 8 3.2 3.6 5.2 
Biodegradable 64.6 47.2 67.8 71 62.7 
Textiles 1.8 3.7 3 1.6 2.5 
Potentially hazardous 0.1 <1 0.2 0.7 0.5 
Construction & Demolition 0.1 1 0 0.7 0.5 
Other 0 0.3 0.2 0 0.1 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 Source: UNESCO (2008:27) 
  
Preventing environmental degradation and managing pollution is an essential requisite for Island 
economies venturing into the tourism sector because it is the aesthetic packaging and promotion 
of the destination product which brings visitors to host communities. The image of Fiji and other 
pacific islands as a largely unspoiled and pristine environment is what brings travelers to these 
shores and consumers to buy the product. The Pacific Islands have a long awareness of the 
unique nature of their societies and its natural endowments, and minimizing the ecological 
footprint while engaging in tourism is an issue at the forefront of their development agenda 
(Cater 1993; Craig-Smith 2005; Crosby 2002; Schellhorn 2010). Microstates in Oceania have 
enthusiastically participated in regional and international forums concerning the environment in 
lieu of their own vulnerability and fragile status (see Table 5.11-5.12). 
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Table 5.11: Regional Agreements/Conventions 
PACIFIC 
ISLANDS 
WAIGANI 
CONVENTION 
SPREP 
CONVENTION 
WHALING 
TREATY 
APIA 
CONVENTION 
PACIFIC TUNA 
CONVENTION 
COOK ISLANDS R R  R S 
FIJI R R  R S 
KIRIBATI R R   S 
MARSHALL IS. R R   S 
FSM R R   S 
NAURU R R    
PNG R R    
SAMOA R R  R S 
SOLOMON IS. R R R R  
TONGA R     
TUVALU A R   S 
VANUATU R R   S 
Source: UNESCO 2008:77 
 R = Ratified; S = Signed; A = Acceded 
 
Table 5.12: Global Agreements/Conventions 
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TONGA   R   R A A   A  R  A S 
TUVALU   R A  R A A   R R R  A  
VANUATU  R R A  R A A   R A R  R S 
Source: UNESCO 2008:77 
 R = Ratified; S = Signed; A = Acceded 
 
 Domestic institutions regulating the physical environment such as the situation in Fiji 
many which date from the colonial era fell within a patchwork of rules organized around natural 
resource extraction and agriculture rather then a centralized regime sensitive to new modes of 
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development or concern for future inhabitants of these islands (see Table 5.13). Only in recent 
years has the traditional awareness for the environment translated into a formalized regime of 
rules that stipulates the proper use and care of the physical environment and the resources that it 
contains.  
  Table 5.13: Rules Regulating Physical Development in Fiji 
INSTITUTION YEAR 
Crown Land Act 1946 
Native Land Trust Act 1946 
Town and Country Planning Act 1946 
Land Conservation and Improvement Act 1953 
Forest Act 1953 
Drainage Act 1961 
Land Development Act 1961 
Mining Act 1966 
National Trust Act 1970 
Irrigation Act 1974 
Agriculture Landlord and Tenants Act 
Fisheries Act 
Environmental Act 
1976 
1978 
2005 
  Source: Parliamentary Reports 
 
The institution of the Environment Management Act of 2005 codified the rules regarding prudent 
use of natural resources and its impact on the environment and established the regulatory 
framework to oversee sustainable development specifically in key sectors like tourism.
75
 
Building on the 1995 Government White Paper on current trends in ecotourism in Fiji (ESCAP 
2003: 14), the new Act promulgated important changes that directly impacted the tourism 
industry in Fiji, including rigorous environmental impact assessments (EIA) before undertaking 
any commercial projects involving hotels, resorts, airports in environmentally sensitive areas 
                                                          
75
 A copy of  the Act can be accessed at 
http://www.environment.gov.fj/pdf/Policies/Acts%20and%20Regulations/Environment%20Management%20Act%2
02005.pdf(accessed August 22, 2011). 
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such as coastlines, beaches and foreshores that measured soil erosion, plant and marine life, 
water quality, pollution, etc. The Act specified the formation of an Environmental Trust Fund to 
pay for monitoring and enforcement, hire technical experts, environmental rehabilitation work, 
undertake research projects and if necessary for the repayment of environmental bonds. Funding 
for the trust fund would come from government appropriations, bonds, donations, penalties and 
fines or from other sources as directed by the government. The government also made it as a 
matter of national policy to promote and develop opportunities for environmentally sensitive 
tourism in Fiji in communities through an initial grant of F$500,000 dollars in the 2006-2007 
budget for the Tourism Ministry (Ministry of Tourism Corporate Plan 2006).   
Sustainable Tourism Projects 
 
 Fiji Islands is uniquely positioned to develop a robust ecotourism industry as it 
“represents a microcosm of the whole spectrum of the South Pacific island environments. It 
contains high volcanic islands...intact and eroded limestone islands and cliffs…caves, islets, 
coasts and coral atolls…Fiji has been called the ‘ecological theatre’(Ayala 1995:42).” 
Ecotourism, even while a fairly niche product, has been implemented in a diversity of regions 
with a large tourism sector such as Tanzania (Charnley 2005), Thailand (Kontogeorgopoulos 
2005), India (Sonak 2004), Nepal (Zurick 1992) and Colombia (Ospina 2006). The collaborative 
aspect of ecotourism involving local communities has made it an appealing model of sustainable 
development. A successful example of an ecotourism project is the Shark Reef Marine Reserve 
venture in the Fiji Islands which began as a private initiative by a local entrepreneur who 
compensated local villages not to fish in a specific area in order to maintain and replenish Bull 
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Shark populations for his dive operations over a number of years (2006-2008).
76
 The total levies 
paid to the villages and the contractual operator according to Brunnschweiler (2010:29-42) up to 
2008 was US$58,040 and will rise to US$100,000 in the next five years. In addition to the 
monetary benefits for these villages, the contract also stipulates a sponsorship program in which 
(1) the dive operator every year trains one person from each village up to the level of a dive 
master, (2) the dive operator acts as the mediating agent between the villages and the 
government, (3) the dive operator is responsible for all technical details such as required 
moorings and markers, (4) the dive operator assists the villages in monitoring the marine 
protected area and (5) the dive operator collaborates with the Department of Fisheries to train 
volunteer Fish wardens that provide oversight in the marine reserve (Brunnschweiler 2010:33).  
 The size of the stakeholders (three villagers and one private dive operation) have made 
this a manageable and successful project, but it does expose some limitations in sustainable 
modes of development such as ecotourism. Chinese scholars (Guangming et.al. 2008) in their 
study of Panda nature reserves in China discovered that the distribution of benefits and 
opportunities from ecotourism were quite disparate among local communities as it simply 
reflected the inherent disparity in the distribution of natural resources. But because ecotourism is 
a localized bottom-up project (Gatzweiler 2005; Stone and Wall 2004), communities feel a sense 
of entitlement because it is their resources and their management of it. It was a matter of luck 
that a very small collection of villages in Fiji discovered in their traditional fishing grounds 
marine life highly desirable to adventure divers and erodes communal linkages and traditional 
obligations (Crosby 2002; Schellhorn 2010). This will remain an issue among communities who 
                                                          
76
 A comparable project elsewhere in the Pacific Islands is in Moorea, French Polynesia. See Boutillier and Duane 
(2006). 
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benefit from the governments renewed emphasis on ecotourism and those who live away from 
areas not deemed suitable for tourism projects. 
 Besides the abundance of marine resources that make Fiji a suitable site for ecotourism 
development is also large tracts of pristine tropical forests institutionally protected from 
commercial development for decades (see Table 5.14). These areas are divided between forests 
reserves where tourist activity is permitted and nature reserves that do not allow any tourist or 
commercial activity. The only forest reserve that has been developed for ecotourism thus far is 
the area known as Colo-i-Suva containing barbeque spots, walking trails, sheds and toilet 
amenities for visitors and both areas have been regulated under the Forestry Act of 1953 and the 
recent Environment Management Act of 2005 (Waqaisavou 1999:97). 
Table 5.14: Selected Forest & Nature Reserves in Fiji 
FOREST RESERVES SIZE (ha) RESERVED NATURE RESERVES SIZE (ha) RESERVED 
Taveuni 11,290 1914 Nadarivatu 93.1 1956 
Buretolu 1197.9 1926 Naqaranibuli 279.2 1958 
Nadarivatu 7400.7 1954 Tomaniivi 1323.4 1958 
Maranisaqa 77.3 1955 Ravilevu 4018.7 1959 
Qoya 67.2 1955 Darunibota 2.2 1959 
Vago 24.6 1959 Vuo Island 1.2 1960 
Korotari 1046.9 1961 Vunimoli 20.2 1968 
Yarawa 161.9 1962    
Colo-i-Suva 369.5 1963    
Savura 447.6 1963    
Saru Creek 3.2 1973    
Source: Waqaisavou (1999: 99) 
 
 Communities located in the villages of Taveuni began in the late 1980’s with the 
assistance of the Native Land Trust Board (NLTB), the Forestry Department, the Fiji Museum, 
the Ministry of Fijian Affairs, the Department of Tourism and the New Zealand Government to 
begin a four phase ecotourism project in Bouma covering 1,603 hectares from the coast of the 
island to the mountainous central plateau, which included Fiji’s largest lake. Most of the area is 
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covered under a tropical rainforest and already designated as a forest reserve (Crosby 2002:373). 
The first two phases of the development opened in 1991 and 1993 and included of walking trails, 
lodges and visitor amenities around the Tavoro water falls. The later two phases minimizes 
physical development inside the forest reserve and only is open to guided tours to Lake 
Tagimoucia and a hiking along a heritage trail through the lush tropical forest (see Table 5.15 
and Crosby 2002: 373-374).  
Table 5.15: Bouma Forest Reserve Ecotourism Project 
PHASE ATTRACTION TYPE AREA (ha) Tribe/Villages 
1 Forest based, Waterfalls, Natural Attractions 535 1 
2 Coastal based, Coastal Walks, Marine Attractions, Trekking 645 1 
3 Forest and Culture based, Cultural sites, lodges, etc. 423 2 
4 Forest based, Inland hiking, Bird watching 603 4 
Source: Seroma (1995) at http://www.fao.org/docrep/X5336e/x5336e0b.htm(accessed August 22, 2011). 
 
 
Unlike the Shark Marine Reserve Project, the Bouma ecotourism development has been a top 
down initiative for obvious reasons, it covers a very large geographical area, the project is 
situated on a small island of the mainland, and the land is designated as a forest reserve and 
hence falls under the jurisdiction of the Forestry Department. The New Zealand government 
underwrote the initial two phases of the project while the villages provided much of the labor 
(see Table 5.16). 
Table 5.16: Summary of Costs of the Bouma Ecotourism Development 
 PHASE 1 ($) PHASE 2 ($) 
Voluntary labor provided by villagers  (4,450 hrs-$1.98/hr) 8,678  (8,900 hrs-$2.48/hr) 22,072 
Materials/Equipment 23,564 16,994 
Labor 17,275 9,091 
Services 16,921 15,391 
Allowances & Subsistence 2,230 4,524 
TOTAL 68,668 68,072 
Source: Seroma (1995) at http://www.fao.org/docrep/X5336e/x5336e0b.htm  (accessed August 22, 2011). 
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Prices range between five to sixty dollars a day for visitors depending on the level of activity and 
have been a commercial success for the villagers in and around the ecotourism project (see Table 
5.17). The low cost of ecotourism development has also been advantageous for local 
communities with little capital who are the traditional custodians of the land in the island 
(Turnbull 2003; Scheyvens and Momsen 2008). This is not to begrudge the good fortune of these 
villages, but to highlight the criticism by Guangming et.al. (2008) that localized tourism 
disproportionately benefits communities who find themselves in the enviable position to having 
ownership of desirable sites with a high potential for diverse development projects. 
Table 5.17: Income and Expenditures at Tavoro Falls in Bouma Forest Reserve (1/7/93-30/6/93) 
INCOME VISITORS REVENUE (FJD) EXPENSES (FJD) PROFIT (FJD) 
Park 3735 15,978 6,814 9,165 
Refreshments  292 60 232 
TOTAL 3735 16,270 6,874 9,397 
Source: Seroma (1995) at http://www.fao.org/docrep/X5336e/x5336e0b.htm (accessed August 22, 2011). 
  
 
These two projects demonstrate the potential for sustainable tourism in the Pacific Islands which 
a richly endowed with natural beauty and ecological diversity and within the resource parameters 
can either originate from local initiatives or State directives. Gains from sustainable remain fairly 
modest and remain a very small part of the overall portfolio of the tourism market and whether it 
is able to increase its market share remains to be seen. The lone dataset of  ecotourism visitors 
from 2003 to Fiji show that out of the annual 430,800 arrivals (see Table 5.7) only 20,249 
tourists engaged in nature-based tourism which amounts to less then 5% of travelers that year 
(see Table 5.18). Interestingly, visitors from Australia and New Zealand which comprise a 
majority of travelers to the Fijian market represented a much smaller percentage of ecotourists 
when compared to countries outside the region.  
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  5.18: Ecotourism Visitor Arrivals (2003) 
COUNTRY ARRIVALS 
Australia 2106 
New Zealand 972 
United Kingdom 6888 
Ireland 954 
Continental Europe 1716 
USA 3203 
Canada 786 
Japan 293 
Others 2093 
TOTAL 20249 
  Source: Fiji Bureau of Statistics 
 
 
Mainstream tourism will in the foreseeable future control the lion’s share of the tourist market, 
but it does not mean that local communities cannot find a foothold in the sector, and given their 
modest beginnings, ecotourism project can only increase their opportunities. The institutional 
challenge lies in the ability of local and national actors to create rules that collateral damage in 
the communities where the projects are undertaken while maximizing the benefits beyond the 
immediate beneficiaries. 
Conclusion 
 The success and failure of tourism in Fiji is largely predicated upon the State’s ability to 
respond to three serious challenges, two of which were intrinsic to the industry per se, namely 
the cost prohibitive aspect of infrastructure provision demanded by tourism and the 
environmental externalities imposed by the arrival of large groups in small societies with limited 
resources. The external challenge to Fijian tourism over the past twenty-five years has been the 
periodic political instability that has inflicted severe costs on the tourism sector from loss of 
visitors to the negative image of the country and damage to its international reputation. 
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 This section has demonstrated the institutional capabilities of Fiji as a typical microstate 
to articulate policies in response to these challenges and successfully prosecute its development 
objectives via the tourism sector. While it is undeniable that State underwriting of tourism 
projects has been a financial failure, the underlying concern of moving beyond sugar production 
is a legitimate issue that has to be resolved, and given the limited options Fiji has as is the reality 
with the other island economies, tourism provides a reasonable opportunity for development. 
 I have also argued that Pacific Islands are justifiably concerned with the environment and 
have taken commendable steps to ensure that they are able to contain degradation as much as 
possible within their means. An attractive way to meld development and tourism has been to 
encourage ecotourism projects in areas with the participation of local communities. While 
ecotourism remains a niche product with modest returns, it has nonetheless provided 
communities with a source of income and a stake in the developments of their region. It remains 
to be seen if the projects can be replicated on a much wider scale and if the benefits can be 
dispersed in a more equitable manner. However the policies put in place by the government in 
response to the specific challenges contradict the assumptions of the MIRAB model (see 
Diagram 5.2) that these islands are fundamentally incapable of organizing their societies in lieu 
of their size, resource limitations and historic metropolitan relationships.  
 
Diagram 5.2: Model of a MIRAB Economy 
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The concluding chapter of this project will examine the following issues regarding Fijis place in 
the global economy, why tourism is a reasonable conduit for development and the future of the 
industry for Fiji and other island economies. This project has argued that comparative advantage 
(see Diagram 5.3) is a better theory that explains the survival of microstates in the global 
economy and that these small islands have the ability to create the institutional structure 
necessary to exploit their natural endowments and develop a tourism industry. The evidence 
presented in this project testifies to the theory of comparative advantage as a sufficiently better 
explanation than are model predicated on colonialist assumptions of dependency, helplessness 
and patronage. Small states do not have the resources to engage in speculative investment 
strategies and investment policies in microstates therefore reflect industries best able to fulfill its 
development priorities. The Pacific Islands because of their natural endowments have a 
comparative advantage in the tourism sector and have developed policies to benefit their 
societies and allow them to thrive in the global economy. 
Diagram 5.3: Comparative Advantage and the Political Economy of Tourism 
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Chapter Six 
 
Conclusion 
 
Introduction 
 
 The route to developing tourism as a viable sector in Fiji has neither been facile nor 
restrictively arduous for a small economy with limited resources in the midst of substantial 
political and social change. The complex and unwieldy nature of international tourism demanded 
that Fiji over time create structures and institutions conducive to the growth and nourishment of 
tourism as a viable industry and its eventual role in national development. The pivotal role of 
tourism in enabling the state to engage in institutional formation is an area of inquiry overlooked 
by scholars and which this project has endeavored to rectify. The tourism sector has made 
significant contributions to the political economy of the Fiji Islands under less then ideal 
conditions, demonstrating both the limits and the potential of microstates to successfully 
negotiate through the global economy. In this chapter I employ a basic SWOT analysis to 
examine both the contribution and threats to the tourism industry in Fiji and enquire into the 
future of the industry in the Fiji Islands (see Table 6.1 on a SWOT analysis of tourism in Fiji) 
 One of the crucial contributions of tourism in Fiji has been in providing employment 
opportunities for the people of Fiji and analysis of data from the Fiji Bureau of Statistics reveal 
that the “employment effects” of tourism development is a significant benefit (Elkan 1975: 129) 
and justified the strategy pursued by the state in building the tourism sector. Secondly, the 
tenuous political climate in Fiji has remained the principal threat to tourism and I have outlined 
specific policy challenges facing the tourist industry in Fiji but to propose policy on the political 
situation in the Island, or proposals for land reform is beyond the scope of this project. Thirdly, 
the long denouement of sugar production has provided an occasion for tourism to climb to its 
  154 
ascendant position as the country’s leading sector and inadvertently exposes a central weakness 
of small economies where a single sector dominates the socio-economic landscape and should be 
a legitimate concern for the state and the stakeholders. Finally the willingness to invest in 
training and education in order to develop a diversified workforce inside the tourism sector as 
well as beyond it is a challenge and an opportunity for the state and the industry and is a 
harbinger of the future direction of tourism in Fiji. The concluding section reiterates the 
importance of institutions and the role of the State to ensure the survival and flourishing of small 
islands in the global economy and adumbrates issues that would benefit from further enquiry.  
 
  Table 6.1 SWOT Analysis 
Strengths Weakness 
Employment 
Institutions 
Sector domination 
State Investments 
Opportunities Threats 
Diversification 
Human capital  
Political instability 
Land tenure 
 
 
Tourism and Employment 
  
 Increased employment opportunities proffered by a bourgeoning tourism sector has been 
compelling enough for the government to channel resources and advocate the desirability of Fiji 
having a robust tourism industry (Fiji Development Plan 2007; Fiji Times November 24 2009;   
November 28 2009)
77
 a perspective echoed by external agencies such as the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB).
78
 The strength of the tourism industry in Fiji has been to provide employment 
opportunities for people of a small island economy with limited resources and declining options. 
                                                          
77
 http://www.fijitimes.com/story.aspx?id=134204 http://www.fijitimes.com/story.aspx?ref=archive&id=134434 
(accessed October 11, 2011). 
78
 http://www.adb.org/projects/pres/pres_case_05.pdf (accessed October 11, 2011). 
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However the salutary benefits of employment though tourism tend to be eclipsed by the fuzzy 
measurement of those directly employed by the tourism industry and the low wages they receive. 
Because the tourism sector provides both direct and indirect employment within the broad 
spectrum of services, distinction is made between employment in tourism related industries and 
employment in tourism enabling industries (Johnson and Thomas 2001: 39-41). The former 
includes people directly employed in hotels, restaurants, clubs, bars, museums etc, while the later 
classification comprises individuals providing ancillary services such as transportation, retail, etc 
(Johnson and Thomas 2001: 43-44). Leiper (1999) has argued in an Australian case study that 
confusion regarding direct and indirect employment leads to an exaggerated and misleading 
relationship between the tourism sector and its impacts on job creation. Leiper concludes that 
official government figures may have inflated jobs in the tourism industry by as much as three 
times the actual employment on a full-time regular basis comparable to other sectors (Leiper 
1999: 606). The second problem associated with employment in tourism is the low wages and 
benefits for work that is demanding, stressful and public requiring the cultivation of a certain 
image and composure. Studies from tourism intensive States like Montana and Utah
79
 and 
municipalities such as Los Angeles
80
 as well country studies from the Cayman Islands (Amit 
2001) and Central America (Ferguson 2010) as well as analysis by the International Labor 
Organization (ILO)
81
 all concede that poor wages is endemic to tourism.  
 The problem of low wages in the tourism sector makes it difficult to defend the efficacy 
of investing in the development of the industry as a vital part of national development. However 
                                                          
79
 http://www.itrr.umt.edu/research/WAGES.pdf 
http://travel.utah.gov/research_and_planning/special_reports/documents/BEBRWageStudy.PDF (accessed October 
11, 2011). 
80
 http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jun/25/business/fi-tourism25 (accessed October 11, 2011). 
81
 http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/press-and-media-centre/news/WCMS_007840/lang--en/index.htm 
(accessed October 11, 2011). 
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the tourism industry in Fiji emerged not from a denuded industrialized economy with previously 
high levels of income, but from a largely agricultural economy with significant levels of informal 
and irregular paid employment. Analysis of employment data (Table 6.2) will therefore reveal 
that the tourism sector has actually been one of the better paid industries in Fiji when compared 
to both agriculture and manufacturing. A reasonable case can be made for the positive role of 
tourism in Fiji as a net generator of employment and one of the main strengths for the 
development of the sector.  
 Beyond the problem of measuring who directly benefits from tourism and how much they 
are being compensated is the deeper issue of skill formation and the development of human 
capital. Thomas (1980), in her study of the impact of tourism on Gullah Blacks from the islands 
of South Carolina, derisively labeled the employment effects as one of “a chambermaid-caddy 
economy”(Thomas 1980:11). In a study of the Cayman Islands whose economy is dominated by 
tourism and the financial sector, Amit (2001) discovered that most natives eschewed working in 
the tourism industry and opted for either fishing or working in finance (585-586) leaving 
temporary workers from the surrounding Caribbean Islands to fill demands in tourism. 
Alternatively a number of scholars such as Levy and Lerch (1991), Jenkins and Henry (1982), 
Narayan (2000), Shaw and Williams (2002) and Richter (1989), even while acknowledging the 
low-skilled aspect of tourism related work, argue that it provides economic opportunities for 
individuals and communities who would otherwise have been excluded from the formal 
economy such as women, tribal communities, rural inhabitants and other groups. The 
development of sustainable tourism, which requires minimal skill formation and technical 
expertise, is an example of previously excluded groups being able to participate, albeit with 
modest financial rewards when compared to economies of scale in the global tourism market. 
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 A cursory examination of the relationship between tourism and employment exposes 
problems of measurement, compensation and skill formation which are unlikely to be resolved 
anytime soon and beyond the limits of this project. I have only endeavored to argue that tourism 
in Fiji has made positive contributions to employment and data from the Fiji Bureau of Statistics 
(see Table 6.2) confirms my position that the employment effect has been one of the strengths of 
tourism in Fiji. 
Table 6.2: Sectoral Comparison of Paid Employment and Wages in Fiji (1975-2004)
a 
Year Agriculture/Forestry/ 
Fishing (Employees) 
Mean Daily 
Wage (FJD) 
Manufacturing 
(Employees) 
Mean Daily 
Wage (FJD) 
Retail/ Hotels/ 
Food (Empl.) 
Mean Daily 
Wage (FJD) 
1975 2,845 4.98 13,185 6.19 10,319 5.68 
1976 2,599 5.03 11,444 6.64 11,701 6.54 
1977 2,441 5.76 11,253 6.87 12,117 6.89 
1978 2,787 6.67 13,484 8.10 12,778 7.26 
1979 2,303 6.88 13,948 8.48 13,099 7.85 
1980 2,627 7.44 15,413 9.52 13,378 8.88 
1981 2,509 6.24 14,223 10.56 14,140 10.24 
1982 2,274 6.16 13,522 11.20 13,878 10.32 
1983 2,517 6.96 14,702 11.92 14,888 11.04 
1984 2,238 8.64 14,184 12.00 14,904 11.20 
1985 2,577 8.32 14,057 12.16 14,805 11.36 
1986 2,165 8.24 13,973 11.84 14,100 11.28 
1987 1,986 8.64 13,680 12.32 12,024 11.68 
1988 2,004 8.56 14,040 12.56 11,864 12.00
b 
1989 2,130 11.92 19,666 11.36 14,330 12.08 
1990 2,312 10.96 21,051 11.44 14,849 12.80 
1993 1,881 13.28 24,882 13.92 17,880 15.76 
1996 1,980 15.68 24,634 16.32 20,730 20.00
 
1997 1,925 12.88 27,039 15.12 20,888 16.96 
1998 2,202 13.36 29,200 14.48 21,025 17.60 
1999 1,647 16.77 29,202 15.15 20,337 18.38 
2000 1,776 16.95 28,536 15.97 22,097 18.58 
2003 1,670 19.44 25,467 17.91 25,781 20.89 
2004 1,570 19.50 25,011 18.95 26,684 20.56 
Source: Fiji Bureau of Statistics Annual Employment Survey 
a 
Data is missing for years 1994-1996, 2001-2002 
b 
Data is inconsistent and unexplained in official records 
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 Analysis of Employment in Fiji 
 
 Table 6.2 above charts paid employment (formal) with the mean daily wages in dollar 
amounts in three sectors from 1975-2004 (minus the missing years) and provides a glimpse of 
the political economy of employment in the Fiji Islands and situates the relationship between 
tourism and labor. The most significant exclusion is employment and payments in sugar 
production which dominated vast sections of Fijian society for decades and ancillary industries, 
many of which would fall under and informal economy. Secondly, the sudden expansion of the 
manufacturing sector from the late eighties should not be interpreted as a positive turn towards a 
more technical/industrial pathway to development as almost all the jobs in manufacturing had to 
do with the establishment of sweatshops in the garment sector where average wages ranged from 
$0.78 in 1988 to $1.36 an hour in 1999, or daily wages on an eight hour shift ranged from F$6.24 
in 1988 to F$10.88 in 1999 (Prasad, Ram and Marr 2009:755; Oxfam 2003). Accordantly the 
problem of measurement as emphasized by Leiper (1999) is evident in data on labor in the retail, 
hotel and restaurant industry which agglomerates employment in tourism related industries with 
employment in tourism enabling industries (Johnson and Thomas 2001). 
 Without eliding over the reservations noted here regarding the data on employment and 
wages in Fiji, two observations are salient to the relationship between tourism and labor within 
the context of the Fiji Islands. First, I concur with the general assessment that service sector jobs 
in general and tourism industry work in particular a mostly low-wage employment (Kim 2000; 
Iverson and Wren 1998; Albrecht et. al. 2000; Howell and Wolff 1991; Choy 1995; Gladstone 
and Fainstein 2001; Szivas, Riley and Airey 2003; Faulkenberry et.al. 2000) even though the 
tourism industry may occasionally attract a thin strata of specialized personnel demanding higher 
wages (Liu and Wall 2006; Szivas and Riley 1999; Baum 2007).  
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 The problem of low wages within the Fijian context as the data demonstrates is not 
unique to tourism but has been an issue across major sectors of the economy. In fact wages in the 
retail, hotel and restaurant industries have paid slighter better than either agriculture or 
manufacturing since 1989, and no perceptible decline in wages occurred after the first coup in 
1987 but a lack of data from 2001-2002 and from 2004 onwards disallow any comparative 
assessment of political crises and wages. Secondly, employment in agricultural related industries 
has continued to decline since 1975 and manufacturing since its peak in 1998 while employment 
in retail, hotels and restaurants have increased two-half times from 10,319 in 1975 to 26,684 in 
2004 corresponding to the increase in visitor arrivals to Fiji from 161,707 in 1975 to 504,075 in 
2004. It is reasonable to postulate that a vital contribution of tourism in Fiji has been the creation 
of much needed jobs in the absence of other more desirable alternatives and though these jobs 
were not as highly remunerative, they were in comparison to the other sectors a better option for 
the people of Fiji.  
 Another issue that has plagued the tourism sector besides low-wages is the low-skilled 
nature of work in the service sector (Bluestone and Harrison 1988; Jovanovic and Nyarko 1997; 
Szivas, Riley and Airey 2003) and remains a challenge for governments to move employees up 
the skill ladder. In Fiji, the state through its investments in post-secondary education has fairly 
well established institutions in both the University of the South Pacific
82
 and the Fiji National 
University
83
 in developing a better trained and internationally qualified workforce for the tourism 
industry. Investments in training and education whether through formal or informal institutions 
allows an equitable dispersal of goods and services and creates opportunities for skill formation, 
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literacy and development which is a necessary condition for success as tourism becomes more 
internationalized in the global economy.  
 The state has played an active and successful role in establishing tourism as a viable 
industry in Fiji but there is a noticeable absence of collaboration between the state and the 
tourism industry in elevating the training and development of workers in the sector. Incentive 
structures set up by the institutions and administered by the respective agencies are 
preponderantly biased towards the infrastructural demands of creating tourism in Fiji, whereas 
there are no comparable mechanisms to incentivize the industry in investing in human capital to 
ensure that Fiji is not reduced to a “chambermaid-caddy economy” (Thomas 1980:11). Baum 
and Szivas (2008:791-792) present the case of tourism in Ireland and suggest that state 
engagement in tourism moved in three different stages of human resource development, 
immature, intermediate and mature. In the initial phases, the government was reduced to 
providing enough training for personnel to work in the tourism industry in accordance with 
sectoral demands. In the intermediate stages, greater stress was placed on individual skills after 
careful national assessments of the labor market, the development of national curricula and 
accreditation of training programs. In the final phase of state involvement in tourism in Ireland, 
the government has created a development agency that coordinates all training in tourism
84
 
which prepares a national human resource development strategy for tourism on behalf of the 
government and delivers senior management and post-graduate programmes for people in 
leadership positions and those who are entering into management in the industry. 
 Fiji is comfortably moving towards the later stages of the industry and it would behoove 
the government to take a more active role in the development of human capital and to build 
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institutions that would engage the industry to become a more active partner in building human 
capital and contributing towards skill formation (Fidgeon 2010; Baum 2007). 
The Future of Tourism 
 
 The optimistic projection by the government of a consistently expanding sector is neither 
warranted nor guaranteed in lieu of the complicated political situation in Fiji over the last 
twenty-five years which inevitably pose a significant threat to tourism in Fiji. Unfortunately this 
optimism has encouraged the state to invest with public funds in tourism development projects 
that have accumulated deep losses that are currently under investigations. This financial 
mismanagement does not bode well for the industry in Fiji and reveals a potentially serious 
weakness in which the government has created a “champion industry” and placed its bets on a 
single sector. Cutter, Boruff and Shirley (2003:12) suggest that a “singular reliance on one 
economic sector for income generation creates a form of economic vulnerability” that is 
unhelpful for communities whose fortunes rise and fall with those of the industry. The 
disproportionate allocation of resources into one sector by the state to the exclusion of other vital 
industries will create a clientelist relationship between the state and the tourism industry and in 
which productive cooperation degenerates into one of entitlement as the tourism industry 
becomes “too big to fail.” 
 Secondly as Leiper (2008) and Berno (2001) have argued tourism is a composite product 
that ranges across the entire cross-section of society. Investment strategies that are merely 
focused on building accommodations or developing golf courses will overlook productive uses 
of valuable capital in other less visible areas such as training, education, environment, culture, 
food etc, all of which are impacted by tourism in host communities. It is recommended that the 
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state divest itself from its substantial investments in the tourism development projects in Fiji and 
resume its positive role as a builder of institutions rather than resorts. 
 The most serious threat to tourism in Fiji is the chronic political instability that has 
continued to disrupt the industry since 1987. The travel warnings triggered by the successive 
coups have heightened the tension between the tourism industry in Fiji and the intractable 
political problems that has beset Fijian society for the past twenty-five years. The tourism 
industry had a fortunate escape after the political crisis of 2006 when visitor arrivals only 
registered a 2% decline unlike the 30% drop in arrivals following the events of 1987 and 2000. It 
is likely that future outbreaks of instability will significantly erode its market share and further 
damage Fiji’s image as an ideal travel destination.  
 The external fallout as a consequence of political instability is not sustainable for 
microstates that must by necessity forge interdependent relationships within their region. The 
ongoing political maneuverings have heightened the divisions between the Melanesian bloc
85
 
(Vanuatu, Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea) which favor a more conciliatory policy 
response towards Fiji and the Polynesian group (Niue and Tonga)
86
 led by Samoa
87
 and 
supported by Australia and New Zealand, who insist on maintaining a more aggressive posture 
towards the political situation in Fiji
88
. For example, the Australian sanction regime places Fiji in 
the unenviable company of Myanmar, North Korea, Yugoslavia, Iran, Libya, Syria and 
Zimbabwe which makes the Fiji Islands a dangerous and rogue nation on par with some nuclear 
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armed states! (See the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs website). The political damage 
to Fiji’s credibility as a reliable center for Pacific leadership is threatened by the ongoing 
political instability with unforeseen shifts in alliances and relationships that could be detrimental 
to Fijian interests, especially its economy.
89
 The changing political dynamics in the South Pacific 
is a fertile area for future research by scholars probing the behavior of microstates that are 
jostling for power, resources and influence in the shadow of a regional hegemon.   
 I have only responded to the political situation in Fiji within the context of its impact on 
the tourism sector and the threat that periodic crises poses to the industry. Resolving the political 
crises in Fiji would not only attenuate the chronic political instability that has damaged Fiji 
politically and economically but would ameliorate the negative fallout in the tourism sector in 
which the government has made substantial investments over many years. The four coup d’états 
since 1987 have economically cost the country a combined F$9.4 billion dollars in investments 
and lost revenue (Fiji Times December 10, 2007; The Australian November 9, 2009)
90
 adding to 
the already discussed political consequences of instability. Fiji has a well developed tourism 
industry with an established consumer base that bodes well for its future but until it resolves its 
political situation that future will remain tenuous and perhaps thwarted. 
Microstates in the Global Economy 
 
 Global economic realities dictate that societies regardless of size or resource capabilities 
develop institutions to help navigate them through the international system or fall further behind, 
as is the unhappy fate of states that fall in the United Nations category of least developed 
                                                          
89
 See http://www.theage.com.au/world/fiji-remains-an-outcast-in-pacific-20110908-1jzte.html (accessed October 
19, 2011). 
90
 http://www.fijitimes.com/story.aspx?ref=archive&id=76233 (accessed October 19, 2011), 
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/nation/coup-culture-risks-starving-people-of-fiji/story-e6frg6nf-
1225795565541 (accessed October 19, 2011). 
  164 
countries (LDC) 
91
and specifically the four microstates in Oceania (Vanuatu, Solomon Islands, 
Samoa and Kiribati, see Table 1) that form part of the LDC group. Collectively all the small 
islands in Oceania share certain attributes that make their survival as independently thriving 
communities highly improbable, which has led scholars to search for a theory that best explains 
the endurance of microstates in the global economy. The flow of foreign aid, remittances and 
labor migration, which is not unique to the South Pacific, nonetheless led theorists to build a 
model of a MIRAB economy that best explains both the structure and the survival of microstates.  
 This project has alternatively argued that the theory of comparative advantage best 
explains how the small islands in Oceania organize their state and economy to maximize their 
natural endowments instead of being merely passive actors that are wholly reliant on the 
goodwill of regional powers and former metropoles for their livelihood. One of the ways in 
which the Fiji Islands as a typical microstate in Oceania has overcome the limitations of size and 
resources is to exploit its location, scenery and climate by developing a robust tourism industry. 
The transition from sugar production to tourism services seemed a natural evolution within the 
circumscribed limits of Fiji’s resource capabilities as both sectors are labor intensive and low 
skilled (Katouzian 1970).   
 The MIRAB model is in essence a philosophical argument regarding the existence and 
structure of microstates in the international system and rests on a series of questionable and 
unsustainable assumptions. The fundamental postulate of the MIRAB hypothesis is that 
microstates are institutionally failed societies and therefore lack the organizational and political 
capacity needed to construct and develop economic policy. The level of sophistication and 
expertise required for institution building is beyond the ken of these small islands and the best 
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that they can do is to ingratiate themselves with either their former metropoles or regional 
hegemons who would than ensure their survival in the global economy (Baldacchino 1993). The 
development of tourism in the Fiji Islands demonstrates that microstates are quite capable of 
building institutions and formulating policy to meet the challenge of social and economic 
development even in the midst of political upheaval and crises. This project advanced the 
hypothesis through a case study of the Fiji Islands that comparative advantage was a better 
explanation for the endurance of microstates in the international system than one predicated on a 
subservient and dependent relationship and the evidence articulated thus far preponderantly 
favors the hypothesis. The hypothesis once established as Lijphart (1971: 692) proposed can now 
proceed for either confirmation or disconfirmation with further comparative analysis and study. 
The peoples of the Pacific deserve nothing less. 
  166 
Bibliography 
 
Adams, Kathleen M. 1984. “Come to Tana Toraja, ‘Land of the Heavenly Kings’: Travel Agents 
 as Brokers of Ethnicity” Annals of Tourism Research 11 (3): 469-485. 
 
Agor, Weston H. 1981. “Private Sector Investment in the Development of the Bahamas: Lessons 
 Learned from Successful Programme Implementation” Public Administration and 
 Development 1 (1): 35-46. 
 
Aili, Liu., Liu Jiaming and Liu Min. 2007. “Progress in Enclave Tourism Study of Overseas: A 
 Literature Review” Chinese Journal of Population, Resources and Environment 5 (3): 
 76-81. 
 
Albrecht, Don E., Carol Mulford Albrecht and Stan L. Albrecht. 2000. “Poverty in 
 Nonmetropolitan America: Impacts of Industrial, Employment and Family Structure 
 Variables” Rural Sociology 65 (1): 87-103. 
 
Albuquerque, Klaus D. and Jerome McElroy. 1999. “Tourism and Crime in the Caribbean” 
 Annals of Tourism Research 26 (4): 968-984. 
 
Allison, Graham and Philip Zelikow. 1999. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile 
 Crisis, 2
nd
 Ed. New York: Addison-Wesley.  
 
Alston, Lee J. 2008. “The ‘Case’ for Case Studies in New Institutional Economics” In New 
 Institutional Economics: A Guidebook, edited by Eric Brousseau and Jean-Michel 
 Glachant. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Amit, Vered. 2001. “A Clash of Vulnerabilities: Citizenship, Labor and Expatriacy in the 
 Cayman Islands” American Ethnologist 28 (3): 574-594. 
 
Anckar, Dag. 2002. “Democratic Standards and Performance in Twelve Pacific Microstates” 
 Pacific Affairs 75 (2): 207-225. 
 
Andereck, Kathleen L., Karin M. Valentine., Richard C. Knopf and Christine A Vogt. 2005. 
 “Resident Perceptions of Community Tourism Impacts” Annals of Tourism Research 32 
 (4): 1056-1076. 
 
Anthoine, Robert. 1979. ed. Tax Incentives for Private Investment in Developing Countries. 
 Deventer: Kluwer. 
 
Armstrong, H. W. and R. Read. 2000. “Comparing the Economic Performance of Dependent 
 Territories and Sovereign Microstates” Economic Development and Cultural Change 48 
 (2): 285-306. 
 
  167 
Asian Development Bank (ADB). 2003. A Strategic Environmental Assessment of Fiji’s Tourism 
 Development Plan Suva: Worldwide Fund for Nature-South Pacific Program (WWF-
 SPP) at http://www.adb.org/projects/pres/pres_case_05.pdf (accessed October 11, 2011). 
 
----------2002. Technical Assistance to the Republic of Fiji Islands for Intermediation of Sugar 
 Sector Restructuring at http://www.adb.org/Documents/TARs/FIJ/tar-fij-36151.pdf 
 (accessed June 28, 2011). 
 
Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. December 6, 2006. “Australia's 
 Autonomous Sanctions: Fiji” at http://www.dfat.gov.au/un/unsc_sanctions/fiji.html 
 (accessed October 19, 2011). 
 
Ayala, Hana. 1995. “From Quality product to Eco-Product: Will Fiji Set a Precedent?” Tourism 
 Management 16 (1): 39-47. 
 
Baldacchino, Godfrey. 1997. “Small Business in Small Islands: A Case Study from Fiji” Journal 
 of Small Business Management 37 (4): 80-84. 
 
----------1983. “Bursting the Bubble: The Pseudo-Development Strategies of Microstates”  
Development and Change 24: 29-51. 
 
Ball, Margaret M. 1973. “Regionalism and the Pacific Commonwealth” Pacific Affairs  
46 (2): 232-253. 
 
Banerjee, Sudeshna Ghosh, Jennifer M. Oetzel and Rupa Ranganathan. 2006. “Private  
Provision of Infrastructure in Emerging Markets: Do Institutions Matter?” Development 
Policy Review 24 (2): 175-202.  
 
Baum, Tom. 2000. “Human Resources in Tourism: Still Waiting for Change” Tourism 
 Management 28: 1383-1399. 
 
Baum, Tom and Edith Szivas. 2008. “HRD in Tourism: A Role for Government?” Tourism 
 Management 29: 783-794. 
 
Baumgartner, Frank R. and Bryan D. Jones. 1993. Agendas and Instability in American Politics. 
 Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Baumgartner, Frank R. Bryan D. Jones and James L. True. 1998. “Policy Punctuations: U.S. 
 Budget Authority, 1947-1995” The Journal of Politics 60 (1): 1-33. 
 
Beaumont, Narelle and Dianne Dredge. 2010. “Local Tourism Governance: A Comparison of 
 Three Network Approaches” Journal of Sustainable Tourism 18 (1): 7-28. 
 
Beirman, David. 2003 Restoring Tourist Destinations in Crisis: A Strategic Marketing 
 Approach. Oxon: Allen & Unwin. 
 
  168 
Berno, Tracy and Douglas, N. 1998. “Tourism in the South Pacific: A Polynesia/Melanesia 
 Discussion” Asia Pacific Journal of Research 2 (2): 65-73. 
 
Berno, Tracy and Brian King. 2001. “Tourism in Fiji after the Coups” Travel and Tourism 
 Analyst 2: 92. 
 
Bertram, Geoffrey. 1999. “The MIRAB Model Twelve Years On” The Contemporary Pacific 11 
 (1): 105-138. 
 
Bertram, Geoffrey and Ray F. Waters. 1985 “The MIRAB Economy in Pacific Microstates” 
 Pacific Viewpoint 26 (3): 497-519 
 
Bianchi, Raoul. 2007. “Tourism and the Globalization of Fear: Analyzing the Politics of Risk 
 and (In)security in Global Travel” Tourism and Hospitality Research 7 (1): 64-74. 
 
Binns, Tony and Etienne Nel. 2002. “Tourism as a Local Development Strategy in South Africa” 
 The Geographical Journal 168 (3): 235-247. 
 
Blanton, Shannon Lindsey and Robert G. Blanton. 2007. “What Attracts Foreign Investors? An 
 Examination of Human Rights and Foreign Direct Investment” The Journal of Politics 69 
 (1): 143-155. 
 
Bluestone, Barry and Bennett Harrison. 1988. “The Growth of Low-wage Employment:1963-
 1986” The American Economic Review 78 (2): 124-128. 
 
Boutillier, Shay and Tim Duane. 2006. “Land Use Planning to Promote Marine Conservation of 
 Coral Reef Ecosystems in Moorea, French Polynesia” Pacific Rim Research Program 
 Berkeley: University of California. 
 
Brady, Henry E. and David Collier. 2004. Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared 
 Standards. Lanham: Rowan and Littlefield Publishers. 
 
Brake, Karen. 1993. “Immigration of Pacific Islanders to New Zealand, 1986-1991: Policies, 
 Patterns and Outcomes” New Zealand Population Review 19 (1-2): 173-203. 
 
Bramwell, Bill and Bernard Lane. 2010. “Editorial: Sustainable Tourism and the Evolving Rules 
 of Government Planning” Journal of Sustainable Tourism 18 (1): 1-5. 
 
Brander, J.A., Spencer, B.J. 1985. “Export subsidies and international market share Rivalry”. 
 Journal of International Economics 18: 83-100. 
 
Brau, Rinaldo, Alessandro Lanza and Francesco Pigliaru. 2003. “How Fast are the Tourism 
 Countries Growing: The Cross-country Evidence” Paper presented at the Conference on 
 Tourism and Sustainable Economic Development, Chia, Sardinia. September 19-20, 
 2003. 
 
  169 
Bray, Mark and Philip Hui. 1989. “The Implications of Size for Educational Development in 
 Small Territories: The Case of Macau” International Review of Education 35 (2): 129-
 143. 
 
Brecher, Michael. 2008. International Political Earthquakes Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
 Press. 
 
Bremmer, Ian and Preston Keat. 2010. The Fat Tail: The Power of Political Knowledge for 
 Strategic Investing Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Brennan, Michael. 2004. Ed. The Origins of the Grand Tour: The Travels of Robert Montagu, 
 Lord Mandeville, 1649-1654, William Hammond, 1655-1658, Banaster Maynard, 1660-
 1663. London: The Hakluyt Society. 
 
Britton, Stephen G. 1982. “The Political Economy of Tourism in the Third World” Annals of 
 Tourism Research 9: 331-352. 
 
Brohman, John. 1996. “New Directions in Tourism for Third World Development” Annals of 
 Tourism Research 23 (1): 48-70. 
 
Brougham, J.E. and R. W. Butler. 1981. “A Segmentation Analysis of Resident Attitudes to the 
 Social Impact of Tourism” Annals of Tourism Research 8 (4): 569-590. 
 
Brousseau, Eric and Jean-Michel Glachant. 2008. Editors. New Institutional Economics: A 
 Guidebook. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Bruner, Edward M. 1991. “Transformation of Self in Tourism” Annals of Tourism Research 18 
 (2): 238-250. 
 
Brunnschweiler, Juerg M. 2010. “The Shark Reef Marine Reserve: A Marine Tourism Project in 
 Fiji Involving Local Communities” Journal of Sustainable Tourism 18 (1): 29-42. 
 
Bryden, John M. 1973. Tourism and Development: A Case Study of the Commonwealth 
 Caribbean.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Brunt, P., R. Mawby and Z. Hambly. 2000. “Tourist Victimization and the Fear of Crime on 
 Holiday” Tourism Management 21: 417-424. 
 
Brunt, P. and D. Shepherd. 2004. “The Influence of Crime on Tourist Decision-making: Some 
 Empirical Evidence” Tourism 52: 317-327. 
 
Buchanan, Sam (February 2007) “The Nervous Triggerman: Samoa’s Experience of New 
 Zealand Rule” In Peace and Conflict in the Pacific, DevForum: Council for International 
 Development: 26. 
 
 
  170 
Buckley, R. Editor. 2004. Environmental Impacts of Ecotourism Oxfordshire: Cabi Publishing. 
 
Burns, Peter. 1995. “Sustaining Tourism under Political Adversity: The Case of Fiji” In Island 
 Tourism: Management, Principles and Practice. Edited by Michael V. Conlin and Tom 
 Baum. Chichester: John Wiley and Sons. 
 
Busse, Matthias. 2004. “Transnational Corporations and Repression of Political Rights and Civil 
 Liberties: An Empirical Analysis” Kyklos  57 (1): 45-66. 
 
Carmichael, Barbara A. 2000. “A Matrix Model for Resident Attitudes and Behaviors in a 
 Rapidly Changing Tourist Area” Tourism Management 21: 601-611.  
 
Carter, Marina. 1996. Voices From Indenture: Experiences of Indian Migrants in the British 
 Empire  New York: Leicester University Press. 
 
Carter, Simon. 1998. “Tourists’ and Travelers’ Social Construction of Africa and Asia as Risky 
 Locations” Tourism Management 19 (4): 349-358. 
 
Cater, Carl I. 2006. “Playing with Risk? Participant Perceptions of Risk and Management 
 Implications in Adventure Tourism” Tourism Management 27: 317-325. 
 
Castelltort, Magi and Gabriela Mader. 2007. “Press media coverage effects on Destinations – A 
 Monetary Public Value (MPV) Analysis.” Tourism Management 30: 1-15. 
 
Cater, Carl and P. Cloke. 2007. “Bodies in Action: The Performativity of Adventure Tourism” 
 Anthropology Today 23 (6): 13-16. 
 
Causey, Andrew. 2007. “‘Go Back to the Batak, It’s safe there’: Tourism in North Sumatra 
 during Perilous Times.” Indonesia and the Malay World 35 (103): 257-271. 
 
Cavlek, Nevenka. 2002. “Tour Operators and Destination Safety” Annals of Tourism Research 
 29 (2): 478-496. 
 
Chabra,  Deepak., Robert Healy and Erin Sills. 2003. “Staged Authenticity and Heritage 
 Tourism” Annals of Tourism Research 30 (3): 702-719. 
 
Charnley, Susan. 2005. “From Nature Tourism to Ecotourism? The Case of the Ngorongoro 
 Conservation Area, Tanzania” Human Organization 64 (1): 75-88. 
 
Chauvet, Lisa, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler. 2009. “Paradise Lost: The Costs of State Failure 
 in the Pacific” Research Paper 2007/16: UNU-WIDER. 
 
Chen, Yong., Barry Mak and Bob McKercher. 2011. “What Drives People to Travel: Integrating 
 the Tourist Motivation Paradigms” Journal of China Tourism Research 7: 120-136. 
 
  171 
Chesney-Lind, M. and I. Y. Lind. 1986. “Visitors as Victims: Crimes Against Tourists in 
 Hawaii” Annals of Tourism Research 13: 167-191. 
 
Chorev, Nitsan. 2007. Remaking U.S. Trade Policy: From Protectionism to Globalization. 
 Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
 
Choy, Dexter. 1995. “The Quality of Tourism Employment” Tourism Management 16 (2): 129-
 137. 
 
Claque, Christopher, Suzanne Gleason and Stephen Knack. 2001. “Determinants of Lasting 
 Democracy in Poor Countries: Culture, development and Institutions” The Annals of the 
 American Academy of Political and Social Science 573 (16): 16-41. 
 
Clement, Harry G. 1961. The Future of Tourism in the Pacific and the Far East: A Report 
 Prepared by Checchi and Company under Contract with the United States Department of 
 Commerce and Co-Sponsored by the Pacific Area Travel Association Washington DC. 
 
Cohen, Erik. 1984. “The Sociology of Tourism: Approaches, Issues, and Findings.” Annual 
 Review of Sociology 10:373-392. 
 
----------1978. “The Impact of Tourism on the Physical Environment” Annals of Tourism 
 Research 5 (2): 215-237. 
 
Collier, David. 1995. “Review: Translating Quantitative Methods for Qualitative  
Researchers: The Case of Selection Bias” The American Political Science Review 89 (2): 
461-466. 
 
Collier, David and James Mahoney. 1996. “Insights and Pitfalls: Selection Bias in Qualitative 
 Research” World Politics 49 (1): 56-91. 
 
Conconi, Paola. 2008. “EC-Export Subsidies on Sugar: Prepared for the ALI Project on the Case 
 Law of the WTO” World Trade Review 28 (7): 179-182. 
 
Connell, John. 1991. “The New Micronesia: Pitfalls and Problems of Dependent Development” 
 Pacific Affairs 14 (2): 87-120. 
 
Cooke, Andrew and Kolinio Moce. 1995. “Current Trends in the Management of Qoliqoli in 
 Fiji” Traditional Marine Resource and Management 5: 2-6. 
 
Coppola, Damon P. 2007 Introduction to International Disaster Management. Butterworth-
 Heinemann: Oxford. 
 
Cortell, Andrew P. and Susan Peterson. 1999. “Altered States: Explaining Domestic Institutional 
 Change” British Journal of Political Science 29 (1): 177-203. 
 
 
 
  172 
Craig-Smith, Stephen J. 2005. “Global Warming and Tourism in Oceania” In Oceania: A 
 Tourism Handbook  Edited by Chris Cooper and C. Michael Hall. Clevedon: Channel 
 View Publications. 
 
Crawford, James. 1989. “Islands as Sovereign Nations” The International and Comparative Law 
 Quarterly 38 (2): 277-298. 
 
Crick, Malcolm. 1989. “Representations of International Tourism in the Social Sciences: Sun, 
 Sex, Sights, Savings, and Servility.”  Annual Review of Anthropology 18:307-344. 
 
Crocombe, Ron, et al. Culture and Democracy in the South Pacific. Suva: University of the 
 South Pacific Press. 
 
Croes, Robertico R. 2006. “A paradigm shift to a New Strategy for Small Island Economies: 
 Embracing demand side economics for value enhancement and long-term economic 
 stability.” Tourism Management 27:453-465. 
 
Crosby, Andrew. 2002. “Archaeology and Vanua Development in Fiji” World Archaeology 34 
 (2): 363-378. 
Curtin, Susanna. 2010. “The Self-presentation and Self-development of Serious Wildlife
 Tourists” International Journal of Tourism Research 12:17-33. 
Cutter, Susan L., Bryan J. Boruff and W. Lynn Shirley. 2003. “Social Vulnerability to 
 Environmental Hazards”  Social Science Quarterly 84 (2): 242-261. 
Dailami, Mansoor and Danny Leipziger. 1998. “Infrastructure Project Finance and Capital flows: 
 A New Perspective” World Development 26 (7): 1283-1298. 
 
Daily Mail Online. October 22, 2005. “Britons Trapped as Hurricane Wilma Strikes” at 
 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-366221/Britons-trapped-Hurricane-Wilma-
 strikes.html (accessed June 4, 2011). 
 
Daniel, Yvonne Payne. 1996. “Tourism Dance Performances Authenticity and Creativity” 
 Annals of Tourism Research 23 (4): 780-797. 
 
Daugbjerg, Carsten and Alan Swinbank. 2009. Ideas, Institutions, and Trade: The WTO and the 
 Curious Role of EU Farm Policy in Trade Liberalization Oxford: Oxford University 
 Press. 
 
Davis, Graham. June 20, 2011. “Playing with Fire: Are Australia and NZ Using Samoa as a 
 Stalking Horse for Regime Change in Fiji? Pacific Media Center at 
 http://www.pmc.aut.ac.nz/articles/playing-fire-are-australia-and-nz-using-samoa-
 stalking-horse-regime-change-fiji (accessed October 19, 2011). 
 
 
  173 
Diamond, J. 1977. “Tourism’s Role in Economic Development: The Case Reexamined” 
 Economic Development and Cultural Change 25 (3): 539-553. 
 
Diamond, Walter H. and Dorothy B. Diamond. Eds. 2006. Global Guide to Investment  
Incentives and Capital Formation. The Hague: Kluwer Law International 
 
Diedrich, Amy and Esther Garcia-Buades. 2009. “Local perceptions of tourism as indicators of 
 destination decline.” Tourism Management 30:512-521. 
 
Dieke, Peter U.C. ed. 2000. The Political Economy of Tourism Development in Africa. New 
 York: Cognizant Communication Corporation. 
 
Dinnen, Sinclair (2004) “Lending a Fist? Australia’s New Interventionism in the Southwest 
 Pacific” Paper Presented at the State Society and Governance in Melanesia Project 
 Seminar Series at The Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies Australian National 
 University, Canberra, Australia. 
 
Dion, Douglas. 1998. “Evidence and Inference in the Comparative Case Study” Comparative 
 Politics 30 (2): 127-145. 
 
Dogan, Hasan Zafer. 1989. “Forms of Adjustment: Sociocultural Impacts of Tourism” Annals of 
 Tourism Research 16: 216-236. 
 
Doggart, Caroline and Nike Doggart. 1996. “Occasional Studies: Environmental Impacts of 
 Tourism in developing Countries” Travel and Tourism Analyst 2: 71-86. 
 
Dommen, Edward and Philippe Hein. Eds. 1985. States, Microstates and Islands London: Croom 
 Helm. 
 
Duncan, Ron and Satish Chand. 2002. “The Economics of the ‘Arc of Instability’” Asian-Pacific 
 Economic Literature  16: 1-9. 
 
Dunning, John H. 1971. ed. The Multinational Enterprise London: George Allen & Unwin. 
 
----------1973. “The Determinants of International Production” Oxford Economic Papers 25 (3): 
 289-336. 
 
Dunning, John H. and Matthew McQueen. 1981. “The Eclectic Theory of International 
 Production: A Case Study of the International Hotel Industry” Managerial and Decision 
 Economics 2 (4): 197-210. 
 
Eadington, William R. and Milton Redman. 1991. “Economics and Tourism” Annals of Tourism 
 Research 18: 41-56. 
 
Egger, Peter and Hannes Winner. 2006. “How Corruption Influences Foreign Direct  
Investment: A Panel Data Study” Economic Development and Cultural Change 54 (2). 
  174 
 
Elkan, Walter. 1975. “The Relation between Tourism and Employment in Kenya and Tanzania” 
 Journal of Development Studies 11 (2):123-130. 
 
Evans, Nigel and Sarah Elphick. 2005. “Models of Crisis Management: An Evaluation of their 
 Value for Strategic Planning in the International Travel Industry” International Journal 
 of Tourism Research 7: 135-150. 
 
Faber, Doeke C. and Tosca M. van Vijfeijken. 1994. “Does the Right Hand Know What the Left 
 Hand is Doing? The Management of Sectoral Linkages in the Eastern Caribbean” Journal 
 of Public Administration 16 (1): 87-108. 
 
Fagence, Michael. October 2001. “Strategies for Developing Ecotourism in Pacific Island 
 Countries” Presentation to UNESCAP/SPTO Seminar on Sustainable Development of 
 Ecotourism in Pacific Island Countries, Suva, Fiji Islands 
 
Farrell, Bryan H. 1979. “Tourism’s Human Conflicts: Cases from the Pacific” Annals of Tourism 
 Research 6 (2): 122-136. 
 
----------1985. “South Pacific Tourism in the mid-1980s” Tourism Management 6 (1): 55-60. 
 
Faulkenberry, Lisa V., John M. Coggeshall., Kenneth Backman and Sheila Backman. 2000. “A 
 Culture of Servitude: The Impact of Tourism and Development on South Carolina’s 
 Coast” Human Organization 59 (1): 86-95. 
 
Faulkner, B. 2001. “Towards a Framework for Disaster Management.” Tourism Management 22: 
 135-147. 
 
Faulkner, B. and Svetlana Vikulov. 2001. “Katherine Washed Out One Day, Back on Track the 
 Next: A Post-mortem of a Tourism Disaster” Tourism Management 22: 331-344.  
 
Ferguson, Lucy. 2010. “Tourism as a Development Strategy in Central America: Exploring the 
 Impact on Women’s Lives” CAWN Briefing Paper 1-7. 
 
Fidgeon, Paul R. 2010. “Tourism Education and Curriculum Design: A Time for Consolidation 
 and Review?” Tourism Management 31: 699-723. 
 
Fiji Broadcasting Corporation. November 25, 2007. “Natadola Project Needs Fix-up” at 
 http://www.radiofiji.com.fj/fiji2/fullstory.php?id=6031 (accessed May 17, 2011). 
 
Fiji Embassy in Washington D.C. February 14, 2007. “Tourism Action Group (TAG) Action 
 Plan Puts Fiji Back On Track” at 
 http://www.fijiembassydc.com/default.asp?contentID=695 (accessed June 6, 2011). 
Fiji Government Publications. 1964. Hotels Aid Act 1964: Revised 2006 Suva: Government 
 Printer. 
  175 
 
----------2006. Hotels Aid Budget Amendment Bill 2006 Suva: Government Printer 
 
----------2005. “Research Paper: Sugar Protocol Agreement 1998” at 
 http://www.parliament.gov.fj/publications/viewResearch.aspx?research=21 (accessed 
 May 18, 2011) 
 
----------2003. Hotels Aid Budget Amendment Bill 2003 Suva: Government Printer 
 
----------1999. An Act to Amend the Hotels Aid Act Suva: Government Printer. 
 
----------1998. Hotels and Guest Houses Amendment Act. Cap 195: Fiji Republic Gazette 
 Supplement Suva: Government Printer. 
 
----------1986. Hotels Aid Amendment Act. Suva: Government Printer. 
 
----------1985. Hotel Turnover Tax. Cap. 202 Rev. 1985 Suva: Government Printer. 
 
----------1985. Hotels Aid Act. Cap. 215 Rev. 1985 Suva: Government Printer. 
 
----------1975. An Act to Amend the Hotel Turnover Tax Act, 1974. Suva: Government Printer. 
 
----------1981-1993. Details of Expenditure by Activity Suva: Government Printer. 
 
----------1976-1980. Fiji Seventh Development Plan: Policies, Strategies and Programs for 
 National Development. Suva: Government Printer. 
 
----------1981-1985. Fiji Eight Development Plan: Policies, Strategies and Programs for 
 National Development. Suva: Government Printer.  
 
----------1986-1990. Fiji Ninth Development Plan: Policies, Strategies and Programs for 
 National Development. Suva: Government Printer. 
 
----------October 8, 1975. Hansard Parliamentary Debates: Hotel Turnover Tax Amendment Bill 
 Suva: Government Printer. 
 
----------December 11, 1975. Hansard Parliamentary Debates: Hotel Aid Amendment Bill. Suva: 
 Government Printer. 
 
Fiji Islands Trade and Investment Board (FTIB). 2008. Annual Report Suva: Government 
 Printing. 1-48. 
 
Fijilive. 2007. “Anthony Accuses Natadola Chief of Stirring Trouble, says Vijay Singh 
 Endorsement No Loss” at 
 http://www.fijiworldnews.com/news/publish/News_1/Anthony_Accuses_Natadola_Chief
  176 
 of_Stirring_Trouble_says_Vijay_Singh_Endorsement_No_Loss_printer.shtml (accessed 
 May 17, 2011). 
 
----------2009. “FNPF Backs Tourism Through Natadola Resort” at 
 http://www.fijilive.com/news/2009/05/11/16046.Fijilive (accessed May 17, 2011). 
 
Fiji Ministry of Information. September 16, 2003. “Police Division to Boost Tourism Industry 
 Security” at http://www.fiji.gov.fj/cgi-bin/cms/exec/view.cgi/12/1294/printer (accessed 
 June 4, 2011) 
 
Fiji Ministry of Tourism. 2008. “Talking Points for Mr. Felix Anthony, Chairman, Natadola Bay 
 Resort Ltd. to the Tourism Forum” at http://www.fijime.com/tourism-resources/tourism 
 forum/Mr%20Felix%20Anthony%20%20Chairman%20Natadola%20Resort%20Limited.
 pdf. (accessed May 17, 2011).   
 
---------2007. Fiji Tourism Development Plan: Strategic Directions-2007-2014.   
 
----------Hotel and Guest Houses Regulations at 
 http://www.tourism.gov.fj/legislation/files/regulations.htm (accessed July 20, 2010). 
 
----------Hotels and Guest Houses at  http://www.tourism.gov.fj/legislation/files/hotel.htm 
 (accessed July 20, 2010). 
 
----------Fiji Visitors Bureau Act at http://www.tourism.gov.fj/legislation/files/fvb-act.htm 
 (accessed July 20, 2010). 
 
----------2006. Adaptation to Climate Change in the Tourism Sector in the Fiji Islands: Summary 
 Report of the Initial Stakeholder Workshop. 
 
----------2004. Tourism Infrastructure Development Policy Conference Report. 
 
----------1992. General Information on Tourism in Fiji: It’s Past and Future and Impact on the 
 Economy and Society. Suva. 
 
Fiji National Provident Fund (FNPF). 2007-2010. Annual Reports Suva: Government Printing. 
 
----------2010. “Media Release: Forensic Accountants Begin FNPF Write-Down Inquiry” at
 http://www.myfnpf.com.fj/resources/uploads/embeds/file/FNPF%20appoints%20Deloitte   
 .pdf (accessed May 17, 2011). 
 
----------June 8, 2009. “FNPF Moves on Momi Bay Project” at 
 http://www.myfnpf.com.fj/pages.cfm/about-fnpf/media-centre/news/2009/ref1309-fnpf-
 moves-on-momi-bay-project.html (accessed May 17, 2011). 
 
Fiji Times Online. June 22, 2010. “Decree Gives Control to FNPF” at 
 http://www.fijitimes.com/print.aspx?id=150577 (accessed May 17, 2011) 
  177 
----------November 24, 2009. “Tourism Projects Create 1210 Jobs” at 
 http://www.fijitimes.com/story.aspx?id=134204 (accessed October 11, 2011). 
 
----------November 28, 2009. “Allocation to Create Jobs” at 
 http://www.fijitimes.com/story.aspx?ref=archive&id=134434 (accessed October 11, 
 2009). 
 
----------June 9, 2009. “FNPF's Auction Plan to Recoup Millions in Momi” at 
 http://www.fijitimes.com/print.aspx?id=123145 (accessed May 17, 2011). 
 
----------December 10, 2007. “Coups Cost Fiji $9.4b” at 
 http://www.fijitimes.com/story.aspx?ref=archive&id=76233 (accessed October 19, 
 2011). 
 
----------January 11, 2007. “Tourism Campaign to Target Australia” at 
 http://www.fijitimes.com/story.aspx?id=55033 (accessed June 6, 2011). 
 
Financial Times. April 28,2005. “WTO Rules Against EU Sugar Subsidy Policy” at 
 http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/509e772c-b820-11d9-bc7c-
 00000e2511c8.html#axzz1d9qyA5bv (accessed June 28, 2011) 
 
Finin, Gerard A. and Terence A. Wesley-Smith. 2000. “Coups, Conflicts and Crises: The  
New Pacific Way?” Pacific Islands Development Series Working Papers 13: 1-31. 
 
Firth, Stewart. 2001. “A Reflection on South Pacific Regional Security, mid-2000 to mid-2001” 
 Journal of Pacific History 36 (3): 277-283. 
 
Fletcher, John and Yeganeh Morakabati. 2008. “Tourism Activity, Terrorism and Political 
 Instability within the Commonwealth: The cases of Fiji and Kenya.” International 
 Journal of Tourism Research 10:537-556. 
 
Fraenkel, Jon. 2004. “The Coming Anarchy in Oceania? A Critique of the ‘Africanisation’ of the 
 South Pacific Thesis” Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 42 (1): 1-34. 
 
Freedman, Lawrence. 2005. “The Politics of Warning: Terrorism and Risk Communication.” 
 Intelligence and National Security 20(3):379-418. 
 
Freitag, Tilman G. “Enclave Tourism Development: For Whom the Benefits Roll?” Annals of 
 Tourism Research 21 (3): 538-554. 
 
Fuchs, Galia and Arie Reichel. 2011. “An Exploratory Inquiry into Destination Risk Perceptions 
 and Risk Reduction Strategies of First Time vs. Repeat Visitors to a Highly Volatile 
 Destination” Tourism Management 32 (2): 266-276. 
 
Fuji, Edwin T. and James Mak. 1980. “Tourism and Crime: Implications for Regional 
 Development Policy” Regional Studies 14 (1): 27-36. 
  178 
 
Gani, Azmat. 1999. “Foreign Direct Investment in Fiji” Pacific Economic Bulletin 14 (1):  
87-92. 
 
Garofalo, J. 1979. “Victimization and the Fear of Crime” Journal of Research on Crime and 
 Delinquency 16: 80-97. 
 
Gatzweiler, F.W. 2005. “Institutionalizing Biodiversity Conservation: The Case of Ethiopian 
 Coffee Forests” Conservation and Society 3: 201-223. 
 
Gearing, Charles E. and William Svart and Turgut Var. 1976. Planning for Tourism 
 Development: Quantitative Approaches New York: Praeger Publishers. 
 
George, Alexander L. and Andrew Bennett. 2005. Case Studies and Theory Development  
in the Social Sciences. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
 
George, Richard. 2009. “Visitor perceptions of crime-safety and attitudes towards risk:  
 The case of Table Mountain National Park, Cape Town.” Tourism Management 30:1-11. 
 
Gersick, Connie J. G. 1991. “Revolutionary Change Theories: A Multilevel Exploration  
of the Punctuated Equilibrium Paradigm” The Academy of Management Review 16 (1): 
10-36. 
 
Ghai, Yash. 1990. Ed. Public Administration and Management in Small States: Pacific  
Experiences. Suva: University of the South Pacific Press. 
 
Gladstone, David L. and Susan S. Fainstein. 2001. “Tourism in US Global Cities: A Comparison 
 of New York and Los Angeles” Journal of Urban Affairs 23 (1): 23-40. 
 
Gnoth, Juergen. 1997. “Tourism Motivation and Expectation Formation” Annals of Tourism 
 Research 24 (2): 283-304. 
 
Goldstein, Judith, Douglas Rivers and Michael Tomz, 2007. “Institutions in International  
Relations: Understanding the Effects of the GATT and the WTO on World Trade” 
International Organizations 61 (1): 37-67. 
 
Goodwin, Harold. 2007. “Measuring and Reporting the Impact of Tourism on Poverty” In 
 Tourism Research: New Directions, Challenges and Applications edited by D. Airey and 
 J. Tribe. Oxford: Elsevier Press. 
 
Goosens, Cees. 2000. “Tourism Information and Pleasure Motivation” Annals of Tourism 
 Research 27 (2): 301-321. 
 
Gounder, Rukmani. 2002. “Political and Economic Freedom, Fiscal Policy, and Growth Nexus: 
 Some Empirical Results for Fiji” Contemporary Economic Policy 20 (3): 234-245. 
 
  179 
Granger, Ken. 1999. An Information Infrastructure for Disaster Management in Pacific Island 
 Countries Canberra: Australian Geological Survey Organization, Record 1999/35. 
 
Greif, Avner and David D. Laitin. 2004. “A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change” The 
 American Political Science Review 98 (4): 633-652. 
 
Grice, Kevin and David Drakakis-Smith. 1985. “The Role of the State in Shaping Development: 
 Two Decades of Growth in Singapore” Transactions of the Institute of British 
 Geographers 10 (3): 347-359. 
 
Gros, Jean-Germain. 2011. “Anatomy of a Haitian Tragedy: When the Fury of Nature Meets the 
 Debility of the State” Journal of Black Studies 42 (2): 131-157. 
 
Guangming, he., Xiaodong Chen, Wei Liu, Scott Bearer, Shiqiang Zhou, Lily Yeqing Cheng, 
 Hemin Zhang, Zhiyun Ouyang, Jianguo Liu. 2008. “Distribution of Economic Benefits 
 from Ecotourism: A Case Study of Wolong Nature Reserve for Giant Pandas in China” 
 Environmental Management 42: 1017-1025. 
 
Gunter, Michael M. 1977. “What Happened to the United Nations Ministate Problem?” The 
 American Journal of International Law 71 (1): 110-124. 
 
Habib, Mohsin and Leon Zurawicki. 2002. “Corruption and Foreign Direct Investment” Journal 
 of International Business Studies 33 (2): 291-307. 
 
Hall, Colin Michael. 1994. Tourism and Politics – Policy, Power and Place.  New York: John 
 Wiley. 
 
---------1994. “Is Tourism Still the Plantation Economy of the South Pacific: The Case of Fiji” 
 Tourism Recreation Research 19 (1): 41-48. 
 
---------1994. “Tourism in Pacific Island Microstates: A Case Study of Vanuatu” Tourism 
 Recreation Research 19 (1): 41-48. 
 
Hall, Peter A. 1995. “The Movement from Keynesianism to Monetarism: Institutional Analysis 
 and British Economic Policy in the 1970s” In Structuring Politics: Historical 
 Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis. Edited by Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen and 
 Frank Longstreth. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Hampton, Mark P. 2003. “Entry Points for Local Tourism in Developing Countries: Evidence 
 from Yogyakarta, Indonesia” Geografiska Annaler 85 (2): 85-101. 
 
Hanna, Stephen P. and Vincent J. Del Casino Jr. 2003. Editors. Mapping Tourism Minneapolis: 
 University of Minnesota Press. 
 
Haralambopoulos, Nicholas and Abraham Pizam. 1996. “Perceived Impacts of Tourism: The 
 Case of Samos” Annals of Tourism Research 23 (3): 503-526. 
  180 
Harms, Philipp and Heinrich W. Ursprung. 2002. “Do Civil and Political Repression Really 
 Boost Foreign Direct Investments?” Economic Inquiry 40 (4): 651-663. 
 
Harrison, David. 2004. “Tourism in Pacific Islands” The Journal of Pacific Studies 26 (1- 
2): 1-28. 
 
Hayward-Jones, Jenny. 2009. Fiji: Flailing State, Policy Brief. Sydney: Lowy Institute for  
International Policy. 
 
---------2008. Engineering Political Stability in the Solomon Island: Outcomes Report. Sydney: 
 Lowy Institute for International Policy. 
 
---------September 2008. “Beyond Good Governance: Shifting the Paradigm for Australian Aid 
 to the Pacific Islands Region” Policy Brief: Lowy Institute for International Policy. 
 
Heath, Ian. 1974. “Towards a Reassessment of Gordon in Fiji” The Journal of Pacific History 9: 
 81-92. 
 
Hedstrom, Maynard. 1930. “Fiji, its Position and Problems: An Outline Summary” Pacific 
 Affairs 3 (10): 947-955. 
 
Henderson, Joan. 2003. “The Future of Democracy in Melanesia: What Role for Outside 
 Powers?” Asia Pacific Viewpoint 44 (3): 225-241. 
 
Henderson, Joan and Alex Ng. 2004. “Responding to Crisis: Severe Acute Respiratory  
Syndrome (SARS) and Hotels in Singapore” International Journal of Tourism Research 
6 (6): 411-419. 
 
Hernandez, Sigfredo A., Judy Cohen and Hector L. Garcia. 1996. “Resident Attitudes Towards 
 and Instant Resort Enclave” Annals of Tourism Research 23 (4): 755-779. 
 
Hindmarsh, Jennie Harre. 1996. “How do we Define Small States and Islands? A Critical  
Analysis of Alternative Conceptualizations” Convergence 29 (2): 36-45. 
 
Higgins-Desbiolles, Freya. 2006. “More than an ‘Industry’: The Forgotten Power of Tourism as 
 a Social Force” Tourism Management 27: 1192-1208. 
 
Hoetjes, Bernard J.S. 1992. “The Dutch Connection in the Caribbean: Six Islands Living Apart 
 Together” In Public Administration in Small and Island States, edited by Randall Baker. 
 West Hartford: Kumarian Press. 
 
Hogan, Jim. 2006. “Remoulding the Critical Junctures Approach” Canadian Journal of Political 
 Science  39 (3): 657-679. 
 
  181 
Honeck, Dale. 2008. “LDC Poverty Alleviation and the Doha Development Agenda: Is Tourism 
 being Neglected?” WTO Working Paper at
 http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd200803_e.pdf (accessed April 10, 2011). 
Honey, Martha. 2008. Ecotourism and Sustainable Development: Who Owns Paradise? 
 Washington D.C.: Island Press. 
Howard, Michael. 1991. Race and Politics in an Island State. Vancouver: University of British 
 Columbia Press. 
 
Howard, Robert W. 2009. “Risky Business? Asking Tourists What the Hazards they Actually 
 Encountered in Thailand” Tourism Management 30: 359-365. 
 
Howe, K. R. Robert C. Kiste and Brij Lal. 1994. Tides of History: The Pacific Islands in the 
 Twentieth Century Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. 
 
Howell, David R. and Edward N. Wolff. 1991. “Trends in the Growth and Distribution of Skills 
 in the US Workplace, 1960-1985. Industrial and Labor Relations Review 44 (3): 486-
 502. 
 
Huang, Jen-Hung and Jennifer C. H. Min. 2002. “Earthquake Devastation and Recovery in 
 Tourism: The Taiwan Case” Tourism Management 23: 145-154. 
 
Hughes, George. 1998. “Tourism and the Semiological Realization of Space” In Destinations: 
 Cultural Landscapes of Tourism Edited by Greg Ringer, London: Routledge 
 
Husbands, Winston. 1981. “Centers, Peripheries, Tourism and Socio-Spatial Development” 
 Ontario Geography 17: 37-59. 
 
Ikenberry, G. John. 1984. “Conclusion: An Institutional Approach to American Foreign  
Economic Policy” In The State and American Foreign Economic Policy, edited by G. 
John Ikenberry, David A. Lake and Michael Mastanduno. Ithaca: Cornell University. 
 
Institute for Tourism and Recreation Research. 1995. Jobs and Wages: The Tourism Industry 
 Dilemma Missoula: The University of Montana at 
 http://www.itrr.umt.edu/research/WAGES.pdf (accessed October 11, 2011). 
 
International Labor Organization (ILO). April 2, 2001. “Hotel, catering and tourism employment 
 expanding worldwide, but globalization leaves many small and medium sized enterprises 
 behind” at http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/press-and-media-
 centre/news/WCMS_007840/lang--en/index.htm (accessed October 11, 2011). 
 
Islands Business. 2010. “What’s Next in Sugar: The Inside Story on a Sticky Business” at 
 http://www.islandsbusiness.com/fiji_business/index_dynamic/containerNameToReplace
 =MiddleMiddle/focusModuleID=19417/overideSkinName=issueArticle-
 full.tpl?PHPSESSID=8b1b9cb01cc99e0439e9460e42478937 (accessed May 18, 2011)  
  182 
 
----------2007. “Waiting with Bated Breath” at 
 http://www.islandsbusiness.com/fiji_business/index_dynamic/containerNameToReplace
 =MiddleMiddle/focusModuleID=18133/overideSkinName=issueArticle-full.tpl  
 (accessed May 17, 2011). 
 
Iversen, Torben and Anne Wren. 1998. “Equality, Employment and Budgetary Restraint: The 
 Trilemma of the Service Economy” World Politics 50 (4): 507-546. 
 
Jaakson, Reiner. 2004. “Beyond the Tourist Bubble? Cruiseship Passengers in Port” Annals of 
 Tourism Research 31 (1): 44-60. 
 
Jafari, Jafar. 1974. “The Socio-economic Costs of Tourism to Developing Countries” Annals of 
 Tourism Research 1: 227-262. 
 
---------1986. “Tourism for Whom? Old Questions Still Echoing: See the Third World While it 
 Lasts” Annals of Tourism Research 13 (1): 129-137. 
 
Jakobsen, Jo and Indra de Soysa. 2006. “Do Foreign Investors Punish Democracy? Theory and 
 Empirics” Kyklos 59 (3): 383-410. 
 
Jayaraman, T. K. and Chee-Keong Choong. 2006. “Foreign Direct Investment in the South 
 Pacific Island Countries: A Case Study of Fiji” World Review of Entrepreneurship, 
 Management and Sustainable Development 2 (4): 309-322. 
 
Jenkins C. L. and B.M. Henry. 1982. “Government Involvement in Tourism in Developing 
 Countries” Annals of Tourism Research 9: 499-521. 
 
Jensen, Nathan M.  2006. Nation-States and the Multinational Corporation: A Political  
Economy of Foreign Direct Investment (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
----------2003. “Democratic Governance and Multinational Corporations: Political Regimes and 
 Inflows of Foreign Direct Investment” International Organization 57 (3): 587-616. 
 
Johnson, Peter and Barry Thomas. 2001. “Employment in Tourism: A Review” Industrial 
 Relations Journal 36-48. 
 
Joseph, Christina A. and Anandam P. Kavoori. 2001. “Mediated Resistance: Tourism and the 
 Host Community” Annals of Tourism Research 28 (4): 998-1009. 
 
Jovanovic, Boyan and Yaw Nyarko. 1997. “Stepping-stone Mobility” Carnegie-Rochester 
 Conference Series on Public Policy 46: 289-325. 
 
Kabutaulaka, Tarcisius Tara (2005) “Australian Foreign Policy and the RAMSI Intervention in 
 the Solomon Islands” The Contemporary Pacific 17 (2):283-308. 
 
  183 
Kaplan, Martha. 1987. “The Coups in Fiji: Colonial Contradictions and the Post-Colonial Crisis” 
 Critique of Anthropology 8: 93-116. 
 
Kaplinsky, Raphael. 1983. “Prospering at the Periphery: A Special Case-The Seychelles” In 
 African Islands and Enclaves, edited by Robin Cohen. Beverly Hills: Sage. 
 
Katouzian, M.A. 1970. “The Development of the Service Sector: A New Approach” Oxford 
 Economic Papers 22 (3): 362-382. 
 
Kersell, John E. 1987. “Government Administration in a Small Microstate: Developing the 
 Cayman Islands” Public Administration and Development 7 (1): 95-107. 
 
Kim, Mariene. 2000. “Women Paid Low Wages: Who they are and where they Work” Monthly 
 Labor Review September: 26-30. 
 
Kim, Samuel Seongseop., Dallen J. Timothy and Hag-Chin Han. 2007. “Tourism and Political 
 Ideologies: A case of tourism in North Korea.” Tourism Management 28: 1031-1043. 
 
King, Brian and Tracy Berno. 2006. “Fiji Islands: Rebuilding Tourism in an Insecure World” In 
 Tourism Security and Safety: From Theory to Practice Edited by Yoel Mansfeld and 
 Abraham Pizam. Burlington: Elsevier Butterworth-Heinemann. 
 
---------2002. “Tourism and Civil Disturbances: An Evaluation of Recovering Strategies in Fiji 
 1987-2000. Journal of Hospitality and Tourism Management 9 (1): 46-60. 
 
King, Brian. Abraham Pizam and Ady Milman. 1993. “Social Impacts of Tourism: Host 
 Perceptions” Annals of Tourism Research 20 (4): 650-665. 
 
King, Gary, Robert Keohane and Sidney Verba. 1994. Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific 
 Inference in Qualitative Research. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Kontogeorgopoulos, Nick. 2005. “Community-Based Ecotourism in Phuket and Ao Phangnga, 
 Thailand: Partial Victories and Bittersweet Remedies” Journal of Sustainable Tourism 13 
 (1): 4-23. 
 
Kozak, Metin, John C. Crotts and Rob Law. 2007. “The Impact of the Perception of Risk  
 on International Travelers” International Journal of Tourism Research 9:233-242. 
 
Krasner, Stephen D. 1984. “Review: Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and 
 Historical Dynamics” Comparative Politics 16 (2): 223-246. 
Laing, Jennifer H. and Geoffrey I. Crouch. 2009. “Myth, Adventure and Fantasy at the Frontier: 
 Metaphors and Imagery behind an Extraordinary Travel Experience.” International 
 Journal of Tourism Research 11:127-141. 
  184 
Lal, Brij. 2010. In the Eye of the Storm: Jai Ram Reddy and the Politics of Post-Colonial Fiji 
 Canberra: Australian University E. Press. 
 
---------1992. Broken Waves: A History of the Fiji Islands in the Twentieth Century. Honolulu: 
 University of Hawaii Press. 
 
----------1988. Power and Prejudice: The Making of the Fiji Crisis. Wellington: New Zealand 
 Institute of International Affairs. 
 
Lal, Victor. 1988. Fiji: Coups in Paradise. London: Zed Books. 
 
Lall, Sanjaya and Rajneesh Narula. 2004. “Foreign Direct Investment and its Role in Economic 
 Development: Do We Need a New Agenda?” The European Journal of Development 
 Research 16 (3): 447-464. 
 
Lawson Stephanie. 1996. Tradition Versus Democracy in the South Pacific: Fiji, Tonga, and 
 Western Samoa. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. 
 
----------1991. The Failure of Democratic Politics in Fiji Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
Lea, John. 1988. Tourism and Development in the Third World. London: Routledge. 
 
Leckie, Jacqueline. 1997. To Labour with the State: The Fiji Public Service Association. 
 Dunedin: University of Otago Press. 
 
Leichter, Howard M. 1983. “The Patterns and Origins of Policy Diffusion: The Case of the 
 Commonwealth” Comparative Politics 15 (2): 223-233. 
 
Leiper, Neil. 1999. “A Conceptual Analysis of Tourism-Supported Employment which Reduces 
 the Incidence of Exaggerated, Misleading Statistics about Jobs” Tourism Management 
 20: 605-613. 
 
----------1997. “The Waste of Tourism” Annals of Tourism Research 24 (3): 736-739. 
 
----------1990. “Tourist Attraction Systems” Annals of Tourism Research 17: 367-384. 
 
----------1983. “An ‘Etymology’ of Tourism” Annals of Tourism Research 10: 277-281. 
 
Lepp, Andrew and Heather Gibson. 2003. “Tourist Roles, Perceived Risk and International 
 Tourism” Annals of Tourism Research 30 (3): 606-624. 
 
Levantis, Theodore, Frank Jotzo and Vivek Tulpule. 2005. “Sweetening the Transition in EU 
 Sugar Preferences: The Case of Fiji” The World Economy 28 (6)  
 
----------2003. “Ending of EU Sugar Trade Preferences: Potential Consequences for Fiji” ABARE 
 Current Issues: Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics 3.2 
  185 
 
Levy, Diane E. and Patricia B. Lerch. 1991. “Tourism as a Factor in Development: Implications 
 for Gender and Work in Barbados” Gender and Society 5 (1): 67-85. 
 
Li, Quan. 2006. “Democracy, Autocracy, and Tax Incentives to Foreign Direct Investors: A  
 Cross National Analysis” The Journal of Politics 68 (1): 62-74.  
 
Lieberman, Evan S. 2005. “Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative 
 Research” The American Political Science Review 99 (3): 435-452. 
 
Lijphart, Arend. 1971. “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method” The American 
 Political Science Review 65 (3): 682-693. 
 
Lindberg, Kreg and Rebecca L. Johnson. 1997. “Modeling Resident Attitudes Toward Tourism” 
 Annals of Tourism Research 24 (2): 402-424. 
 
Lin, Stephen F. and Catherine Thomas. 2008. “When do Multinational Firms Outsource? 
 Evidence from the Hotel Industry” Working Paper: Columbia Business School. 
 
Liu, Abby and Geoffrey Wall. 2006. “Planning Tourism Employment: A Developing Country 
 Perspective” Tourism Management 27: 159-170. 
 
Liu, Tien-Lung. 1998. “Policy Shifts and State Agencies: Britain and Germany, 1918-1933. 
 Theory and Society 27 (1): 43-82. 
 
Los Angeles Times. June 25, 2009. “Tourism Industry is L.A. County's No. 1 Job Generator, 
 Report Shows” at http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jun/25/business/fi-tourism25 (accessed 
 October 11, 2011). 
 
Lowenheim, Oded. 2007. “The Responsibility to Responsibilize: Foreign Offices and the  
 Issuing of Travel Warnings” International Political Sociology 1(3):203-221. 
 
MacCannell, Dean. 1979. “Staged Authenticity: Arrangements of Social Space in Visitor 
 Settings” American Journal of Sociology 79 (3): 589-603. 
 
Mahadevan, Renuka. 2009. “The Less than Sweet Solution to Fiji’s Sugar Industry Problems” 
 Journal of International Development 21: 126-136. 
 
Mara, Ratu Kamisese. 1997. The Pacific Way: A Memoir. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. 
 
Mathieson, Alister and Geoffrey Wall. 1982. Tourism: Economic, Physical and Social Impacts 
 New York: Longman House. 
 
Maunders, Keith. 2007. “Culture versus Sustainability-A Case Study from the Fiji Islands” 
 Journal of the Asia Pacific Centre for Environmental Accountability 13 (4): 2-7. 
 
  186 
Mawby, R. 2000. “Tourists’ Perceptions of Security: The Risk-Fear Paradox” Tourism 
 Economics 6: 109-121. 
 
Mbaiwa, Joseph E. 2005. “Enclave Tourism and its Socio-Economic Impacts in the Okavango 
 Delta, Botswana”  Tourism Management 26: 157-172. 
 
McCusker, Rob. March 2006. “Transnational Crime in the Pacific Islands: Real or Apparent 
 Danger?” Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice: Australian Institute of 
 Criminology 308: 1-6. 
 
McDonnell, Ian. 1998. “Tourism Precincts: A factor in Bali's Rise in Fortune and Fiji's Fall From 
 Favor- An Australian Perspective” Journal of Vacation Marketing  4 (4): 353-367. 
 
McElroy, Jerome L. 2003. “Tourism, Development in Small Islands across the World” 
 Geografiska Annaler. Series B, Human Geography 85 (4): 231-242. 
 
McGraw, David J. 2005. “New Zealand Foreign Policy under the Clark Government: High Tide 
 of Liberal Internationalism” Pacific Affairs 78 (2): 217-235. 
 
-----------1995. “New Zealand’s Foreign Policy under National and Labor Governments: 
 Variations on the “Small State” Theme?” Pacific Affairs 67 (1): 7-25. 
 
McKeown, Timothy J. 1999. “Review: Case Studies and the Statistical Worldview: Review of 
 King, Keohane and Verba’s Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative 
 Research” International Organization 53 (1): 161-190. 
 
Macnaught, Timothy. 1982. “Mass Tourism and the Dilemmas of Modernization in Pacific 
 Island Communities” Annals of Tourism Research 9: 359-381. 
 
Mendelson, Maurice H. 1972. “Diminutive States in the United Nations” The International and 
 Comparative Law Quarterly 21 (4): 609-630. 
 
Michener, James. 1992. The World is My Home: A Memoir New York: Random House. 
 
Milne, S. 1992. “Tourism and Development in South Pacific Microstates” Annals of Tourism 
 Research 19 (2): 191-212. 
 
Minitz, Sidney W. 1985. Sweetness and Power: The Place of Sugar in Modern History New 
 York: Penguin Books. 
 
Naidu, Vijay. 1980. The Violence of Indenture in Fiji. Suva: University of the South Pacific. 
 
Naidu, Vijay and Mahendra Reddy. 2002. “ALTA and Expiring Land Leases: Fijian Farmers’ 
 Perception of the Future” Suva: University of the South Pacific at 
 http://piasdgserver.usp.ac.fj/apmrn1/fileadmin/files/projects/fiji_alta.pdf (accessed May 
 25, 2011). 
  187 
Narayan, Jai. 1984. The Political Economy of Fiji. Suva: South Pacific Review Press. 
 
Narayan, Paresh Kumar and Russell Smyth. 2003. “The Determinants of Immigration  
from Fiji to New Zealand: An Empirical Reassessment Using the Bounds Testing 
Approach” International Migration 41 (5): 33-57. 
 
Narayan, Paresh Kumar. 2005. “The Structure of Tourist Expenditure in Fiji: Evidence  
from Unit Root Structural Break Tests” Applied Economics 37: 1157-1161. 
 
----------2005. “Did Rabuka’s Military Coups have a Permanent Effect or a Transitory Effect on 
 Tourist Expenditure in Fiji: Evidence from Vogelsang’s Structural  Break  Test” Tourism 
 Management 26:509-515. 
 
Narayan, Paresh Kumar and Biman Chand Prasad. 2005. “Economic Importance of the  
Sugar Industry for Fiji” Review of Urban & Regional Development Studies 17 (2) 
 
Nash, Denison. 1996/1997. “On Anthropologists and Tourists” Annals of Tourism Research 23 
 (3): 691-694. 
 
National Business Review. August 25, 2009. “Momi Bay Auction Passed in at $41 million, 
 Negotiations Continue” at http://www.nbr.co.nz/article/momi-bay-auction-passed-41-
 million-negotiations-ongoing-109039 (accessed May 17, 2011). 
 
Neemia, Uentabo Fakaofo. 1986. Cooperation and Conflict: Costs, Benefits and National 
 Interests in Pacific Regional Cooperation. Suva: University of the South Pacific Press. 
 
Nelson, Michael A. and Ram D. Singh. 1998. “Democracy, Economic Freedom, Fiscal  
Policy, and Growth in LDCs: A Fresh Look” Economic Development and Cultural 
Change 46: 677-696. 
 
New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. January 21, 2010. “Frequently asked 
 questions about New Zealand's policy towards Fiji” at http://mfat.govt.nz/Foreign-
 Relations/Pacific/0-Fiji-FAQ.php (accessed October 19, 2011). 
 
New York Times. April 28, 2005. “EU Ordered to Stop Dumping its Sugar on Global Markets” 
 at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/28/business/worldbusiness/28iht-sugar.html 
 (accessed June 28, 2011). 
 
New Zealand Herald Online. June 5, 2009. “Bridgecorp Bosses Get Five Year Ban” at 
 http://www.nzherald.co.nz/news/print.cfm?objectid=10576539 (accessed May 17, 2011). 
 
O’Connor, Brendan (2004) “Perspectives on Australian Foreign Policy, 2003” Australian 
 Journal of International Affairs 58(2):207-220. 
 
 
  188 
O’Donnell, Michael and Mark Turner. 2005. “Exporting New Public Management: Performance 
 Agreements in a Pacific Microstate” The International Journal of Public Sector 
 Management 18 (7): 615-628. 
 
OECD. 2003. Checklist for Foreign Direct Investment Incentive Policies. Paris: OECD  
 
Official Journal of the European Union. 2011. “Council Decision of March 31, 2011 on 
 Amending and Extending the period of Application of Decision 2007/641/EC” 
 
O’Neal, John R. 1994. “The Affinity of Foreign Investors for Authoritarian Regimes” Political 
 Research Quarterly 47 (3): 565-588. 
 
Oppermann, Martin. 1993. “Tourism Space in Developing Countries” Annals of Tourism 
 Research 20 (3): 535-556. 
 
Ospina, Guillermo Andres. 2006. “War and Ecotourism in the National Parks of Colombia: 
 Some Reflections on the Public Risk and Adventure” International Journal of Tourism 
 Research 8: 241-246. 
 
Otago Daily Times Online. June 23, 2010. “Bridgecorp Receivers Stymied by Fiji Move” at 
 http://www.odt.co.nz/news/business/112199/bridgecorp-receivers-stymied-fiji-move 
 (accessed May, 17 2011). 
 
Oxfam. 2005. “The Fijian Sugar Industry: Investing in Sustainable Technology” Oxfam Briefing 
 Paper 1-62. 
 
----------2004. “An End to EU Sugar Dumping: Implications of the Interim WTO Ruling in the 
 Dispute Against EU Sugar Policies brought by Brazil, Thailand and Australia” at 
 http://www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/policy/trade/downloads/bn_eu_sugar_dumping.pdf 
 (accessed June 28, 2011). 
 
----------2003. The Fiji Garment Industry. Auckland: Oxfam Publications. 
 
Park, Minkyung. 2011. “Casino Gaming and Crime: Comparisons among Gaming Counties and 
 Other Tourism Places” Journal of Travel Research  50 (3): 289-302 
 
Pearce, Douglas G. 2001. “An Integrative Framework for Urban Tourism Research” Annals of 
 Tourism Research 28 (4): 926-946. 
 
----------1984. “Planning for Tourism in Belize” Geographical Review 74 (3): 291-303. 
 
Pearce, Philip L. 1982. The Social Psychology of Tourist Behavior Oxford: Pergamon Press. 
Peattie, Sue, Philip Clarke and Ken Peattie. 2005. “Risk and Responsibility in Tourism: 
 Promoting Sun-safety.” Tourism Management 26: 399–408 
  189 
Pelton, Robert Young. 2000.  The Worlds Most Dangerous Places 4th ed. New York: Harper 
 Collins. 
Peters, Guy P. Jon Pierre and Desmond King. 2005. “The Politics of Path Dependency: Political 
 Conflict in Historical Institutionalism” The Journal of Politics 67 (4): 1275-1300. 
 
Pirotte, Claire., Bernard Husson and François Grunewald. Editors. 1999. Responding to 
 Emergencies and Fostering Development; The Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid translated 
 by Julia Monod-Robinson. New York: Zed Books. 
 
Pizam, Abraham. 1982. “Tourism and Crime: Is There a Relationship?” Journal of Travel 
 Research 20 (3): 7-10 
 
Plischke, Elmer. 1977. Microstates in World Affairs: Policy Problems and Options. Washington 
 D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. 
 
Poirine, Bernard. 1998. “Should we Love or Hate MIRAB?” The Contemporary Pacific 10 (1): 
 65-106. 
 
Porter, Michael E. 2008. “The Five Competitive Forces that Shape Strategies” Harvard Business 
 Review  25-40. 
 
Powell, Nicholas. February 15, 1995. "Bid to Hold Back TV's Transatlantic Tide" The Herald 
 (Glasgow) 16: 12. 
 
Prasad, Biman Chand., Yenteshwar Ram and Ariel Marr. 2009. “The Future of the Fijian 
 Garment Industry” In Trade and Poverty Reduction in the Asia-Pacific Region Edited by 
 Andrew L. Stoler., Jim Redden and Lee Ann Jackson. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
 Press. 
 
Prasad, Biman Chand and J. Asalu-Adjaye. 1998. “Macroeconomic Policy and Poverty in  
Fiji” Pacific Economic Bulletin 13: 47-56. 
 
Prideaux, Bruce., Eric Laws and Bill Faulkner. 2003. “Events in Indonesia: Exploring the Limits 
 to Formal Tourism Trends Forecasting Methods in Complex Crisis Situations” Tourism 
 Management 24: 475-487. 
 
Quester, George H. 1983. “Trouble in the Islands: Defending the Microstates” International 
 Security 8 (2): 160-175. 
 
Radio Australia. July 16, 2009. “Samoa's PM Wants Tougher Action Against Fiji” at 
 http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/pacbeat/stories/200907/s2628104.htm (accessed October 
 19, 2011). 
 
Ragin, Charles C. 2004. “Turning the Tables: How Case-Oriented Research Challenges  
  190 
Variable-Oriented Research” In Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared 
Standards, edited by Henry E. Brady and David Collier. Lanham: Rowan and Littlefield 
Publishers. 
 
---------1994. Constructing Social Research: The Unity and Diversity of Method. Thousand 
 Oaks: Pine Forge Press. 
 
Rao, Maheshwar. 2002. “Challenges and Issues for Tourism in the South Pacific Island States: 
 The Case of the Fiji Islands” Tourism Economics 8 (4): 408-429. 
 
Ratuva, Steven (2008) “Un-Neighborly Neighbors” Fiji Times (Tuesday December 30).   
 
Ravuvu, Asesela. 1992. “Culture and Traditions: Implications for Modern Nation Building” in 
 Culture and Democracy in the South Pacific edited by Ron Crocombe, Uentabo Neemia, 
 Asesela Ravuvu and Werner vom Busch. Suva: University of the South Pacific. 
 
Reddy, Mahendra. 2003.  “Farm Productivity, Efficiency and Profitability in Fiji’s Sugar  
Industry” Fijian Studies 1 (2)  
 
Reddy, Narendra. 2003. “Survival Strategies for the Fiji Sugar Industry” Fijian Studies 1  
(2): 265-285. 
 
Reilly, Benjamin. 2006. Democracy and Diversity: Political Engineering in the Asia-Pacific. 
 Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
---------2004. “State Functioning and State Failure in the South Pacific” Australian Journal of 
 International Affairs 58 (4): 479-493. 
 
---------2000. “The Africanization of the South Pacific” Australian Journal of International 
 Affairs 54 (3): 261-268. 
 
Richter, Linda K. 1989. The Politics of Tourism in Asia Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. 
 
Ritchie, Brent. 2004. “Chaos, Crises and Disasters: A Strategic Approach to Crisis Management 
 in the Tourism Industry” Tourism Management 25: 669-683. 
 
Rittichainuwat, Bongkosh Ngamsom and Goutam Chakraborty. 2009. “Perceived travel risks 
 regarding terrorism and disease: The case of Thailand.” Tourism Management 30: 410- 
 418. 
 
Robertson, Robbie. 2006. “Fiji Futuring: Connectivity and Development” Pacific Economic 
 Bulletin 21 (2): 22-35. 
 
Robertson, Robert T. and Akosita Tamanisau. 1988. Fiji: Shattered Coups Sydney: Pluto Press 
 
 
  191 
Rolfe, Jim. 2006. “Beyond Cooperation: Towards an Oceanic Community” Australian  
Journal of International Affairs 60 (1): 83-101. 
 
Romeril, Michael. 1989. “Tourism and the Environment-Accord or Discord?” Tourism 
 Management (September): 204-208. 
 
Rosentraub, Mark S. and Mijin Joo. 2009. “Tourism and Economic Development: Which  
Investments Produce Gains for Regions?” Tourism Management 30: 759-770. 
 
Rothkopf, David. 1997. "In Praise of Cultural Imperialism?" Foreign Policy 107 (Summer): 38-
 53. 
 
Rowley, Chris and Malcolm Warner. 2007. “The Management of Human Resources in the Asia-
 Pacific: Into the 21
st
 Century” Management Revue 18 (4): 374-391. 
 
Ryan, Chris. 1993. “Crime, Violence, Terrorism and Tourism: An Accidental or Intrinsic
 Relationship?” Tourism Management 14 (3): 173-183. 
 
Sartori, Giovanni. 1970. “Concept Misinformation in Comparative Politics” The American  
Political Science Review 64 (4): 1033-1053. 
 
Sautter, Elise Truly and Birgit Leisen. 1999. “Managing Stakeholders: A Tourism Planning 
 Model” Annals of Tourism Research 26 (2): 312-328. 
 
Scarr, Deryck. 1990. The History of the Pacific Islands. Sydney: Macmillan.1988. Fiji: Politics 
 of Illusion, The Military Coups in Fiji.  Kensignton: New South Wales University Press. 
 
Schellhorn, Matthias. 2010. “Development for Whom? Social Justice and the Business of 
 Ecotourism” Journal of Sustainable Tourism 18 (1): 115-135. 
 
Scheyvens, Regina and Janet H. Momsen. 2008. “Tourism and Poverty Reduction: Issues for 
 Small Island States” Tourism Geographies 10 (1): 22-41. 
 
Schwartz, Ronald David. 1991. “Travelers Under Fire: Tourists in the Tibetan Uprising” Annals 
 of Tourism Research 18: 588-604. 
 
Scott, Rory. 1988. “Managing Crisis in Tourism: A Case Study in Fiji.” Travel and Tourism 
 Analyst 6: 57-71. 
 
Sebele, Lesego S. 2010. “Community-Based Tourism Ventures, Benefits and Challenges: Khama 
 Rhino Sanctuary Trust, Central District, Botswana” Tourism Management 31: 136-146. 
 
Seroma, Lavisai. 1995. “Ecotourism: The Fijian Experience” in Beyond Timber: Social, 
 Economic and Cultural Dimensions of Non-Wood Forest Products in Asia and the 
 Pacific edited by Patrick B. Durst and Ann Bishop. Bangkok: Food and Agriculture 
 Organization Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific (FAO/RAP). 
  192 
Shareef, Riaz and Michael McAleer. 2005. “Modeling International Tourism Demand and 
 Volatility in Small Island Tourism Economies.” International Journal of Tourism 
 Research 7:313-333. 
 
Sharpham, John. 2000. Rabuka of Fiji: The Authorized Biography of Major General Sitiveni 
 Rabuka. Rockhampton: Central Queensland Univ. Press. 
 
Sharpley, Richard, Julia Sharpley and John Adams. 1996. “Travel Advice or Trade Embargo? 
 The Impacts and Implications of Official Travel Advice” Tourism Management 17
 (1): 1-7. 
 
Shaw, Gareth and Allan M. Williams. 2002. (2
nd
 ed.) Critical Issues in Tourism: A Geographical 
 Perspective Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 
 
Simpson, Penny M. and Judy A. Siguaw. 2008. “Perceived Travel Risks: The Traveler 
 Perspective and Manageability.” International Journal of Tourism Research 10: 315-327. 
 
Silver, Ira. 1993. “Marketing Authenticity in Third World Countries” Annals of Tourism 
 Research 20: 302-318. 
 
Sinclair, M. Thea. 1998. “Tourism and Economic Development: A Survey” The Journal of 
 Development Studies 34 (5): 1-51. 
 
Skocpol, Theda. 1995. “Why I am a Historical Institutionalist” Polity. 37 (2):103-106. 
 
Sonak, Sangeeta. 2004. “Ecological Footprint of Production: A Tool to Assess Environmental 
 Impacts of Tourism Activity” The Journal of Tourism Studies 15 (2): 2-12. 
 
Sonmez, Sevil F. 1998. “Tourism, Terrorism and Political Instability” Annals of Tourism 
 Research 25 (2): 416-456. 
 
South, G. Robin., Posa A. Skelton, Joeli Veitayaki, Alan Resture, Clive Carpenter, Craig Pratt 
 and Alena Lawedrau. 2004. “The Global International Waters Assessment for the Pacific 
 Islands: Aspects of Transboundary, Water Shortage and Coastal Fisheries Issues”  Ambio 
 33 (1-2): 98-106. 
 
Southern African Documentation and Cooperation Center (SADOCC). December 17, 2010. 
 “Black Ownership Lacking in Tourism Industry” at 
 http://www.sadocc.at/news/2010/2010-155.shtml (accessed August 22, 2011). 
 
Stoler, Andrew L., Jim Redden and Lee Ann Jackson. Editors. 2009. Trade and Poverty 
 Reduction in the Asia-Pacific Region Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Stone, M and G. Wall. 2004. “Ecotourism and Community Development: Case Studies from 
 Hainan, China” Environmental Management 33: 12-24. 
 
  193 
Storey, Donovan and Warwick Murray. 2001. “Dilemmas of Development in Oceania:  
The Political Economy of the Tongan Agro-Export Sector” The Geographical Journal 
167 (4): 291-304. 
 
Stronza, Amanda. 2001. “Anthropology of Tourism: Forging New Ground for Ecotourism and 
 Other Alternatives” Annual Review of Anthropology 30: 261-283. 
 
Sturton, Mark and Andrew McGregor. 1991. Fiji: Economic Adjustment 1987-91. Honolulu: 
 East-West Center. 
 
Sutherland, William. 1992. Beyond the Politics of Race: An Alternative History of Fiji to  
1992. Canberra: Australian National Univ. Press. 
 
Szivas, Edith., Michael Riley and David Airey. 2003. “Labor Mobility into Tourism: Attraction 
 and Satisfaction” Annals of Tourism Research 30 (1): 64-76. 
 
Szivas, Edith and Michael Riley. 1999. “Tourism Employment in Conditions of Economic 
 Transition: The Case of Hungary” Annals of Tourism Research 26: 747-771. 
 
Tasci, Asli D. A. and Yasin Boylu. 2010 “Cultural Comparison of Tourists’ Safety Perception in 
 Relation to Trip Satisfaction.” International Journal of Tourism Research 12:179-192. 
 
Taylor, John P. 2001. “Authenticity and Sincerity in Tourism” Annals of Tourism Research 28 
 (1): 7-26. 
 
Teye, Victor B. 1988. “Coups D’état and African Tourism: A Study of Ghana” Annals of 
 Tourism Research 15: 329-356. 
 
The Age (Australia). September 9, 2011. “Fiji Remains an Outcast in Pacific” at 
 http://www.theage.com.au/world/fiji-remains-an-outcast-in-pacific-20110908-1jzte.html 
 (accessed October 19, 2011). 
 
The Australian. November 9, 2009. “Coup Culture 'Risks Starving People of Fiji'” at 
 http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/nation/coup-culture-risks-starving-people-of-
 fiji/story-e6frg6nf-1225795565541 (accessed October 19, 2011). 
 
---------May 19, 2009. “EU Backs Away from Fiji Sugar Support” at 
 http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/eu-backs-away-from-fiji-sugar-support/story-
 e6frg6sx-1225713297817 (accessed May 18, 2011). 
 
The Gleaner (Jamaica). October 25, 2009. “Foreign Investors Edge Out Jamaicans in Tourism 
 Ownership, Local Share Falls to 40 per cent” at http://jamaica-
 gleaner.com/gleaner/20091025/business/business4.html (accessed August 22, 2011). 
 
  194 
The Telegraph. March 31, 2011. “Thailand Floods: Stranded Tourists Criticize Lack of 
 Information” at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/travelnews/8418356/Thailand-floods-
 stranded-tourists-criticise-lack-of-information.html (accessed June 4, 2011). 
 
Thomas, Frank R.  2002. “Self-Reliance in Kiribati: Contrasting Views of Agricultural  
and Fisheries Production” The Geographical Journal 168 (2): 163-177. 
 
Thomas, June Manning. 1980. “The Impact of Corporate Tourism on Gullah Blacks: Notes on 
 Issues of Employment” Phylon 41 (1): 1-11. 
 
Thomas, Kenneth P. 2000. Competing for Capital: Europe and North America in a Global Era. 
 Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press. 
 
----------2007. Investment Incentives: Growing Use, Uncertain Benefits, Uneven Controls, An 
 Exploration of Government Measures to Attract Investment. Winnipeg: International 
 Institute for Sustainable Development. 
 
Thomas, Nicholas (1990) “Regional Politics, Ethnicity and Custom in Fiji” The Contemporary 
 Pacific 2 (1): 131-146. 
 
Time Magazine. December 11, 1995. “We Are Not An Average Nation: An Exclusive Talk With 
 Jacque Chirac" Interview Section: 59. 
 
Treloar, Peter and C. Michael Hall. 2005. “Tourism in the Pacific Islands” In Oceania: A  
 Tourism Handbook. Edited by Chris Cooper and C. Michael Hall. Clevedon: Channel 
 View Publications. 
 
Tucker, Hazel. 2001. “Tourists and Troglodytes: Negotiating for Sustainability” Annals of 
 Tourism Research 28 (4): 868-891. 
 
Turnbull, J. 2003. “South Pacific Agendas in the Quest to Protect Natural Areas” Development 
 and Change 34 (1): 1-24. 
 
UN. 1982. Transnational Corporations in International Tourism New York: United Nations 
 
UNCTAD. 2008. FDI and Tourism: The Development Dimension, East and Southern Africa 
 New York: United Nations Publications. 
 
UNEP and CI. 2003. Tourism and Biodiversity: Mapping Tourism’s Global Footprint at 
 http://www.unep.fr/shared/publications/pdf/WEBx0016xPA-TourismFootprint.pdf 
 (accessed August 10, 2010). 
 
UN ESCAP. 2003. Ecotourism Development in the Pacific Islands: Economic and Social 
 Commission for Asia and the Pacific Tourism Review No. 23. New York: United Nations 
 Publications. 
 
  195 
UNESCO. 2008. Sustainable Development-A Pacific Islands Perspective: A Report on Follow 
 up to the Mauritius 2005 Review of the Barbados Program of Action Apia: UNESCO 
 
UNESCO. 1976. “The Effects of Tourism on Socio-Cultural Values” Annals of Tourism 
 Research 4 (2): 74-105. 
 
UNITAR (United Nations Institute for Training and Research). 1971. Small States and 
 Territories: Status and Problems New York: Arno Press. 
 
UNWTO. 2004. Tourism and Poverty Alleviation: Recommendations for Action. Madrid: World 
 Tourism Organization. 
 
Uriely, Natan, Darya Maoz and Arie Reichel. 2007. “Rationalizing Terror-related Risks: The 
 Case of Israeli Tourists in Sinai.” International Journal of Tourism Research 9: 1-8. 
 
Utah Division of Travel Development. 1997. Tourism and Jobs in Utah: A Quantitative and 
 Qualitative Analysis, Executive Summary and Conclusions Salt Lake: University of Utah 
 Bureau of Economic and Business Research at 
 http://travel.utah.gov/research_and_planning/special_reports/documents/BEBRWageStud
 y.PDF (accessed October 11, 2011) 
 
Valentine, Peter S. 1993. “Ecotourism and Nature Conservation: A Definition with some Recent 
 Developments in Micronesia” Tourism Management 14 (2): 107-115. 
 
Van Fossen, Anthony B. 2003. “Money Laundering, Global Financial Instability and Tax Havens 
 in the Pacific Islands” The Contemporary Pacific 15 (2): 237-275. 
 
---------1987. “Two Military Coups in Fiji” Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 19 (4): 19-31. 
 
Vayrynen, Raimo. 1971. “On the Definition and Measurement of Small Power Status” 
 Cooperation and Conflict 6 (1): 91-102. 
 
Vassiliou, George. 1995. “Tourism and Sustainable Development, Lessons from the  
Cyprus Experience” In Small Islands, Big Issues: Crucial Issues in the Sustainable 
Development of Small Developing Islands. Helsinki: UNU/World Institute for 
Development Economics Research. 
 
Voorend, Koen. 2005. “ACP and the EU Stronghold: The Sweet Sugar Deal” at 
 http://www.acp-eu-trade.org/library/files/Voorend-Koen_EN_18012005_ACP-and-the-
 Sweet-EU-Stronghold-The-Value-of-the-Sugar-Protocol.pdf (accessed May 25, 2011). 
 
Wainwright, Elsina. 2003. “Responding to State Failure-The Case of Australia and Solomon 
 Islands” Australian Journal of International Affairs 57 (3): 485-498. 
 
Walmsley, D. J., R. M. Boskovic and J.J. Pigram. 1981. Tourism and Crime Armidale: 
 University of New England, New South Wales, Australia. 
  196 
Wang, Ning. 1999. “Rethinking Authenticity in Tourism Experience” Annals of Tourism 
 Research 26 (2): 349-370. 
 
Wang, Yu-Shan. 2009. “The impact of crisis events and macroeconomic activity on Taiwan’s 
 international inbound tourism demand” Tourism Management 30:75-82. 
 
Waqaisavou, Timoci. 1999. “Parks, Reserves and Tourism: The Fiji Experience” The Journal of 
 Pacific Studies 23 (1): 91-109. 
 
Ward, Gerard R. 1989. “Earths Empty Quarter: The Pacific Islands in the Pacific  
Century” The Geographical Journal 155 (2): 235-246. 
 
Ware, Helen. 2005. “Demography, Migration and Conflict in the Pacific” Journal of  
Peace Research 42 (4): 435-454. 
 
Warrington, Edward. 1994. “A Capacity for Policy Management: Re-Appraising the  
Context in Microstates” Asian Journal of Public Administration 16 (1): 109-133. 
 
Watson, G. Llewellyn and Joseph P. Kopachevsky. 1994. “Interpretations of Tourism as 
 Commodity” Annals of Tourism Research 21 (3): 643-660.  
 
Weaver, David. 2010. “Indigenous Tourism Stages and their Implications for Sustainability” 
 Journal of Sustainable Tourism 18 (1): 43-60. 
 
Wen,Y., G. Huimin and R.R. Kavanaugh. 2005. “The Impact of SARS on the Consumer  
Behaviour of Chinese Domestic Tourists, Current Issues in Tourism 8 (1): 22-38.  
 
Wilkinson, Paul F. 1989. “Strategies for Tourism in Island Microstates” Annals of Tourism 
 Research 16 (2): 153-177. 
 
Williams, Allan M. and Armando Montanari. 1999. “Sustainability and Self-regulation: Critical 
 Perspectives' Tourism Geographies 1 (1): 26–40. 
 
Winslow, Donna. 1991-1992. “Sustainable Development in New Caledonia” Pacific Affairs 64 
 (4): 489-505. 
 
Wong, Jehn-Yih and Ching Yeh. 2009. “Tourist Hesitation in Destination Decision Making.” 
 Annals of Tourism Research 36(1):6-23. 
 
World Health Organization (WHO) and UNICEF. 2010. Progress on Sanitation and Drinking-
 Water: 2010 Update  Geneva: WHO Press. 
 
World Tourism Organization (WTO). 2001. Global Code of Ethics for Tourism at 
 http://www.unep.org/bpsp/Tourism/WTO%20Code%20of%20Conduct.pdf (accessed 
 May 15, 2011). 
 
  197 
Wrage, Alexandra Addison. 2007. Bribery and Extortion: Undermining Business, Governments, 
 and Security. Westport: Praeger Security International. 
 
Wu, Chung-Tong. 1982. “Issues of Tourism and Socioeconomic Development” Annals of 
 Tourism Research 9:317-330. 
 
Yang, Li. 2011. “Ethnic Tourism and Cultural Representation” Annals of Tourism Research 38 
 (2): 561-585. 
 
Yin, Robert K. 2003. Case Study Research: Design and Methods. Thousand Oaks: Sage  
Publications. 
 
Yuksel, Atila and Fisun Yuksel. 2007. “Shopping risk perceptions: Effects on tourists’ emotions, 
 satisfaction and expressed loyalty intentions.” Tourism Management 28:703-713. 
 
Zurick, David N. 1992. “Adventure Travel and Sustainable Tourism in the Peripheral Economy 
 of Nepal” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 82 (4): 608-628. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
